PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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THE SOVIET UNION

Economic Problems

Keith Bush • *Harold J. Noah*

The Political System

Merle Fainsod • *Arrigo Levi*

EASTERN EUROPE

Poland: *Michael Gamarnikow*

The GDR: *Ilse Spittmann*

SPECIAL BOOK SECTION

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Politics in Flux: IV

EDITORS' NOTE: The political situation in Poland, as the heroine of Alice in Wonderland might say, is becoming "curiouser and curiouser." As the intoxicating victories of 1956 are gradually being replaced by a mixture of narrow-minded chauvinism, cultural stagnation and economic immobilism, Poland's politics seem to be as animated as in the past. Yet, as Mr. Gamarnikow points out, this political restiveness is confined almost exclusively to the ruling party. Within it, the spectrum runs from unadulterated Stalinism cum *antisemitism at one end to social democratic revisionism at the other. Poland's neighbor to the west, however, is not one to suffer from* Polnische Ordnung: *After a brief spell of liberalism, the GDR's traditional Teutonic-Stalinist pattern has reasserted itself, as much within the party as in the country at large. But not entirely: As shown in Miss Spittman's article, the period of relative liberalism, however short-lived, has left an imprint on the political atmosphere of the country. The regime no longer relies on massive terror alone, and the population is no longer as cowed and atomized as it was in the days of Stalin. Similarly, it is clear that Poland's version ofpolitical pluralism cannot forever be limited to intra-party factionalism. Politics in both Poland and East Germany is as much in a state of flux as it is in all the onetime East European satellites of the USSR.*

Poland: Political Pluralism in a One-Party State

By Michael Gamarnikow

One cold day in February 1966, an Albanian citizen named Mehmet Servetka arrived at the Polish-Czechoslovak border in Zebrzydowice aboard the Paris-bound express. He flashed his diplomatic passport at the unsuspecting border guards, who, after a perfunctory perusal, saluted and left him alone in his reserved compartment. Only a few days later, when another Albanian diplomat, whose passport also bore the name of Mehmet Servetka, boarded a Tirana-bound plane at the Okecie Airport near Warsaw, did the Polish authorities begin to wonder. An investigation soon disclosed that while the air-borne traveler was an authentic

Mr. Gamarnikow, who is on the staff of Radio Free Europe (Munich), has written extensively on political and economic affairs in Poland. This is his first contribution to Problems of Communism.

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member of the Albanian diplomatic service, the train passenger was no other than Kazimierz Mijal, a former member of the Polish Central Committee and the acknowledged head of the anti-Gomulka Stalinist underground in Poland.[1] Although the name on his passport was false, the document itself was authentic enough. It was issued to Mijal by his good friend Koco Prifti, the Albanian ambassador in Warsaw, in whose house Gomulka's arch-opponent was a frequent and honored guest. The ambassador was promptly declared *persona non grata* for "helping a Polish citizen to leave Poland illegally" and departed from Warsaw in disgrace a few days later.

But the political harm was already done. Mijal soon turned up in Tirana as the General Secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP).[2] According to some press reports, he was later joined there by his two close associates, Wiktor Klosiewicz and Stanislaw Lapot. Very soon Radio Tirana began to broadcast regularly Mijal's vitriolic attacks against the "usurper traitor's clique headed by Gomulka and his revisionist cohorts"[3] as well as open appeals for the overthrow of the regime.[4] A few excerpts from a recent broadcast will give the reader an idea of the style of Mijal's propaganda:

Today, no honest Pole can be found who cannot see the progressive rotting of Polish society, poisoning the social conscience and eliminating the old moral and ideological values which determine the vital force of the nation. . . . The demoralization of youth is intentionally organized by the ruling clique. The bases of the biological existence of the nation are threatened. Therefore, the fight in defense of socialism for the victory of Communist ideas, the fight against traitors and bourgeois agents, carried out by the Communist Party of Poland, is the fight for the most vital interests of the Polish nation. Gomulka-ites and Zionists, in their vain attempts to retain power, use the security apparatus as a tool of terror against the Communists. In this way they tend to transform the apparatus into the tool of counter-revolution, the weapon of reaction and the bourgeoisie. . . . All guilty of this crime will be severely punished in accordance with the revolutionary laws of the proletarian dictatorship, and in the near future they will face the revolutionary people's tribunal. . . . We appear to all Communists in the ranks of the security apparatus to be united in the struggle against revisionism, imperialism and its agents in our country. Put up resistance against the criminal plans of Gomulka-ites and the Zionist agency of traitors.[5]

Neo-Stalinism

All this is highly reminiscent of a recent crop of revolutionary manifestos of various "true Marxist" parties which seem to flourish in the backwaters of the Sino-Soviet conflict. But unlike most such groups, the neo Stalinist underground in Poland is a real political force with some genuine grass-roots support among the hard-line elements in the Communist party apparatus.[6] It began to act as an organized pressure group long before the Peking-Moscow conflict broke into the open. In fact, its political activity started as soon as Gomulka came to power, when Mijal himself and his henchmen Lapot and Klosiewicz were still top-level members of the ruling elite.[7]

By early 1957 Mijal was already producing anti-Gomulka propaganda and has since become an inveterate pamphleteer.[8] His major "masterpiece" was a 90-page political manifesto, *In Struggle—Victory! In Drift and Silence—Defeat!*, which was widely distributed throughout Poland in the winter of 1964. The pamphlet was allegedly mimeographed on the duplicating machine of the State Investment Bank in Warsaw, of which Mijal was the managing director at the time. The wide circulation of this vitriolic denunciation of "Gomulka's neo-capitalism" created a major political scandal. Yet the reaction of the party leadership was surprisingly mild. Mijal, Lapot and Klosiewicz were dismissed from their politically non-sensitive sinecures and temporarily placed under house ar-

[1] The story of how Mijal (alias Mehmet Servetka) escaped from Poland was published in the Polish press only a year after the event. Cf. "S.K.," "Podwojne zycie Servetka Mehmetki" ("The Double Life of Mehmet Servetka"), *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), February 5, 1967.

[2] KPP (*Komunistyczna Partia Polski*) was the name of the prewar Polish Communist Party. In 1938 Stalin dissolved it on the grounds that it had become infiltrated by agents of the Polish police, and all its leaders, then in the Soviet Union, were liquidated. The present Communist Party in Poland (reconstituted in 1942) bears the name of PZPR (Polska Zjednoczana Partia Robotnicza)—Polish United Workers' Party.

[3] Radio Tirana in Polish, April 22, 1967.

[4] *Ibid.*, April 18, 1967.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] For a fuller account of Mijal's group activity in 1957-1964, see J. Nowak, "The Stalinist Underground in Poland," *East Europe* (New York), March 1965.

[7] Mijal himself was the Minister of Communal Economy until February 1957, and a member of the Central Committee until March 1959. Lapot was a deputy-prime minister until October 1956 and a member of the Central Committee until March 1959. Klosiewicz was the head of Polish Trade Unions until November 1956. He was expelled from the Central Committee in March 1958.

[8] In January 1957, a leaflet condemning Gomulka's policies and known as "Mijal's open letter" was freely circulating in Warsaw. Mijal was also believed to be the author of a 54-page anti-Gomulka pamphlet addressed to "Communist Comrades," signed "Jan Kos" and distributed throughout Poland in early summer of 1957. (*Trybuna ludu*, Warsaw, November 13, 1957.

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rest, but they were not even expelled from the party. A few months later at the PZPR Congress in June 1964, Gomulka's spokesmen deliberately played down the political stature of his opponents, dismissing them as a "small group" without any political significance.

But are they? Anybody who is familiar with the conditions prevailing in a Communist country must realize that a handful of dissidents cannot carry out open political propaganda, much less publish and distribute tens of thousands of copies of a 90-page pamphlet, without having a widespread network of dedicated followers and sympathizers and—perhaps more important—the protection of trusted friends in positions of power. How did it happen, for instance, that Mijal's activity escaped the attention of the ubiquitous secret police? Is it conceivable that he could have operated under their very noses without their being aware of it? Furthermore, how could such a well-known personality, who, by all rules of the political game, ought to have been under constant secret police surveillance, leave the country so easily—even if a friendly Albanian ambassador did supply him with a fictitious diplomatic passport?

All this leads to one simple conclusion. Mijal and his known associates may be merely a small lunatic fringe of the dogmatist elements within the Polish Communist movement. Their political ideas may be ridiculous, demagogic and hopelessly out of touch with reality. But in real political terms they are merely the visible tip of a neo-Stalinist iceberg. Mijal's political pamphleteering was tolerated (if not aided and abetted) by hardliners still in positions of power because it served a useful political purpose. His abusive and demagogic attacks on Gomulka appealed to the self-serving instincts of the still predominantly dogmatic party apparatus, and at the same time focused the responsibility for Poland's indisputable economic and social shortcomings on Gomulka's "revisionist" policies. It was not only that Mijal was stating publicly what Gomulka's more sophisticated hard-line opponents were thinking in private. Far more important was the fact that this aggressive propaganda continually undermined the political positions of the leadership—and thus, in objective terms (in which all Marxist-Leninists are trained to think), increased the prospect of a takeover by the pseudo-loyalist dogmatic elements.

Mijal's political program amounts essentially to a restoration of the pre-Gomulka status quo. His propaganda glorifies the Stalinist era in Poland and eulogizes Stalin personally. It demands a return to the fully centralized Communist economy, an immediate resumption of collectivization, the revival of class struggle, and the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[9] In addition, it is violently antisemitic: his "party's" political manifesto devotes a whole chapter to an attack on "the Zionist-Trotskyite conspiracy . . . which wants to establish the rule of the tiny Jewish minority over the 30-million-strong Polish nation."[10] Finally, it promises higher wages to the workers and demands the return of the eastern sectors of Poland that are now a part of the Soviet Union.[11]

In the Polish political spectrum Mijal and his followers are merely the irreconcilable ultras of the dogmatic wing. But the really strong point of their flow of propaganda is their constant harping on Poland's economic troubles, which indeed are the Achilles' heel of the Gomulka regime. Those portions of the KPP manifesto and its daily radio broadcasts that deal with economic stagnation, growing unemployment, and declining living standards cannot help but have a political impact. Ironically—but not too curiously—the KPP line in this connection is almost identical with the attacks directed against the party leadership by opposition groups in the revisionist wing of the Polish Communist movement, to which we shall now turn.

The Revisionists

In contrast to the dogmatists, who—apart from Mijal and his followers—were able to create other well-organized and cohesive political pressure groups within the ruling party elite (of which more below), the revisionist wing in Poland is at present politically unorganized and ideologically atomized. Its sole strength lies in the intellectual caliber of its individual members and the general support it gets from the vast majority of university students and the younger members of the intellectual class. The only common ties among these people are the fear of a dogmatic takeover, the

[9] "Pod sztandarem Marksizmu-Leninizmu do walki o socjalizm" ("Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism onward to the struggle for socialism"), programmatic statement of the provisional Committee of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), published in French translation in the Belgian (pro-Peking) Communist weekly *La Voix du Peuple* (Brussels), March 25, 1966.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.* The KPP also circulated a leaflet showing a map of Poland, stretching from the Oder-Neisse border to a point east of Kiev and bearing the caption: "We guarantee you such a Poland."

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desire for greater intellectual freedom, and a keen realization of the shortcomings of the present regime. What one finds in the revisionist wing, then, is a number of small, isolated groups who are greatly disillusioned with the Polish reality and who are searching for alternative ideological, political and economic solutions that are both "socialist" and democratic.

A typical example is the Kuron-Modzelewski group, whose political creed is now available in the West in published form.[12] This group is by no means unique; evidence shows that other clandestine intellectual conspiracies are politically active in Poland. They are all essentially socialist (although not necessarily Marxist) in their outlook, all highly critical of official party policies and current conditions in Poland, and all at work on alternative political programs. If this article deals more extensively with the Kuron-Modzelewski group, it is only because its political thinking has been set forth in print and can be legitimately examined in more detail.

First, a few words about the leaders of this group. In November 1964, two young assistant lecturers in the History Department of Warsaw University, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski (as well as several other people from the intellectual milieu) were arrested by Polish security organs. During the search of Kuron's apartment, the police confiscated among other papers a 128-page draft of a political document containing a damning critique of political, economic and social conditions in Poland. All the arrested were soon released, but disciplinary proceedings were started against them by the Rector of Warsaw University. In addition, Kuron and Modzelewski were expelled from the party.

A few months later, Kuron and Modzelewski circulated an "Open Letter" to members of the party organization (PZPR) and the Socialist Youth Organization (ZMS) at Warsaw University, in which they explained their political stand and outlined their ideological thinking. For this they were again arrested in March 1966 (as they had anticipated in the text of the "Open Letter") and jailed for "preparing and distributing materials . . . detrimental to the interests of the Polish state."[13]

Critique from the Left

The "Open Letter" of Kuron and Modzelewski is a fascinating political document. Applying the standard technique of Marxist analysis to contemporary Polish conditions, the authors argue convincingly that Poland is ruled in an arbitrary and

[12] J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski: "List otwarty do czlonkow podstawowej organizacji partyjnej PZPR i czlonkow uczelnianej organizacji ZMS przy Uniwersytecie Warszawskim" (An open letter to the members of the basic party organization of the PZPR and the members of the university organization of the USY (Union of Socialist Youth) at Warsaw University," published by Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1966.

Szpilki
„PRAWDZIWA CNOTA KRYTYK SIĘ NIE BOI" (KRASICKI)
Nr 44 (1316) ● Rok XXXII ● Cena zł 2.50 ● 30. X. 1966 r.
— A bo to moje?
— A bo to moje!
MAGAZYN
— A bo to moje?
— A bo to moje?
rys. Jerzy Flisak

A Comment on Contemporary Polish Morality

The speakers in this sequence (representing a bureaucrat, a storehouse guard, a farmer, and a father) all voice the refrain, "Is it mine?"

—*From* Szpilki *(Warsaw), Oct. 30, 1966.*

[13] Kuron was sentenced to three years and Modzelewski to three and a half years in jail for "preparing and distributing materials containing false information on the political and socio-economic conditions in Poland, detrimental to the interests of the State." Cf. official PAP release as published in *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), July 20, 1965. As this article was going to press, word was received from Warsaw that Kuron had been released from jail in April after serving two-thirds of his sentence (standard good conduct remission).

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dictatorial manner by a new class, the "central party bureaucracy," which is plunging the country into an ever-deeper economic and social crisis, while at the same time exploiting the workers by appropriating for its own use the surplus value of their labor. The only possible outcome, according to the authors, is a true proletarian revolution, which would destroy the existing system and replace it with a workers' democracy based on a multiparty system and providing full intellectual freedom. Similar antibureaucratic revolutions would immediately be triggered in other Soviet-bloc countries, saving Poland from the fate of Hungary in 1956. At the same time, the argument goes, the organized workers in the West would prevent a "capitalist intervention" against the new revolutionary regime.

The central theme in the political thinking of Kuron and Modzelewski is the problem of why the accepted Marxist solutions have failed to transform Poland (and other Communist-bloc countries) into a workers' democracy and a classless society. Their answer is that the historic task of industrializing an economically backward country required a system of bureaucratic class dictatorship, even though this system was contrary to the specific interests of the working class and other social strata. On the basis of its unique economic position, the ruling group of bureaucrats appropriated a monopoly of political power. With the passage of time, the growing vested interests of this "central party bureaucracy" led it to make increased use of the state apparatus of force to protect its power. Today, it continues to assert absolute political authority, even though its rule became outdated once the stage of "saturation of industry" was reached. The growing contradictions between objective economic conditions and the prevailing political system are—according to Kuron and Modzelewski—the prime causes of both political ferment and growing economic crisis. Production tasks which are set by the bureaucracy are unrelated to the true economic needs of the country and can be realized only at the expense of the standard of living of the working class. This is the classic Marxist formula for a prerevolutionary situation, and it is on this basis that Kuron and Modzelewski justify their prophecy of an anti-bureaucratic revolution.

The postrevolutionary program of Kuron and Modzelewski is perhaps the weakest part of their scheme. Apart from postulating full industrial democracy at the enterprise level (all factories to be operated by workers' councils in a decentralized, socialist market economy) and envisaging a Central Council of Workers' Delegates as a sort of collective economic overlord, they have little to say on how the economy is to be run in the post-revolutionary period. They limit themselves to such generalities as: "Basic decisions relating to the sharing and use of the national income . . . must remain the prerogative of the working class, otherwise it would lose control over the product it has created." Or: "Our economy must become a planned socialist market economy."

In the political sphere, Kuron and Modzelewski advocate a multiparty system (but are against a parliamentary democracy), intellectual freedom, and independence of trade unions. They also want to abolish the political police and the bulk of the regular army ("the instruments of class rule") and replace them with workers' militia. Armed forces are to be limited to small professional units of air force, rocketry and navy.

Thus the political platform of the Kuron-Modzelewski group is a curious mixture of traditional Marxism (inevitable proletarian revolution, albeit one directed against the present party leadership, which will bring about a classless society); "Djilasism" (the concept of the new class, defined here as the "central party bureaucracy"); a strong dose of Trotskyism [14] (attacks on the bureaucratic rule of the party leadership, as contrary to the political and economic interests of the working class); and Anarcho-Syndicalism (the predominant role of workers' delegates in shaping economic policies and ruling the country). It also contains ideas associated with contemporary social democracy, such as the multiparty system and the continued need for trade unions to defend the workers' interests, even after private ownership of the means of production has been abolished. The authors' own background is reflected in their extremely strong stand on the issue of intellectual freedom, while specific Polish conditions are perhaps responsible for their outspoken defense of small peasant farming and their clear rejection of collectivization. The text of the "Open Letter" also expresses some ideas which are politically romantic and utopian.

As noted, Kuron, Modzelewski and their associates form only one of many isolated groups of the revisionist wing in Poland. Their outlook is probably not even representative of revisionist

[14] This is perhaps explained by the fact that a prominent member of the Kuron-Modzelewski group—Ludwik Haas—is a well-known Trotskyite.

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thinking (as Mijal's antisemitic and demagogic diatribes are unrepresentative of the more realistic political platform of the dogmatic elements). Therefore, the political significance of this group should be sought in its motivation, rather than in its proposed solutions.

Political Malaise

While Mijal's propaganda is essentially an expression of nostalgia for the good old days of Stalinism, the "Open Letter" of Kuron and Modzelewski is basically a symptom of the frustration and disillusionment prevailing among the idealistic and intellectual left as the result of the growing gap between the promises of their Marxist faith and the present-day Polish reality. In this sense the thinking of Kuron and Modzelewski does indeed represent their social milieu. The content of the "Open Letter" suggests that the basic political complaint of its authors is not so much the absence of a "workers' democracy" as the lack of intellectual freedom, the absence of any revolutionary ideas within the ruling elite, and the economic plight of the country, the stagnation of living standards, the hopelessness affecting the youth. While for Mijal and his associates poverty, economic inequality and unemployment are simply convenient weapons for anti-Gomulka propaganda, for the intellectual left they are obvious symptoms that something went seriously wrong in the course of "building socialism."

Kuron and especially Modzelewski are also symbolic of the disillusioned intellectual left in another sense. It is a peculiarity of the Polish political situation that the *spiritus movens* of the revisionist rebellion is the second and sometimes even the third generation of the Communist elite—the sons, daughters, granddaughters and grandsons of the early pioneers of Marxism-Leninism in Poland. Karol Modzelewski is a classic example of this phenomenon. His father, Zygmunt Modzelewski, was a pupil of Rosa Luxemburg and a member of the prewar Communist Party of Poland (KPP) from its very beginning in 1918. In People's Poland, Modzelewski senior was, until his death in 1954, a member of the Central Committee and for several years the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His mother, Natalia, is also a lifelong party member. This is the background of the young intellectual, who sees revolution as the only way to overthrow the dictatorial regime his father did so much to establish.

In this attitude of rebellion Modzelewski is by no means alone. Other second and third generation Communists active in revisionist groups include the daughter of Edward Ochab, a Politburo member and the titular President of People's Poland (as Chairman of the State Council); and the son of Roman Zambrowski, for nearly twenty years one of the most powerful members of the Polish Politburo.

The Intellectuals

In essence, however, the Kuron-Modzelewski group and others like them are only the extremist manifestation of a much broader and more significant political phenomenon—the revolt of Polish intellectuals, whose central demand, intellectual freedom, has by now become the precondition for a more fundamental matter—the right to formulate viable political alternatives.

Intellectual ferment has simmered under the surface for many years in Poland. In its initial stages it was predominantly a defensive struggle against the regime's constant infringements on the margin of freedom won in October 1956. It finally broke into the open in March 1964, when 34 of Poland's most prominent intellectuals signed a protest letter to Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz condemning the principle of preventive political censorship and the restrictive cultural policy of the party leadership. The list of signatures read like a "Who's Who" of contemporary Polish literature and science. However, the main political impact of the "letter of 34" lay not in its content (which was quite moderate), nor even in the intellectual prominence of its signatories, but in its revelation that the bonds which unite the intellectual class in Poland are far stronger than those of party allegiance. Although the signers themselves were non-party people, within a few weeks no less than 57 prominent writers in the PZPR openly defied party discipline by expressing solidarity with their protesting fellow intellectuals.[15]

Thereafter, the rebellion of the intellectuals gathered momentum and acquired more definite overtones of political opposition. For a time, the

[15] After the letter of thirty-four became a *cause célèbre* both in Poland and abroad, the regime organized the signing of a counterprotest letter, which fifty-seven prominent writers, all party members of long standing, refused to sign! See K. A. Jelenski, "Gomulka und die Schriftsteller," *Die Weltwoche*, (Zurich), January 15, 1965.

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main center of ferment was the Warsaw branch of the Union of Polish Writers (ZLP). Of special significance were two meetings of this organization held in the spring of 1965. At a meeting on March 29, not only was the cultural policy of the party subjected to violent criticism, but a purely political resolution was proposed demanding: a) abolition of the death penalty, b) abolition of the so-called Small Penal Code of 1946,[16] c) abolition of summary jurisdiction in court proceedings, and d) abolition of preventive censorship.[17]

For purely procedural reasons (the text of the proposal was not made available in advance, as prescribed in the Statute of the Union of Writers), the resolution was not put to a vote immediately, but rather held for action at the next plenary meeting in May. This delay transformed the vote into a real trial of political strength. With ample notice given, the party exerted every possible pressure on the rebellious writers and mobilized its own loyal supporters among the Union members in an all-out attempt to defeat the resolution. All in vain. At the next meeting, held on May 8, 1965, the four demands were formally endorsed by an overwhelming majority.[18]

This act of defiance had, of course, no immediate practical consequences. The party-dominated Main Board of the Union of Polish Writers refused even to submit the Warsaw branch's resolution to the Union Congress, which was held in December 1965. But the basic fact remained that in Warsaw the majority of the party writers had allied themselves with their non-party colleagues to defeat a handful of pro-regime loyalists— and on an issue that was clearly political in nature, to boot.

In the meantime, the center of ferment had shifted to Warsaw University, where—as noted earlier—the Kuron-Modzelewski group and similar intellectual clusters had been operating for some years as part of a loose revisionist community of politically-minded students and young unorthodox scholars.[19] In the spring of 1964, several meetings and demonstrations were staged by dissident students to express support of "the letter of 34." New demonstrations took place after the arrest of Kuron and Modzelewski and again when they were jailed.[20] In effect, the case acted as a catalyst, rallying to the two men's defense all students and young scholars who opposed the party's restrictive cultural and intellectual policies, regardless of how they assessed the political ideas of Kuron and Modzelewski. These protest actions led to reprisals, and several students were suspended or reprimanded.

Young Rebels

The climax of developments came in October 1966. Ironically, the occasion that was to result in an unprecedented escalation of the intellectual revolt was a meeting organized October 21, 1966, under the auspices of the ultraloyalist Union of Socialist Youth, to mark the 10th anniversary of the Gomulka regime. What looked like a safe official celebration was quickly transformed into an open forum for protest, when the main guest speaker—Leszek Kolakowski, Poland's leading Marxist scholar and a professor of Marxist philosophy at Warsaw University—used his keynote speech to contrast the hopes and expectations of October 1956 with the present-day reality.[21] Kolakowski declared that there was no reason to celebrate the anniversary, since there was still no democratic freedom in Poland and political activity remained severely restricted. Listing a substantial number of the demands voiced in 1956 that had not been realized, he charged that the ruling party oligarchy continued to act in an arbitrary and authoritarian manner and paid no proper attention to the just postulates of the population.

[16] The Small Penal Code (Maly Kodeks Karny) was an emergency measure introduced by a special decree in 1946 to provide a quasi-legal basis for the draconic suppression of all "anti-state elements" after the Communist takeover in Poland. Although clearly defined as a temporary emergency measure, it is still being used by the Polish regime to deal with opponents whose "crimes" do not fall within the provisions of the regular Penal Code. The Small Penal Code has been widely applied in court proceedings against rebellious intellectuals such as Kuron and Modzelewski, Wankowicz, Cat-Mackiewicz, and others.

[17] D. Halberstam, *The New York Times*, April 2, 1965.

[18] "Aufsaessige Schriftsteller in Polen," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), May 22, 1965.

[19] From the end of 1959 through the beginning of 1961, a number of well-known hardliners, who had been switched to non-sensitive posts after October 1956, were politically reactivated and reappointed to leading positions in the party leadership and the government. At the same time several of the more "liberal" members of the post-October team were removed from their posts. These personnel changes coincided with a considerable hardening of the official party line, both in the economic and in the cultural field.

[20] D. Halberstam, *The New York Times*, July 29, 1965.

[21] The account of this meeting is based on an eyewitness report of Dr. Peter Raina, a young Indian scholar who was doing his post-graduate research studies at Warsaw University and was present at the meeting. Early in January, Dr. Raina was expelled from Poland. P. K. Raina, "Kolakowski spricht," *Neues Forum* (Vienna), March 1967.

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He also accused the party leaders of disregarding the advice of experts and plunging the country into severe economic difficulties. Finally, he complained bitterly of the lack of intellectual freedom and denounced the harsh and arbitrary use of the Small Penal Code against intellectuals.[22]

Professor Kolakowski's speech was greeted by enthusiastic applause, followed by a heated (if rather one-sided) discussion. Subsequently, a student read aloud the text of a resolution (obviously prepared in advance) charging that "the program of the 8th Plenum [of October 1956] had not been implemented" [23] and posing several specific political demands. The relevant portion of the text read as follows:

It is our firm belief that the ideas of socialism have today been accepted by an overwhelming majority of the people. For this reason, we consider that [the people] should have the right to express publicly differing views concerning the principles of the functioning of socialist democracy in our country. These principles should also be the subject of free discussion in the press. . . . We see no need for the existence of preventive censorship. We are convinced that in a socialist society legal measures promulgated during a state of emergency should not be binding, and in particular that the "decree on especially dangerous offenses during the period of reconstruction of the state" [i.e., the so-called Small Penal Code] should be abrogated.[24]

Another resolution requested the release of Kuron and Modzelewski.[25]

The resolutions submitted to the meeting were greeted by stormy applause. Nobody stood up to speak against them, but the chairman of the meeting nevertheless refused to put them to the vote. The students dispersed quietly, having achieved their political objective.

The reaction of the party authorities was sharp and immediate. The day after the meeting, Professor Kolakowski was expelled from the party, and the university authorities—obviously prodded from above—started disciplinary proceedings against a number of the students who had taken an active part.

Predictably, Kolakowski's fellow intellectuals rallied to his defense. In the second half of November, a group of 22 prominent Polish writers—all of them party members of long standing—signed protest letters to the party leadership deploring Kolakowski's expulsion and demanding his reinstatement.[26] The letters (three in all) called the purge of Kolakowski an open attack on the ideas of humanistic socialism and an attempt to limit the freedom of discussion at party meetings. They also expressed the signatories' anxiety over the lack of respect for the rule of law in Poland and over the regime's restrictive cultural policies. Some of the writers also emphasized their solidarity with Professor Kolakowski's statement that "socialism can and must assimilate democratic pluralism." [27]

The Party vs. the Intellectuals

Despite strong pressure exerted on them by the top party leaders during personal interviews at party headquarters, none of the 22 writers agreed to withdraw his signature. Subsequently, several of them resigned from the party, and a few others were expelled.[28]

Early in December 1966 the Kolakowski affair and the protest letters of the 22 writers were discussed at a special meeting of the basic party organization of the Warsaw branch of the Union of Polish Writers, with Central Committee Secretary Artur Starewicz in attendance.[29] Here, too, the majority of the participants took a stand defending Professor Kolakowski and objecting in strongest possible terms to his expulsion. The meeting was so stormy that Starewicz at one point threatened to have the party unit dissolved.[30]

The same rebellious atmosphere prevailed when the Kolakowski affair was discussed a few days

[22] H. Kamm in *The New York Times*, November 5, 1966.

[23] "The Program of the 8th Plenum" is the official party code name for the reforms introduced after October 1956. It was at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the PZPR's Central Committee (October 19-21, 1956) that Gomulka was elected First Party Secretary and that a number of top dogmatists and Stalinists were dropped from the ruling Politburo. However, most of the liberal reforms were forced upon the new party leadership by popular pressure after the Plenum had ended.

[24] The full text of this resolution was smuggled to the West and subsequently published in the Polish emigre monthly *Kultura* (Paris), Nos. 1-2, 1967.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] H. Kamm, *The New York Times*, December 8, 1967.

[27] Before his formal expulsion from the PZPR, Professor Kolakowski had frequently been in open conflict with the party authorities. In March 1966, Kolakowski was reportedly summoned before the Party Control Commission, where several charges were made against him, such as defending Kuron and Modzelewski and refusing to join in the officially organized anti-Church campaign. He was asked to submit in writing his political "Credo." In this paper Kolakowski elaborated on the thesis that "socialism must assimilate democratic pluralism." (See A. Ross Johnson, "Intellectual Ferment in Poland—1966," *Radio Free Europe Research Papers*, Munich, Jan. 25, 1967.)

[28] B. Margueritte in *Le Monde* (Paris), December 23, 1966.

[29] "Polish Writers Expelled From Party," *The Times* (London), January 20, 1967.

[30] *Ibid.*

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later at a meeting of the basic party organization of Warsaw University. There was another heated and acrimonious discussion, in the course of which a substantial number of professors and senior lecturers (all of them party members) defended the right of Kolakowski to state his dissenting views publicly and openly.[31]

The same type of solidarity was displayed by the Warsaw University campus fraternity with respect to the students involved in the Kolakowski affair. When one of them was threatened with suspension and even expulsion from the University, more than 1000 students and some 150 professors and lecturers signed a petition to the Rector asking for leniency.[32] There was also considerable pressure exerted on those members of the faculty who took part in the disciplinary proceedings, which in the end, for all practical purposes, fizzled out.

So far we have dealt with political groupings which, although generally "socialist" in their outlook, are essentially outside the mainstream of official Communist Party politics and present ideology. The Mijal group represents the ultras of the dogmatic wing and advocates the overthrow of the present party leadership and a drastic reversal of its "revisionist" policies. Intellectual conspiracies—as typified by the Kuron-Modzelewski group—do not preach open revolt, but believe that a true proletarian revolution, directed against the prevailing system of dictatorship of the "central party bureaucracy," is both inevitable and unavoidable. Thus in terms of practical politics, these must be regarded as subversive groups, since the *conditio sine qua non* of implementing their political programs (such as they are) is the overthrow of the existing regime by force. The broad revisionist movement of which Professor Kolakowski and his fellow intellectuals are the prototypes is not, perhaps, subversive in the accepted political sense, since their avowed political aim is not to overthrow the existing system, but to reform it. Yet from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist point of view, the political ideas of such revisionist groups are clearly ideologically subversive, since their essential objectives are incompatible with the principles of the "leading role of the party" and "the dictatorship of the proletariat." These aims have far more in common with the political ideas of the contemporary West European social democrats than with Communist thought—even the diluted ideology of goulash communism.

[31] P. K. Raina, *loc. cit.*
[32] Associated Press dispatch from Warsaw, *The New York Herald Tribune* (Paris), March 24, 1967.



rys. Juliusz Puchalski

— ...a Kowalska na każdy pochód pierwszomajowy ma nowy kapelusz!

EMBOURGEOISEMENT?

—". . . and Mrs. Kowalski gets a new hat for every May Day Parade!"

—From Szpilki (Warsaw), May 1, 1966.

Factionalism Within Bounds

We may now pass on to those pressure groups which have found for themselves an ideologically acceptable, or at least legally tolerated, place in Poland's political spectrum.

As far as the factions active within the PZPR organizational framework are concerned, we may disregard the numerous cliques and coteries which exist solely for the sake of the personal advancement of particular leaders and which have no alternative political concepts to offer. Such pressure groups abound in any political and social system, and no useful purpose will be served by analyzing contemporary Polish manifestations of the phenomenon.

There are, however, two pressure groups within the party structure which merit attention. For, although the leaders of these factions may be primarily motivated by personal ambition and the desire for political power, the groups as such have

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evolved some degree of ideological and organizational cohesion and a semblance of an alternative political and economic program. One of them is the so-called "Partisans," the other is a vaguer group of "Technocrats."

The "Partisans" owe their name to the fact that the hard core of this group and most of its leaders (although by no means all of them) commanded Communist partisan units during World War II. These units were militarily insignificant, but for political and propaganda purposes their feats were subsequently blown up out of all proportion.[33] Indeed it is this "heroic" legend of the Communist resistance movement, carefully and methodically built up by official propaganda over the last 22 years, that provides the main political capital of the Partisans.[34] Other political assets include the relative youth of their leaders; an energetic breed still in their early fifties, they are able to create a favorable public image in contrast to the "tired old men" in the Politburo. Finally, the Partisans have managed to achieve a monopoly of power inside the security apparatus (which is both a source of strength and—at times—a political liability).

For the last three years or so the Partisan group has become the rallying point for all kinds of hardliners (as well as the usual bandwagon opportunists) who, although they are an integral part of the ruling party elite, are highly critical of Gomulka's indecisive leadership and his halfway, compromise-oriented policies.

As the hard core of this rather large coalition, the "Partisans" have become a political pressure group to be reckoned with; not only do they advocate changes in party policy leading to a tightening of the dogmatic screw, but they are constantly on the alert to get their own people into key positions in the party and government apparatus. In addition, the leaders of the Partisans look upon themselves (unfortunately with some justification) as potential successors to the present party leadership. It is presumably in the hope of speeding up this takeover of power that the Partisans have persistently turned a blind eye to the anti-Gomulka activities of Mijal and his associates.

The political program of the Partisans is not easily ascertained except in broad outlines. One reason is that the group (as any faction within the PZPR hierarchy) has no official existence, and its leaders, unlike Mijal or Kuron and Modzelewski, see no reason to put their political thinking on paper; thus their platform is known only through the extensive propagation of their ideas through whispered propaganda and subtle innuendoes. Another reason their program is vague is that, like any pretenders to political power, they attempt to be all things to all men. Although openly anti-semitic in their outlook, they are not beyond cultivating selected influential party dignitaries of Jewish origin. While essentially anti-intellectual —as are all Communist hardliners—they do not hesitate to be effusive to intellectuals in disgrace and to criticize in private (and not always in private) the restrictive cultural policies of the Gomulka regime. Bound more closely to Moscow than perhaps any other faction in the PZPR leadership, they nevertheless play strongly upon popular nationalistic sentiments and advocate (in sub rosa propaganda) a Rumania-like, Poland-first policy. Such crude tactics are, of course, sheer political opportunism, but in the hopeless and frustrated political atmosphere of contemporary Poland, they are quite effective.

What is real and indisputable is the relentless drive of the "partisan group" to secure for their followers any available positions in the bureaucratic apparatus of power, and their utter ruthlessness in eliminating potential political opponents. This step-by-step acquisitive policy is pursued at every level, from grass-roots organizations, through ostensibly non-political positions in the central bureaucratic superstructure, to the top party and government posts. All this adds up to a clever long-term strategy of creating a multitude of vested interests and a broad base of personal allegiance as a substitute for an attractive political platform. It is the only sound strategy open to the Partisan leaders, who, as members of the ruling party oligarchy, cannot either openly advocate alternative political solutions or risk a premature head-on clash with Gomulka and his adherents.

In contrast to this type of strategy, the much more loosely organized group of "Technocrats" bases its political appeal on the promise of sound economic management. The Technocrats exploit

[33] The really significant military force in the Polish resistance movement was the "Armia Krajowa" (Home Army—AK). At its peak it reached the strength of 360,000 organized underground soldiers. "Armia Krajowa" was directly subordinated to the Polish government in exile in London. The minuscule "Armia Ludowa," the armed branch of the Communist Party, did not enter the struggle until 1943 and did not reach its peak strength of some 40,000 men until just before the end of the hostilities.

[34] The emergence of the "Partisans" as a pressure group is well described by H. Kamm in his "Linksruck in Polen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), August 21, 1962, and by Phillipe Ben in *Le Monde* (Paris), September 19, 1962.

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for their own political purposes Poland's economic stagnation by blaming the current state of affairs on the dilettantism of "professional politicians." Their apparent leader (though he may be a figurehead) is Edward Gierek, a Politburo member and the First Party Secretary in Silesia, the administrative region containing one third of Poland's industrial potential. Although a "professional politician" himself, Gierek has somehow acquired renown as an efficient economic administrator.

Chaotic conditions throughout the Polish economy provide the Technocrats with their only (but rather effective) political plank: the claim that the management of the country's economy should be entrusted to "specialists" who know their business. Although they profess to be anti-dogmatic in their attitude to economic problems, they are by no means liberal in their general outlook. They make no promises to the intellectuals, although Gierek himself occasionally produces sympathetic noises about the freedom of creative work.[35] They emphasize the need for tightening labor discipline and are clearly more interested in rational management of the existing industrial potential than in market-oriented economic reforms.

So far as the still clandestine struggle for Gomulka's succession is concerned, there is no direct evidence that the Technocrats are interested in political power as such—although Gierek himself is definitely in the running. Their political objective, as a pressure group representing the specific interests of the managerial class, seems to be limited to ensuring for themselves the right to run the economy without the constant interference of "incompetent" politicians. It is not clear, however, whether this is an ultimate objective or merely an interim goal intended to create a base for the eventual takeover of political power.

Outside the Party

Besides the groups thus far discussed, there are still other powerful political forces in Poland which are perhaps of necessity less active, but potentially far stronger, than the party itself. Here one has to make a fine distinction between real political forces and the puppet political organizations which are licensed to represent their interests and act as their official political representatives.

One example of this subtle distinction is provided by the peasantry. In terms of *Realpolitik;* Polish peasants are a powerful pressure group with very specific political, economic and social interests, which they manage to promote quite effectively. Unlike the other countries of the Moscow bloc, Poland has now returned to the traditional form of small-scale private peasant holdings as the basic agricultural producing unit. Individual peasant holdings in Poland occupy some 85.3 percent of the cultivated land,[36] and comprise about 3.6 million private homesteads.[37] This would be a powerful base for any political party representing the real interests of the peasantry.

There is, of course, no such party in Poland. The Communist-licensed United Peasant Party (ZSL) is nothing more than a faithful satellite of the ruling PZPR. It plays its allotted role in Poland's make-believe "multiparty" system, occupying some 117 seats (out of a total of 460) in the Polish parliament and supplying a Deputy Prime Minister and a few ministers to Poland's "coalition" government. But its political program (to the extent it has any) is a carbon copy of the Communists'.

In contrast, the peasant masses are a real political force. Their political objectives are of necessity limited to getting adequate representation at the lower rungs of local administration. Yet even though they are not represented at higher levels, they are very efficient in forcing through their social and economic group postulates. Broadly speaking their primary concern has been their own self-preservation as a class of agricultural producers engaged in private enterprise. Having forced the reversal of the official policy of mass collectivization in 1956-57, they have since skillfully exploited the regime's dependence on the output of private farming to consolidate their gains. Although lacking effective political leadership (except at the grass-roots level), they have been able (perhaps by sheer instinct) not only to formulate concrete demands, but to evolve sufficient group solidarity to exert pressure on the ruling elite. One has only to observe the gradual evolution of official agrarian policy, from a reluctant permission to dissolve some "uneconomic" kolkhozes to a firm endorsement of private peasant farming as fully compatible with the "socialist reconstruction

[35] See, for instance, Gierek's speech to the journalists in Silesia in *Prasa Polska* (Warsaw), November 1964.

[36] *Rocznik statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Central Statistical Office, 1966, p. 229.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

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of the countryside," [38] to realize how effective this pressure has been.

As the largest social class in Poland, the peasantry not only pursues its own objectives, but also provides the main power base for another political force in Poland—the Catholic Church. As in any predominantly Catholic country, the Church has always played an active role in Polish politics. As a rule, however, the Polish hierarchy has not identified itself closely with any one political party, in the same way, say, as the Italian hierarchy is now associated with the Christian Democrats. Until 1939, the Church had been using its considerable political influence for behind-the-scenes maneuvering. It is only since the Communist takeover that the Catholic Church in Poland has evolved into a cohesive quasi-political force with an identity of its own.

Paradoxical though it may seem, the political base of the Catholic Church in Poland had never been as broad as it is now under the Communist rule. The reasons for this are quite simple. When the remnants of legal political opposition were forcibly liquidated in 1947-48,[39] the Church—although itself under strong pressure—remained as the only major national institution which was not identified in the public mind with an alien regime. Consequently, it became a rallying point for many opponents of the new rulers. Active participation in the ostensibly purely religious activities of the Church became the only legal form of expressing political defiance. Thus even confirmed agnostics began attending mass regularly to demonstrate their opposition to the regime.

Last, but by no means least, in Cardinal Wyszynski the Church has found an able and determined leader, who not only is progressive on social issues, but also possesses a large dose of political acumen. It is enough to compare the political behavior of Cardinal Wyszynski during the crucial period of Polish October with that of, say, Cardinal Mindszenty during the Hungarian Revolution, to realize how much the Catholic Church in Poland owes to the political sagacity of its leader.

Despite periodic administrative harassments and violent anti-hierarchy propaganda campaigns during the last ten years, the Church has been able to preserve its position as the only legal all-national institution which is not subservient to the regime. Indeed, the attacks have proved, if anything, politically counterproductive. No dictatorship can afford to emerge persistently second best from major quasi-political confrontations. True, the Church has lost some political skirmishes and has been forced to yield a number of the purely religious gains which it secured in the early post-October period. Yet it still remains a formidable force. This was clearly demonstrated last year, when the Church and party clashed head-on during the millenium celebrations.

The plan to commemorate the thousandth anniversary of the introduction of Christianity to Poland in 966 originated with the Church. In accordance with this plan, the religious festivities began several years ago, and were supposed to reach their climax in 1966. To steal the Church's thunder, the party oligarchy decided—rather late in the day—to celebrate at the same time the millennial anniversary of Poland's statehood (although Poland existed as a cohesive state organism long before 966). This politically motivated decision resulted in a series of direct State-Church confrontations, with rival festivities held simultaneously in dozens of major towns. Knowing the Church's schedule of its Millenium ceremonies, which had been made public well in advance, the state authorities went out of their way to find a suitable pretext to stage rival celebrations on the same day and in the same locality. Accordingly, attractive public events were arranged to draw people away from the Church-organized Millenium ceremonies. In addition, there was also a great deal of administrative harassment and petty chicanery.

This provocative and diversionary strategy misfired badly. The mass attendance at the Church-sponsored festivities was hardly affected. In many localities the regime had to suffer the indignity of smaller crowds at its own command performances. On the other hand these provocative confrontations visibly increased political tension throughout the country. This led to protest demonstrations and

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[38] M. Mieszczankowski, "Ewolucja charakteru gospodarki chlopskiej w Polsce ludowej" ("Evolution in the character of peasant economy in People's Poland"), *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 5, 1964. See also A. Bodnar, "Socjalizm na wsi" ("Socialism in the countryside"), *Polityka* (Warsaw), May 30, 1964.

[39] Until the end of 1948, some vestiges of political opposition were still tolerated in Poland. The main political force at that time was the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) under the leadership of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. There was also an independent Socialist Party lead by Zygmunt Zulawski and a somewhat larger Polish Socialist Party, infiltrated to some extent—at least at the top echelons—by crypto-Communists and pure opportunists. After falsifying the results of parliamentary elections, held in January 1947, the Communist leadership (then as now under Gomulka) used terroristic tactics to break up the legal opposition parties.

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even riots in many large towns.[40] In Warsaw an angry crowd marched on party headquarters and clashed with a police cordon.[41] In the end the regime decided to withdraw from direct confrontations, although the administrative harassment continued until the end of the Millenium ceremonies.

Despite this impressive show of strength and occasional aggressive tactics pursued by the Church hierarchy, its basic political objective remains that of preservation of the Church as an independent, all-national religious institution, with full prerogatives necessary to fulfill its spiritual mission. But the very fact that the Church's stand on moral, educational, social or even national issues is often in open conflict with the established policies of the Communist regime, inevitably transforms every confrontation into an open clash with strong political undertones.

Catholics—and Catholics

To conclude this survey of political tendencies in contemporary Poland, a few words must also be said about those political groups which profess a Catholic world outlook. There are three of them, none with a following comparable in any way to that enjoyed by the Church proper, but—uniquely in the Communist world—all competing to represent both the Catholic world outlook and the political and social interests and aspirations of the Catholic masses.

One of them—"PAX"—is a rather curious political mixture. Its membership includes the usual diversionary elements, such as "priests—patriots" and other pro-regime Catholic groupings. But it also boasts a substantial number of opportunistic Catholic intellectuals and old-time aristocrats. The organizational framework, however, is provided by a group of former fascists—the faithful followers of "PAX"s leader and chief "ideologue", Boleslaw Piasecki.[42] In real political terms, "PAX" is nothing else but a regime-subsidized diversionary group, which the ruling oligarchy uses time and again as a handy weapon against the Church.

The second group, the so-called Christian-Social Association, is politically negligible, consisting of a small number of former "PAX" members who had broken with this organization after October 1956 for purely opportunistic reasons. The "Christian-Social Association" is tolerated and financed by the regime only because of its potential political value both as a lever against "PAX" and as an additional weapon against the Church.

The third group—"ZNAK"—is qualitatively different. Composed mainly of reputable liberal Catholic intellectuals politically persecuted during the Stalinist period, it came into being on the wave of the October 1956 events as a quasi-official political representation of the Catholic masses, endorsed by the hierarchy. At that time the leaders of the "ZNAK" group were indeed quite close to Cardinal Wyszynski. But ten years of active participation in the regime's politics has levied its toll. Gradually the "ZNAK" group has come to identify itself more and more with the Polish reality and to seek political compromises, even at the price of vital interests of the Church. Their relations with the Church's hierarchy began to deteriorate. Today, the "ZNAK" group is still an entirely different political and ideological quantity from the purely diversionary "PAX". But it pursues its own policies, which are often in open contradiction to the essential objectives of the hierarchy. Some of the "ZNAK" leaders have achieved high state positions and a certain degree of purely personal political influence. But at the same time they have alienated themselves from the mainstream of the Catholic masses. The political significance of the "ZNAK" group is also steadily declining. In the first post-October Parliament, they had eleven deputies, as compared to one for the "Christian-Social Association" and none for "PAX" (which was then in temporary political disgrace). Today there are only five "ZNAK" deputies against three for the "Christian Social Association" and five for "PAX".

However, all these diverse political groups, notwithstanding their potential strength, do not present any immediate political danger to the ruling Gomulka faction. The pro-Chinese Mijalists may be stronger than elsewhere in the bloc, but their hate-Gomulka propaganda has mainly nuisance value. Barring a major upheaval on a bloc-

[40] For instance, the demonstration in Lublin, June 5, 1966. See *Le Monde* (Paris), June 7, 1966; and *The Times* (London), June 2, 1966.

[41] *New York Times*, June 27, 1966.

[42] Boleslaw Piasecki was, before World War II, the leader of a fascist, ultranational political grouping, ONR-FALANGA. During the war this group had some partisan units which were mainly busy liquidating the Jews and the underground Communist and crypto-Communist organizations and personalities. Piasecki fell into Soviet hands and was sentenced to death. But after a long series of talks with the notorious General Serov, he was mysteriously pardoned, and later rehabilitated. In December 1945, he emerged as the leader of "PAX."

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wide scale, Mijal and his associates have no earthly chance to gain power in a state which occupies such a sensitive position between the Soviet Union and East Germany. The Church and the peasantry are essentially self-preserving defensive political forces, and the intellectual revisionist wing is too politically atomized to engage in anything more than ideological guerrilla warfare.

This leaves the "Partisans" and the "Technocrats" as the only real contestants for power. However, the tactics of both those factions are clearly aimed at establishing a power base for the eventual post-Gomulka succession crisis rather than challenging the top leadership at the present time. Both groups play a waiting game, based on the major premise that Gomulka's own political and economic mistakes and his inherent immobility will make a change at the top inevitable.

The success of either of these groups, however, would hardly affect the long-range political trends in Poland. No personal changes in the top leadership are likely to stop the process of ideological disintegration within the party and the political ferment outside it. Neither the dogmatic nationalism of the "Partisans," nor the good-management slogans of the "Technocrats" offer a viable political and ideological alternative to the revisionist ideas of the younger generation of party intellectuals. The more democratic forms of communism, which the isolated intellectual conspiracies are trying to evolve, are not only more consistent with the general trends discernible throughout the bloc, but are also the only solution which could give the ruling elite at least a semblance of popular support. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that sooner or later another October 1956 situation (although not necessarily a quasi-revolutionary one) may arise, in which some elements of the party oligarchy would ally themselves with the revisionist groups among the youth, with the intellectuals, and with other segments of the population in order to take over the apparatus of power and institute a comprehensive program of political and economic reform.

East Germany: The Swinging Pendulum

By Ilse Spittmann

There have been only two major political changes in the German Democratic Republic over the past four years, but of such far-reaching consequences that one may be tempted to think of Pankow as the bellwether of those East European Communist regimes engaged in some type of reform. The first was the advent to power of the liberal wing of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in January 1963; the second, the recapture of power by the conservatives at the 11th Party Plenum in December 1965. Both events were directly linked to the consequences of building the Berlin Wall in 1961.

For many years the East German party leaders believed that the isolation of the GDR from the outside world would enable them to solve their two chief problems: the stabilization of the economy and the disaffection of the population. Actually this policy did produce some results in both areas. The economy began to pull away from its low point

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in 1962, growth was restimulated, and the population, with no reasonable alternative, reached an accommodation with the government.

The core problems remain unresolved, however. The rate of growth continues to lag even behind the scaled-down targets and is totally insufficient to meet the requirements of modernizing productive plant and equipment. Long-range planning has been in deep trouble ever since the first Seven-Year Plan was called off in 1963. The economic reform,[1] despite some surface success, has created more problems than it has solved. Efforts to establish a genuinely uniform system of enterprise management have failed, with the result that the "New Economic System" stumbles from one experiment to another and is constantly fragmented into "subphases." The people endure the regime since they cannot change it, but they do not truly accept it. Perhaps the situation would be different if the political liberalization which initially accompanied the economic reforms had been allowed to continue. But the fact that it was abandoned is characteristic of the GDR, where any relaxation of control risks the erosion of power and automatically produces a return to totalitarian measures.

Brief Moment of Reform

Under the influence of the orthodox-conservatives on the Politburo, who were primarily responsible for the construction of the Wall, the East German regime continued its policy of strict control over every aspect of cultural, economic and political life. It was, as everyone realized, a policy which had been responsible for the economic and moral crisis of 1961, but one which at least kept the political power structure intact. By mid-1962, however, it became obvious that the old philosophy and discipline were merely aggravating the crisis, despite the fact that the Wall had stopped the mass exodus of skilled labor. In desperation, party leader Walter Ulbricht, with Soviet prodding, put the problem into the hands of the reform group within the party, headed by Erich Apel, Central Committee Secretary for Economic Affairs, and Günter Mittag, Director of the Economic Commission of the Politburo, with some support from Willi Stoph, President of the Council of Ministers.

In the months that followed the 6th Party Congress of January 1963, and considerably before the economic reforms were put into effect, the regime substantially reduced coercion, deemphasized ideological indoctrination, and sought to stimulate voluntary cooperation on the part of the population by making concessions to their material needs. Arbitrary arrests ceased, criticism was permitted, and party personnel were instructed to adopt gentler tactics in winning over the population.

Not long after the "new line" had been put into effect, however, a wave of criticism of the conditions so long endured swept over the country with the party as the main target. This was accompanied by a veritable invasion of Western styles, ideas and attitudes which the younger generation quickly adopted. Books and films began to deal critically with the Stalinist past, and many of the old dogmas were challenged. Industries began to adopt Western techniques of management. Cybernetics and sociological techniques received new emphasis and broader application. Discussions and experiments dominated the political climate, and a spirit of innovation and optimism appeared for the first time in East German life, puzzling even the most cynical observers.

The official attitude toward West Germany also became more liberal and relaxed. A visitors' program was initiated, permitting West Berliners once more to visit their relatives in the eastern sector of the city on certain holidays. East German writers began to take part in public discussions in the Federal Republic, and a book-exchange program began to function. Travel restrictions for East Germans, particularly those on retirement pensions, were also relaxed.

All of these things went a long way toward improving the political climate, but they did not win over the population. On the contrary, the extent of the grievances and criticisms that were aired strikingly demonstrated how wide the gulf between the party and the population had grown. Inevitably the conservative hard-liners in the Politburo—chief among them Erich Honecker, Paul Fröhlich, Alfred Neumann, Albert Norden and Alfred Kurella—backed up by the lesser party functionaries, pointed out that relaxation and liberalization were not strengthening, but eroding party rule. In economic affairs, for example, the role of the party planners was considerably reduced by the reforms that virtually abolished central planning, while in cultural matters the spate of books, articles and films which appeared attacking and criticizing the Stalinist past did considerable damage to the pub-

[1] See Dorothy Miller and Harry Trend, "Economic Reforms in East Germany," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1966, and Hans Apel, "Economic Reforms in East Germany, A Comment," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1966.

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lic image of the party, which—as everyone knew—had never "destalinized" itself. The party faithful were also concerned about the perceptible political maneuvering that the GDR was beginning to undertake within the bloc itself, which, they were sure, would irritate Moscow.

The "New System of Planning and Managing the Economy," which Ulbricht proclaimed in June 1963, put the GDR—long disparaged everywhere as a stronghold of Stalinism—at the head of the reform movement in the Soviet bloc. Under Apel's direction, reformers such as Siegfried Loschau, head of the Leuna-Werke Chemical Consortium and later Minister for the Chemical Industry, Fritz Behrens of the Economic Institute, and Georg Klaus, the cyberneticist, undertook a series of reforms, many of them designed to make enterprises financially self-sufficient. Their economic reforms were also applied in the non-industrial sector and in domestic and foreign trade. In this latter category, Apel was determined to reduce the GDR's dependence on the East and to gain a foothold in world markets, and to some extent he actually succeeded. Between 1962 and 1965, two-way trade with the Soviet Union dropped from 49.3 percent of the GDR's total foreign trade to 43.4 percent. Between 1963 and 1966 trade with the entire Eastern bloc dropped from 78 to 73.7 percent of total trade.[2]

The relatively minor shift of 4 to 5 percent certainly did not indicate a major reversal, but as a reflection of a political trend, it was highly significant. Erich Apel, explained the trend as follows:

This must be made quite clear: Our sights are definitely set on world standards. If in any given field the Soviet Union achieves a world record, then we shall model ourselves on that pattern; if West Germany or Japan achieves a similar distinction, then we shall follow their example. But if we ourselves reach the top, for example in chemical plant construction, then we do not have to look abroad but simply make sure that we maintain that level.[3]

The reformers never intended to take the GDR out of the Eastern bloc. Rather they sought autonomy within the bloc, together with greater freedom of decision. A flexible commercial policy toward the West played the role of a counterweight to their natural dependence on the East. The course, however, involved certain risks, for holding a position midway between East and West is in the long run impossible for the GDR. Its inner structure is much too unstable for that, and too susceptible to the lingering illness of the national question. The pull of the western half of the nation is still too strong. A regime that is no longer securely anchored to the Eastern bloc must inevitably succumb to the West.

Such, at any rate, was the view of the orthodox-conservatives in the party whose interests demanded that no such risk be taken. Steeped in Stalinist ideology and untrained or unable to cope with the technological problems that the reforms engendered, these apparatchiks found themselves gradually being overshadowed by a growing number of trained, ideologically uncommitted technicians. They naturally regarded any trend toward a society of achievement based on competition, then only barely visible, as a vital threat to party rule.

In the confusion that followed Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, the conservative leaders of the party headed by Erich Honecker, Central Committee Secretary for Security and Organization and considered by many to be Ulbricht's intended successor, decided to make their move. Launching an ideological offensive at the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in December, they attacked the reforms which had brought such violent changes to the life of the country, called for stricter controls by the party, demanded a tougher line toward West Germany, and criticized the drift of the regime's foreign policy away from the East.

The attack was well-timed, for in effect Moscow had begun to call for bloc unity in the face of the conflict with Peking and the escalation of the war in Vietnam. In the months that followed, increasing pressure from Moscow finally persuaded Ulbricht to return to a more cautious policy of control. By the end of 1965, the reformist phase of East German politics, with its faint but unmistakable touch of liberalism, came to a dramatic end. On December 3, the GDR planning chief and father of the New Economic System, Erich Apel, committed suicide in his office only a few hours before the signing of a new trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, at the 11th Plenary meeting of the SED Central Committee, the counter-reformation began.[4]

[2] *Berechnungen nach Ostdeutschen Statistiken*, IWE-Wirtschaftdienst (West Berlin), Dec. 15, 1966.

[3] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Feb. 21, 1964.

[4] It should be noted in this connection that in September 1965 Ulbricht led a delegation composed of Apel, Mittag and Alfred Neumann to Moscow to discuss trade relations with the USSR, which had been deteriorating. Two months later, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev flew to East Berlin for a two-day visit. Erich Honecker later explained that he had come to discuss economic questions and the Vietnamese conflict. *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 16, 1965.

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The problem at hand was delicate, as the speeches at the Plenum indicated. Ulbricht's keynote speech, for example, made it clear that the economic reforms introduced in 1963 would not be abandoned but would be reinforced with only a few minor changes. What had to be dealt with were the side effects of the reform—the tendencies toward autonomy that had spilled over from the economic reorganization into the political and cultural aspects of everyday life. A cleansing process was needed, a purging of the disruptive elements which permeated the more articulate levels of East German society.

Restoring Order

Not surprisingly, the first victims of the inquisition were the intellectuals. Honecker lectured them on their transgressions in a speech delivered at the 11th Plenum:

In the name of an "abstract truth," the artists concentrate on portraying alleged shortcomings and defects in the GDR. Some writers think that socialist education can be achieved only through a massive recital of shortcomings and mistakes. It escapes their attention that the effect of their work is to retard and block the development of a socialist consciousness among the workers. *How is an ideology of unrestrained philistine skepticism* going to help the workers? . . . If we wish to raise productivity along with the standard of living we cannot promote nihilistic and morally corrupting philosophies in literature, films, television and the press. Skepticism and rising living standards are mutually exclusive in building socialism on all fronts.[5]

In the course of the meeting, Honecker singled out a number of writers, artists and film producers for special attack, among them Werner Bräunig, Heiner Müller, Manfried Bieler, Wolf Biermann, Stefan Heym, Günter Witt and Kurt Maetzig.

Bräunig, who had published excerpts from an unfinished novel dealing with the brutal life of workers in the Soviet-controlled mines, was accused of casting a slur on the working class and of being anti-Soviet.[6] Honecker next critized Heiner Müller's unproduced play *Der Bau* (Construction), which deals with life on a large construction site, on the grounds that "it denies the creative character of human labor. The individual finds himself confronted with the collective and with party and state leaders who are represented as cold and alien powers. It views our reality only as harsh and sacrifice-demanding."[7]

Two films, produced by the State Film Association (DEFA), were also screened at the Plenum. They were *Das Kaninchen bin ich* (A Rabbit am I), adapted from a banned novel by Manfried Bieler, and *Denk bloss nicht, ich heule* (Don't Ever Think I'll Cry). A party-line critic, Helmut Sakowski, later described the reaction of the Central Committee:

The mood of many comrades was such that one felt ashamed of belonging to the Writers' Union. Some say that the films are bad. They are not badly done, however; in fact, they are better than most DEFA films. But they are false and evil. One thing in particular incensed me about *Denk bloss nicht, ich heule*. The film tells the story of a young man who is destroyed by the society in which he must live—our society! For long stretches of the film, the young man and his girl sit before the memorials on the grounds of Buchenwald. They appear all but destroyed by a world that refuses to understand them, and the naive viewer is expected to think: Why indeed did thousands die at Buchenwald, tortured to death and murdered? What for—so that now the cold unfeeling people can have power?[8]

As for Heym and Bierman, both were accused of being traitors for publishing material in the West and "giving false pictures of life in the Soviet

[5] Report of the Politburo, 11th Plenum of the Central Committee, *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 16, 1965.

[6] Excepts of Bräunig's novel "Rummelplatz" (The Fairgrounds) appeared in *Neue Deutsche Literatur* (East Berlin), Vol. XIII, 1965. In effect, Bräunig was serving as a scapegoat for his colleagues, Christa Wolf, Erich Neutsch and Herman Kant, whose similarly critical but earlier works fell within the limits of destalinization and had even received Ulbricht's endorsement.

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 16, 1965.

[8] *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, Vol. XIV, 1966.

A Lonely Voice

We expect our fellow writers in the West to raise their voices against tyranny and for human rights. Do we raise our voices whenever the great principles are violated, principles for which our revolution was made? We expect our fellow writers in the West, if need be, to give up honors, comforts and life for so unrewarding a thing as truth. What have we ever given up when the occasion called for it?

—Stefan Heym, in Die Zeit (Hamburg), Oct. 29, 1965.

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Union and the GDR," and for dealing with "Western-oriented truth." [9]

Immediately following the Plenum, a wave of dismissals swept all the cultural institutions and editorial offices. Most of those who lost their jobs have had to abandon their profession. For example, Heym and Bierman are no longer allowed to publish in the GDR. A purge of the DEFA took away a number of screen writers and directors, among them Klaus Wischnewski and Jochen Mückenberger. The editor-in-chief of *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, Wolfgang Joho, and the Director of the Film Division of the Ministry of Culture, Günter Witt, were dismissed. The most dramatic removal was that of Hans Bentzien, the GDR Minister of Culture.[10] Only two recanted their heresy and offered lame self-criticism—Günter Witt and Kurt Maetzig, the director of *Das Kaninchen bin ich*. The others withdrew into silence.

With only a brief reference to literature and art, Walter Ulbricht spelled out the new principles of the GDR's cultural policy in his speech to the 7th Party Congress in April 1967:

The progressive tendencies in the development of culture and art must be consciously and systematically encouraged by means of economic incentives. This applies particularly to the encouragement of productions which apply Socialist Realism in all the arts. This requires the concentration of economic resources especially on the production and dissemination of those works which have maximum mass appeal. . . .[11]

Flaming Youth

The 11th Plenum in December 1965 was also the scene of violent attacks on the younger generation, especially those in charge of the youth movement (the FDJ), who were accused of contaminating the country with beat music, pornography and brutality imported from the "West German capitalist morass."

While probably more docile than their contemporaries in the East as well as the West, East German youth, it is true, did enjoy certain freedoms after the inauguration of the "soft policy" in 1963. The relaxation of controls over the young had come as a result of a number of surveys made at that time on the attitudes of young people. The survey reports revealed that even those young people under 20 who had known no other regime lacked any attachment to the state or the government, felt no commitment to the party, and identified their ideal as a Western-style affluent society with a minimum of political obligations and a maximum of personal freedom.[12]

When the reformers took over in 1963, the party and its youth organization, the FDJ (Free German Youth), began to court the "future leaders" by permitting them to adopt Western styles and relegating ideological indoctrination to the background. A communiqué by the Politburo regarding youth policy published in September 1963 read:

It will not suffice any longer to brush aside uncomfortable questions by young people as a nuisance or a provocation. This would merely drive them into hypocrisy. What we need are self-reliant and self-confident citizens of the community.[13]

By 1965, however, the situation had gotten out of hand, and the orthodox recapture of power sig-

[9] Both Biermann and Heym were popular not only in the West but also in the East where their works had been published. Heym in particular attracted the attention of intellectuals in Czechoslovakia and Italy.

[10] *SBZ Archiv* (Köln), January 1966.



Der konstruierte Konflikt

"The Constructive Conflict"

—From Sonntag (East Berlin), March 19, 1967.

[11] *Neues Deutschland*, April 18, 1967.

[12] *Forum* (East Berlin), No. 8, 1963, the organ of the student youth branch of the FDJ; and *Junge Generation*, No. 4, 1963.

[13] *Neues Deutschland*, Sept. 21, 1963.

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naled the end of permissiveness. The FDJ leader, Horst Schumann, admitted at the 7th Plenum that his organization had adopted "totally erroneous ideological guidelines," and called for a return to the sensible policies of the past.[14] Within a few weeks after the Plenum, all youth activities were halted and a new program of ideological indoctrination begun. Western radio and television programs were banned. The FDJ periodical *Junge Generation* explained the shift as follows:

It is our declared purpose to let ourselves be guided in all aspects by the decisions and the counsels of the party, and to instill in our youth love of the party and the cause for which it fights. In sharp contrast to all those liberals who insist on denying the leadership role of the party, we stand by the slogan: the party, the party, the party is always right.[15]

The government made its position even more clear in a resolution passed on March 31, 1967. The first of the ten principles of the new Socialist Youth Policy reads:

Socialist youth policy today consists of directing education and the self-education of youth in such a way that it will blend independent thinking and creative production for socialism with love for our socialist fatherland, that it will strengthen and defend our sovereign Socialist German Democratic Republic and commit all hearts and minds to friendship with the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism.[16]

Two Germanies

Probably the most dramatic step taken by Pankow in recent months to emphasize the "counter-reformation" was the decision to break off all contact with the Federal Republic and to liquidate the "all-German" institutions and contacts that had existed, however tenuously, in the past. During 1966, for example, the GDR tightened its visiting laws for West Berliners, halted the book-exchange program and the speaker exchange with the West German Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), and forbade East German Protestant ministers and bishops from taking part in any functions of the Evangelical Church of Germany, one of the last all-German institutions to survive the events of 1961. On February 20, 1967, the East German Volkskammer passed a citizenship law which repealed the Reich and State Citizenship Act of 1913 and struck from the GDR constitution the phrase "There is only one German nationality"; and on February 2, 1967, the State Secretariat for All-German Questions was renamed the State Secretariat for West German Questions.

Once again, the reason for the hardening line was that the relaxation brought about by the reformers in 1963 had gone beyond all acceptable limits. The rapprochement between the SPD and the SED, for example, which had initially been encouraged by Pankow as a means of driving a wedge between the leadership of the West German party and its members, had backfired. Long before the West German Socialists entered into a coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDU), East German officials were concerned over the popularity of the Social Democrats, many of whose letters were printed in the East German press, giving the people their first opportunity in nearly 20 years to have legal access to the arguments and doctrines of the SPD.

The government's decision to liquidate the all-German contacts, however, was more directly linked to fear of Bonn's diplomatic overtures to the bloc countries, which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations in January of this year between the Federal Republic and Rumania. For years the GDR had insisted that the entire Eastern bloc endorse its own policy toward Bonn, a policy which rejected the claim of the Federal government to be the sole representative of the German people and its claims to West Berlin. This has not impeded the Eastern countries from seeking to improve their economic if not their political relations with Bonn, however, and the trend is clearly toward some sort of accommodation which will embarrass the Ulbricht regime.

The Medium is the Menace

. . . This is a struggle that is not based on material factors alone. It is not limited to how one does one's job. The struggle accompanies every citizen of our Republic every step of the way and does not abandon him even within his own four walls. The class enemy lies in ambush everywhere, on the radio and on television, waiting for an inadvertent turn of the dial to let him into our homeland.

—Neues Deutschland, *April 8, 1967.*

[14] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1965.
[15] *Junge Generation*, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1966.
[16] *Neues Deutschland*, April 1, 1967.

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Two months prior to the 7th Party Congress in April 1967, the Central Committee circulated a letter to the basic organizations of the party designed to prepare them for the official line. The letter read in part:

We have realized that unification is only possible under socialism and that the road to this goal may be a long and arduous one for West Germany. . . . A political situation has indeed developed in which any slogan about the unification of the two German states under this or that formula has become totally unrealistic for the simple reason that neither of the two opposed world systems could ever agree to the major change in the balance of power that would inevitably result from the unification of the German states.[17]

The closing manifesto of the Party Congress in April came as no surprise. "The establishment of socialism in West Germany," it stated, "is the only possible way in which the ultimate unification of the two states can come about.[18]

The Implications

All in all, the present SED policy is unhappily reminiscent of the Stalinist era. There are significant differences, of course. Mass physical terror is no longer employed. The new pressures are psychological and economic. The prevailing mood in the country is not fear, but sullen resignation mixed with scorn for a regime that is clearly on the defensive at home and unpopular abroad, in the East as well as in the West.[19]

Under the circumstances, one can legitimately question whether or not the East German regime can maintain such a policy for very long in the present East European atmosphere of change. The party leaders, as far as one can judge from the outside, are firmly in place. The "reformation" and the "counter-reformation" were almost bloodless since they were promoted by the same man—Walter Ulbricht, whose power base has always been the conservative majority in the party. Only Erich Apel, the symbol of the reformation, is dead. The other two reformers, Günter Mittag and Willi Stoph, have recanted. The purge that did take place affected a lower echelon—the hundreds of intellectuals, functionaries and managers, who have lost their jobs or been demoted.

But the most serious problem remains—the party must find a suitable successor to Ulbricht, who is 74 years old and not in perfect health. While Erich Honecker often acts as the "heir apparent," he is clearly not acceptable to many party members. As is the case with many dictators, the SED party leader considers himself irreplaceable. His immediate associates are a mediocre lot, none of whom has sufficient authority within the party to guarantee a peaceful transition of power. Once Ulbricht does step down, the temporary stability of the leadership will dissolve as rival factions vie for power. Even if another period of reform should ensue, it is likely to be followed by yet another counter-reformation.

[17] *SBZ Archiv* (Koln), Nos. 9 and 10, 1967.
[18] *Neues Deutschland*, April 17, 1967.
[19] The East German press has often attacked its Communist critics in the West, such as Lombardo Radice of the Italian Communist Party, Roger Garraudy of the French Communist Party, and Ernst Fischer, the Austrian Marxist. Relations between the SED and the Italian Communists are particularly strained. See *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 24, 1966, *Sonntag* (East Berlin), Dec. 25, 1966 and Feb. 12, 1967.



Was soll bei dem Fraß auch schon 'rauskommen

Zeichnung: Prof. Leo Haas

A typical East German depiction of West Germany ("Munich 1938, armament supplies, deficits, *Mein Kampf*, revenge"), Chancellor Kiesinger (the rabbit), and Bonn's claim to represent all the German people ("*allein vertretung*").

—From Neues Deutschland *(East Berlin), May 10, 1967.*

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Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles by Professor Fainsod and Mr. Levi are the last in our series of commentaries on the evolution of the Soviet political system. The authors whose views provided the basis for this symposium, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Mr. Michel Garder (see the January-February and March-April 1966 issues of this journal), will reply to the commentaries in a forthcoming issue.

Roads to the Future

By Merle Fainsod

A review of the discussion precipitated by Professor Brzezinski's provocative article reveals two fundamentally different perspectives on the future of the Soviet regime. On the one hand, there are those who align themselves with Michel Garder, *though not necessarily with his timetable, in predicting* that the regime is doomed to collapse. They believe that the party leadership finds itself in a prerevolutionary situation where it is faced with insoluble problems that cannot be resolved within the framework of the existing political system. They argue that it will inevitably be swept away by the dynamic social forces with which it has lost touch. On the other hand, there are those who predict that the regime will follow a path of evolutionary development, transforming itself in response to the new challenges which it faces. They see its problems as serious, but in no sense posing a fundamental threat to the stability of the regime. They anticipate that the regime will continue to muddle along, patching up compromises and adjustments, and responding sufficiently to the aspirations of its people to avoid total collapse.

Professor Brzezinski's attitude toward these two contrasting perspectives is somewhat ambiguous. His analysis of the present position implies a crisis of major proportions: an unstable leadership which is "inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation," "a reopening of the gap that existed in

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prerevolutionary Russia between the political system and the society," an ideology which is increasingly irrelevant to Soviet realities, and the absence of a program to justify party rule. He does not "entirely" exclude "the possibility of revolutionary outbreaks;" at the same time he does not affirm the apocalyptic thesis that the regime is destined for catastrophic collapse. He suggests that the ruling Soviet elite can still save itself from the threat of systemic degeneration by coopting "a broader representation of social talent within the top political leadership," by institutionalizing the selection and tenure of the chief executive, and by giving the institutional and group interests that now exist in Soviet society a more effective representational role. His advice to the party "to adjust gracefully to the desirability, and perhaps even inevitability, of its own gradual withering away" is hardly likely to be warmly embraced by those to whom it is rendered. In any case, Professor Brzezinski avoids identifying himself with the view that such an evolution will or must take place. He does, however, conclude that it represents the only alternative to the degeneration of the Soviet system.

Professor Brzezinski is wise in eschewing prophecy. In the half-century since the establishment of Bolshevik power, there have been innumerable predictions of its imminent collapse, and the discussion inspired by Professor Brzezinski's article indicates that the spate has not abated. Certainly anyone at all sensitive to the role of change in human affairs must recognize that the Soviet regime, like all others, faces the alternatives of adaptation or disintegration and dissolution. While no one can be certain what the future may bring, it is dangerous to assume that the Soviet regime has exhausted the possibilities of adaptation and survival.

However repugnant the Soviet regime may be to Western onlookers, or to disaffected elements in its own population, it is important to recognize the sources of its strength and durability. It has enlisted leading elements of Soviet society in party ranks, even though party functionaries still dominate the leadership. It has consolidated its control over key posts in government, the police, and the armed forces, penetrated important social formations, survived a series of succession crises, and achieved the kind of legitimacy which derives from an impressive record of industrial progress, military victories, territorial gains, and, more recently, an increasing degree of responsiveness to the welfare aspirations of its own people. By abandoning mass terror and placing greater reliance on incentives and amenities, it has sought to narrow the gap between rulers and ruled and to broaden its base of popular support. Faced with rising ferment among intellectuals and students, it has undertaken to quiet restiveness by enlarging the area of permissible criticism while reserving its negative sanctions for the heretics and the heterodox.

As the appeal of its revolutionary ideology has dimmed, it has placed greater reliance on the cementing force of nationalism and anchored its power on the vested interests of the new class bred by industrialization. In contrast with the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, which bear the stigma of having been established as Soviet client states and which seek their legitimacy in emancipation from Soviet controls, the Soviet regime has been able to draw strong support from identification with a native fund of patriotic sentiment. In contrast with its Communist Chinese neighbor, which has still to demonstrate its potential for rapid industrialization and which is caught up in the convulsions of frustrated revolutionary expectations and its first succession crisis, the Soviet regime has emerged as a relatively mature industrial power with a broadening social infrastructure involved in its conservation and survival.

Yet stable as the regime may appear to be, the same cannot be said of the prerogatives of the party functionaries who man the key posts in the party machine and who reserve to themselves the power to define the regime's policy. Limitations on their authority have been imposed by the very revolution over which they have presided. In directing a complex industrial society and in determining its priorities of development, they must increasingly depend on those who possess the professional skills to guide and manage it. In inescapable fashion, the professionalisms of military technology, industrial management, and every branch of science and engineering, impinge on the capacity of the party leadership to coordinate them. Within the ranks of the party there is a continuously troublesome problem of relating the overall authority of full-time party functionaries to the jurisdiction of other party members who exercise professional authority in specialized fields.

As Soviet society has become more professionalized and differentiated, the outlines of an inter-

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est-group structure have begun to emerge. The armed forces, the police, the managers of industry and agriculture, the scientific community, and the cultural intelligentsia all have their specialized interests to defend, and since they cannot be promoted outside the party, the party has itself become an arena in which these competing interests must be adjusted and reconciled. One of the results has been to introduce a strong adaptive ingredient into the party leadership's mobilizing and coordinating role.

There are still other forces at work which contribute to limit, if not to undermine, the authority of the party functionaries and the party which they direct. As the custodians of a doctrine which claims to embody infallible truth, they find their credentials contemptuously rejected by their powerful Chinese neighbor, and they no longer speak for a united Communist world. As spokesmen for the "wave of the future," they see their revolutionary dynamism arrested, and their expansionist ambitious limited by the imperatives of survival in a thermonuclear age. As the putative possessors of an exclusive formula for rapid industrialization, they have watched their growth rate slacken as planning and management problems have become increasingly difficult and complex. Even where they have relaxed restrictions on the cultural intelligentsia and gone part way to satisfy popular expectations of higher living standards, they discover that the appetites which they have whetted demand still more.

What do these developments portend for the future of the Soviet one-party system? There are some who see these pressures as operating to transform what was once a monolithic party into a pluralistic party in which interest groups will be free to maneuver and legalized factions may emerge. There are others who foresee the eventual appearance of a two-party or multi-party system as the leadership finds it impossible to confine the plural energies of Soviet society within the bounds of a single party. There are still others who predict that a weakening of party leadership will set the stage for a military *coup d'état* and the emergence of a military dictatorship. There are yet others who visualize the gradual transformation of what was once a militant ideologically-inspired party into a technical and managerial elite, governing in authoritarian fashion, but presiding over an essentially nationalist state.

Without undertaking to predict the shape of things to come, it is, nevertheless, possible to identify certain forces which are likely to influence the development of the Soviet one-party system in the years ahead.

First, it can safely be posited that a party leadership which has built up its power through the suppression of opposition outside the party and of organized factionalism within, will not willingly abdicate its supreme role short of a major catastrophe such as military defeat or an equivalent domestic disaster. Second, it can also be assumed that no party, whatever its pretensions to monolithism, can escape individual and group rivalries, and that these rivalries will inevitably reflect the changing configuration of interests inside the party as they are shaped by the tasks it assumes. Third, in ministering to the needs and directing the destinies of a highly industrialized country, the Soviet leadership must perforce accord greater weight and authority to those elements in the party who possess the knowledge and technical skills which make an industrial society work. Fourth, as the economy and the society become more complex and differentiated, the influence of professionalism will probably increase, and tendencies toward a dispersal of authority are likely to become more clearly manifest. Fifth, given the commitment of the Soviet regime to technical progress and scientific advance, the need for a social environment conducive to innovation and creativity is likely to intensify and to exert its effect outside scientific walls. Finally, the disillusionment bred by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the spread of polycentric tendencies in the Communist movment, with its self-evident lesson that there are not one, but many Communist truths, should contribute to undermine the dogmatic certainty on which party monolithism rests. If these propositions have any validity, they would point to the emergence over time of a looser, more pragmatic, and pluralistically-based party in which the differentiated interests of an industrial society find freer expression and where the party leadership acts as the manager of their inter-relationships and as the custodian of the national interests of the Soviet state.

There is, of course, no guaranty that future party leaders will respond to the changing social aspirations of an increasingly industrialized and professionalized society or that they will relate themselves creatively to the variety of interests which it has been spawning. They may choose to ignore them. Should they do so, they can only end by sowing the seeds of their own downfall.

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The Evolution of the Soviet System

By Arrigo Levi

At a September 1966 meeting of Western and East European economists on "Pricing and Planning in Eastern Europe,"[1] the discussions were so open and stimulating, the sense of communication so alive and sweeping, that one of the Western participants was heard to say: "The schism is over. All that remains to be done is to eliminate the consequences."

The impression that the "schism" between East and West is indeed over has gained ground in Europe. This ideological, historical and political schism has divided parties, peoples and states. Its resolution would constitute the prelude to a restoration of the geographic and moral unity of Europe, a reunification of the European left, the definitive end of the cold war, and possibly a new era of cooperation between the United States and the USSR. Is it to be wondered, then, that this prospect is seized upon with enthusiasm as much by the intellectual and the politician as by the man on the street?

Yet, if the enthusiasm of many is understandable, so surely are the caution and skepticism entertained by others. Is the schism really over? Has the historico-ideological challenge of the Communist world to the non-Communist world actually come to an end? Has the nature of the Communist regimes truly undergone such radical change? Many students and observers of communism incline toward a negative answer, claiming that nothing can change in the Communist world as long as the Communist parties in power remain monolithic and totalitarian. Undoubtedly, the "Leninist" party has changed very little, if at all. Even though the economic reforms have been vast, and obvious shifts in real power have resulted therefrom, political power remains firmly in the hands of the party.

The optimistic belief in the "end of the schism" and the pessimistic view of the "unchangeable nature of party rule" are reflected in the current debate over "evolution or revolution" of the Communist regimes. The optimists are proponents of the evolutionary theory who believe in the capacity of the parties to adapt themselves to new conditions; the pessimists feel that tensions will build up in Communist societies to such a point that the existing political order will explode.

Ten years ago Milovan Djilas raised the vital

[1] Meeting of the Center for Economic Studies and Research on Social Problems, held in Florence, Italy, September 1966.

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question of how the totalitarian "new class" society would adapt itself to change. Recently another Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Markovic, rephrased the question as follows:

An underdeveloped, preeminently rural society . . . cannot avoid that phase of its development in which an elite, in the best of cases a genuinely revolutionary elite, will try to create, through maximum mobilization of the masses and the use of coercion, the conditions necessary [for socialist self-government]—that is to say, an industry, a working class, an intelligentsia, a school system and a mass culture . . . However, a question arises: when those conditions have been attained, will this elite find the moral strength to decide voluntarily to go on to the essential part of the socialist revolution, namely, the establishment of self-government and, consequently, its own gradual elimination as a power elite? Or will a few decades of intense power concentration have changed its social structure to the point where it will want to be the personification of socialism, to preserve its political and material privileges forever, and to be not only the brain but also the iron fist of the historical process? [2]

This is indeed the paramount question facing the Communist regimes of today. However, Markovic describes here only the most recent phase of the revisionist process, which has barely begun. Before engaging in any attempts to prognosticate the course of this process, we must first have a clearer understanding of the initial revisionist phase which made its appearance immediately upon Stalin's death.

Politics After Stalin

If Stalin's power machine—or political "superstructure," to use a Marxist term—was admirably suited to the conditions of a largely agricultural and only incipiently industrial society, such as Russia was in the 1920's and early 1930's, it had become decidedly anachronistic by the time of its creator's demise, when Russia had already transformed itself into a powerful industrial as well as socially and culturally more sophisticated state. Indeed, March 5, 1953, witnessed not only the passing of an omnipotent dictator, but also the collapse of his political "superstructure." Revisionism thus began at Stalin's bier. Almost overnight, his successors were faced with the task of maintaining stability, which until then had depended on one man, his instruments of terror, and his myth. Not surprisingly, they decided first to create a meaningful contract between the government and the party and to reassure, not the masses, but the ruling elite (which in a way had suffered more under Stalin's purges) that their "rights" would be respected. This was the fundamental but often disregarded meaning of Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress. The denunciation of Stalin's crimes represented a constitutional charter under which the new leader pledged himself not to use terror. As a guarantee of this pledge, he destroyed the myth of the *Vozhd* (leader). The masses, however, had to wait another five years, until the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, for the myth to be destroyed in public.

Within five or six years after Stalin's death, the new political system managed to achieve substantial stability. The sense of relief that swept over the Soviet Union in the early years of destalinization provoked the release of enormous amounts of creative energy, reflected to some degree in Khrushchev's optimistic vitality and zealous patriotism. Despite the occasional signs that destalinization was following a rather "pendular course"—representing a constant struggle between "liberals" and "conservatives"—the Soviet leader's "Bureaucratic Revolution" produced welcome changes in the power system, some of the more significant being:

1) The disappearance of massive and arbitrary terror and the restoration of a certain amount of personal security and respect for law. The laws, to be sure, remained harsh, and were designed to guarantee the authority of the party and to prevent any manifestation of dissent, but at least laws and regulations took over where unchecked terror and personal vendetta had prevailed before.

2) A change in the ratio of investment for capital goods vs. consumption in favor of consumption, and a consequent improvement in living standards.

3) A rise in agricultural production and a concomitant rise in the living conditions of almost half of the Soviet Union's population—the peasants.

4) A steady improvement in the relations between the political elite and the intellectuals. For the first time in many years, the party found itself faced with the task of having to answer criticism, however cautiously expressed.

5) Freer debate in the highest party echelons, contributing to the development of an oligarchy. (It should be noted, however, that power within the party became concentrated in the Presidium and even more so in the hands of Khrushchev, who exercised absolute control over all information and propaganda, and who more than once appealed to

[2] Mihajlo Markovic, "Socialism and Self-government," in *Critica Marxista*, May-June 1966 (reproduced from *Praxis* of Zagreb).

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the masses over the heads of the party bureaucrats to maintain his leading position.)

The bureaucratic revolution thus produced a new situation, a kind of managerial state of the "new class" (as Djilas would later describe it) which was certainly preferable to the despotism of "the years of arbitrariness" (*godi proizvolia*)—as Russians referred to the years of Stalin's great purges. To speak of "socialism," or of democracy, during this period would, in this writer's opinion, be manifestly absurd. Yet farfetched though it may sound, there are signs of precisely this phenomenon—a transformation to democratic socialism—manifesting themselves in the second phase of the revisionist process. Fifty years after the October revolution and 14 years after Stalin's death, one is finally justified in speaking of the halting beginnings of a system which the Revolution was designed to usher in half a century ago.

A Temporary Solution

Khrushchev, to his credit, did manage to assure a peaceful transition between Stalin's despotism and a new balance of power. Under his leadership, the party was able for a time to control the tensions and aspirations toward greater autonomy which appeared in Soviet society after the end of the terror. But just as Stalinism fell victim to its own limitations, so did Khrushchev's bureaucratic solution, with all its appalling shortcomings, generate its own downfall. Khrushchev himself was aware of these shortcomings and limitations—so much so that, in an effort to overcome them, he increasingly accentuated the personal character of his power, as if he alone could grasp, sum up, synthesize, and solve all the problems of Soviet society. "Who will speak out if I don't?" he asked at Minsk in January 1962 in one of his speeches on the state of Soviet agriculture.

The first and principal defect was that on the one hand the new system continually gave rise to aspirations for freedom and well-being on the part of the intellectuals, the technocrats, and ultimately the masses, while on the other it proved incapable of accommodating them in any meaningful, durable fashion. The citadel of power was thus constantly besieged by forces that sought to break in and share power. These forces had to be placated at first, but ultimately repulsed.

Secondly, the new political solution was extremely shortsighted. For example, the relationship between the party and the *samoupravlenie* (self-government) organs was defined at the time of the 22nd Party Congress as follows:

The building of the Communist society does not occur spontaneously, although it is governed by objective laws. An ever-greater function to that end belongs to the conscious activity of the workers, oriented towards a precise goal and directed by a single will. . . . From it follows the need to broaden even more the task of the Marxist-Leninist party, which is the leading and cognizant force in the construction of communism. It is precisely the party, armed with a scientific theory and attentive to what takes place, which learns . . . more thoroughly and completely the objective tendencies of life so as to direct the creative work of the popular masses. . . . As the state gradually transfers some of its functions to the social organizations, the party increasingly becomes the overall leader of society and the force that guides the social organizations. Thus, the party also directs the process of the extinction of the state, the activities of the labor unions and other social organizations, whose new tasks it helps to perform on the eve of the advent of communism. . . . The task of the party becomes greater . . . as the party assumes more and more of the functions of organizer and leader of the masses. . . .[3]

In the face of these dicta, the more liberal forces in Soviet society could never make demands based on the principle of *samoupravlenie*. In fact, they opposed it on juridical grounds, holding that it was an instrument of illegality. Rather they seized on the principle of "socialist legality" in the hope of strengthening the state machinery by making it the natural vehicle for greater freedoms. As B. P. Kravtsov, a liberal Soviet jurist, wrote,

The full development and further improvement of Soviet democracy presupposes the explicit and full proclamation of the people's sovereignty, that is, its primacy and complete dominion. . . . In a state belonging to all the people, it is essential to establish new channels and new forms of participation by the working masses in the performance of state functions: participation in the legislative power, in administration, in enforcing the laws, in supervising their application and exercising control over the activities of the state organs. . . .[4]

However, as long as legality stopped at the doors of the party organization, as long as the party itself remained beyond the rule of law, it was obvious that any meaningful democratization could not take place. The system of power, therefore, was open to easy criticism. The struggle for autonomy on the part of intellectuals, workers and farmers met with only limited success. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era, in fact, open criticism of

[3] *Les principes du Marxisme-Leninisme* (*The principles of Marxism-Leninism*), Moscow, pp. 691-2.

[4] Quoted by U. Cerroni in "Constitutional issues in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Socialism*, July-August 1963, p. 872.

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the "alienated Soviet party" began to become commonplace.[5]

Because of this, the enthusiasm that had revived the energy and initiative of Soviet society in the very early years of the post-Stalin era gradually subsided. For example, in the countryside, the beneficial effect of the first reforms disappeared after a few years. "Non-collaboration" began anew, and production indices fell. The setback, however, was not so much economic as it was political in that it showed the limited degree of loyalty that Khrushchev's bureaucratic system was capable of stimulating among the masses who felt their grievances justified.

Further, there is no doubt that the material sacrifices which the people were called upon to endure were not popular. Many thought of them as unnecessary, imposed—as they seemed to have been—for ideological reasons. To repress these manifestations of dissent, Khrushchev wasted energy that could have been used elsewhere and lost consensus where he might have found it. All this was, of course, the result of Khrushchev's particular power system and of its internal contradictions.

But it was particularly in the economic field that the bureaucratic system showed its limitations most concretely. The history of Khrushchev's economic reforms is a maze of contradictory measures, of which we need cite only a few.

The seesawing of reform measures, first demanding decentralization and then calling for the consolidation of economic decision-making, was to a great extent more apparent than real. In substance, the determination of economic policy remained the responsibility of the bureaucrats during the entire period. It mattered little if at times control moved from the central ministerial bureaucracy to that of the periphery or vice versa. The producers, the managers of the kolkhozes, and the consumers always remained the objects of manipulation, the executors of the plans, rather than the originators of decisions.

The system, which was nothing more than a continuation of the authoritarian Stalinist type of central planning, became less and less efficient as the Soviet economy grew and as the share of the total production represented by consumers' goods increased. The "purchase plan" for consumers' goods proved to be the most difficult to implement. When the consumers began to show a reluctance to buy, there was no way to force them to do so.

The crisis of the bureaucratic planned economy manifested itself in various ways: in declining growth rates for both industry and agriculture; in the food shortages that resulted from the failure of the agricultural program; in the technological-scientific lag of Soviet industry in many important sectors (electronics, chemistry, etc.), which portended even greater difficulties in the future; and finally in the increasing apathy and cynicism of the population. The Soviet leaders eventually realized that they had to inject greater vitality into the economy than the bureaucratic system had produced. The question was how.

A New Dispensation

The search for an answer to this question began with the proposal to alter the "command economy." It was at this point that the new phase of revisionism took shape, for the economic reforms, if fully carried out, promised to impair and curtail radically the economic and political powers of the bureaucracy and the party. From the very beginning, therefore, opponents of the reforms proposed by Liberman, Nemchinov and others pointed to the danger that the power of the party would seriously diminish once it relinquished any part of its control over the economy.

Hence the caution with which the first experiments in independent management were made, and the fragile compromise between the opposing concepts in the solution that was finally adopted. Under the "market apparatus" formula which the Soviets adopted, powers of decision were redistributed among producers and consumers, but only in those industrial sectors that produce consumers' goods, with the further essential institutional limitation that the highest organs of power would continue to set prices.

This essential point—the continued fixing of prices from above—distinguishes the Soviet economic reforms from those planned in Czechoslovakia, for example, and even more so from the radical liberalization measures adopted in Yugoslavia, which reestablish market mechanisms in the sectors of capital investments and foreign trade. In short, Soviet planning continues to be authoritarian, with little diminution of the economic powers of the state.

The new "socialist market" system "based on the profit of the enterprise" cannot properly be

[5] See particularly G. Boffa, *Dopo Krusciov* (After Khrushchev), Rome, 1965; and V. Strada, *Letteratura Sovietica* (Soviet Literature), Rome, 1964.

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evaluated until its effects have had an opportunity to manifest themselves. Until now, however, the very cautious approach of the Soviet regime in devising compromise formulas makes such an eventuality a rather long-range prospect. In the meantime, however, even a partial market apparatus can set in motion some very strong tensions capable of throwing the entire system out of balance as soon as it discloses the weaknesses that have thus far remained concealed.

Yugoslavia's experience, for example, demonstrates that economic reform can accomplish a great deal, but only at great expense, that it causes and requires radical changes in habits and thinking, and that the profitability of enterprises is not what the masses want unless they have a share in the profits. Weaknesses inherent in the bureaucratic system are bound to reappear. It is true that some of the disadvantages will be offset by a better distribution of decision-making power, greater prosperity, higher wages, and a greater availability of consumer goods on the market. But all this will require a much more open political dialogue between the leaders and the masses, and will eventually impose a different type of political balance.

The Next Step

From forces favorable to development, the conditions of production now become obstacles to these forces. . . . A period of social revolution then begins. . . . With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly overthrown.[6]

The classical revolutionary situation thus described by Marx with reference to the historic surmounting of the "conditions of production" in proto-capitalism bears a striking resemblance to the "conditions of production" in the bureaucratic society of proto-communism. The intuition underlying the Marxian theory which attributes autonomy and priority to economic facts as opposed to political facts seems to find a whole series of empirical confirmations in the Communist world of today. There an evolution of the economic system is taking place independently and cannot be stopped, even though it is presently curbed by "an immense superstructure" of political roadblocks.

In more general terms, one might say that a modern economic system, because of its internal requirements, tends to have an organizational and managerial "superstructure" that is much more complex than is usually permitted under an authoritarian planning system. A modern economy can function at its best only in a political environment which will afford the fullest information, the most independent and unprejudiced research, the most exhaustive and unrestricted debate. In short, a modern economy can mature only in some sort of a democratic political system.

A practical confirmation of these ideas can be found in Eastern Europe. Here the economic reformers are the real revolutionaries. Although they are still searching for a dialogue with the masses and for a suitable base of political independence, they are already clashing with the privileged political circles. It is the authoritarian and hierarchic structures of the Communist parties and their domineering presence in every aspect of life that are hampering the spread of these new autonomies.

This is why it is legitimate to raise the question of whether or not the economic reforms can prevail without a concomitant reform in the party organizations and whether the latter reform does not in turn presuppose some sort of politico-economic crisis.

Even if we agree that the transformation of the economic structures will ultimately "overthrow the political superstructures, gradually or suddenly," we are still far from certain as to how this can actually happen. How far must a political reform be taken for the economic reform to produce the necessary results? How long can the party preserve its anti-democratic and hierarchic structure, or will it be able to renovate this structure with the necessary speed? Up to what point will the autonomous centers of power outside the party be allowed to develop? How will the dialogue between the authorities and the *pays légal* be changed? Lastly, how will the "immense political superstructure" be overthrown, gradually or suddenly?

Good sense tells us that at least at the present stage of our knowledge of social matters, and in the face of the incredible complexity of the power relationships in any society, there are no rational, precise, sure, demonstrable answers to questions of this type. Nevertheless, some salient facts present themselves for consideration.

First, the entire revisionist movement at present revolves around the economic reforms now under way in the Soviet Union and the other countries in Eastern Europe. The most important innovative forces are fighting today for these reforms.

Second, the evolution of the political "super-

[6] Karl Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, London, 1904.

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structures" has not stopped, but is continuing. Although the tempo of the evolution is slow in the Soviet Union, given the prudence and the power of the post-Khrushchev leaders, there is evidence of a gradual power shift from the party to the state organs. (The sphere of state power comprises, let us not forget, the technicians and the business managers.) Therefore, there is a marked "superstructural" difference between Khrushchev's bureaucratic society, hinged as it was to the power of the party bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic society of Brezhnev and Kosygin, in which the party shares power with the technical and state organs. Even some changes in the "philosophy" of the leading group have taken place, particularly with respect to its relationship with the outside world. As to the relationship between the leading group and the country, it continues in large measure to be severely paternalistic, but is nevertheless slowly becoming more and more open and more rational. Prosperity and "rationalization" remain the primary goals of the regime.

Third, if we extend our investigation of revisionism to include the other countries in Eastern Europe, we can clearly see that the innovating process ultimately involves the party, its internal organization, its function in society, and its ideology. The example of Yugoslavia is particularly germane. It seems, in other words, that one can recognize a continuous thread leading from the first manifestations of revisionism (destalinization, the "thaw" in the cold war) to the latest Yugoslav proposals for radical reforms in the theories of Marx and Lenin, in which ideas of such diverse origins as the social-democratic thought of Kautsky, the communism of Bukharin or Trotsky, and the principles of Western liberal democracy converge.

If we concede that there is a radically new situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we must reject as schematic, formal and overly pessimistic those concepts which maintain that there can be no meaningful change as long as the totalitarian and monolithic nature of the party remains intact. Real power can be subtly redistributed through gradual reforms while leaving apparently unchanged and unchangeable the absolute power of the bureaucratic hierarchy. This, in effect, has already begun to happen.

Proponents of the theory that the necessary changes in the Soviet Union can come about only through revolution have not paid attention to all the realities of the Communist world, though they do us a service by dramatizing the monolithic nature of the system. It is probably true that the quest for ever greater efficiency, progress and material comforts (a tendency shared by all contemporary societies in both the East and the West), is related to the growth of democracy and requires the active participation of all business, labor and professional groups in the making of decisions to a greater extent than is possible under the rigid post-Stalin political system. At the same time, whether we assume that the system will be swept away or that it will accommodate itself to new realities, we must remember that there may be substantial delays along the road—periods of stagnation and lulls during which the innovating fervor may subside or even die out. The fact is that order and security also have their merits for society as a whole. All this works in favor of an evolutionist hypothesis—reinforced, as it is in this author's opinion, by the fact that evolution has been going on in Soviet society for more than a decade.

The evolution of the Soviet power system is continuing. The Communist world is in motion. Old dogmas are being discussed—and frequently discarded—in all the East European countries. The era of myths and ironclad ideologies is coming to an end, and this is the fundamental fact to be noted. How far this process will go is still difficult to say, for we are dealing with not one but several totalitarian societies, each with its own special set of problems, traditions and goals.

It is encouraging and stimulating to know that the eastern half of Europe is again engaged, however haltingly and in the face of much resistance, in a critical search for new forms of political and economic organization, just as Western Europe is seeking new forms to institutionalize what has been called the "permanent bourgeois revolution." This is what the Western economist meant when he said, "The schism is over." Looking East, we no longer see a blank wall, but new political horizons. This is certainly much more than we might have hoped for just over ten years ago, when Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian rebellion.

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Problems of Economics

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles below deal with two different facets of the Soviet economy. The first, by Mr. Keith Bush, offers an appraisal of the economic reforms which by now have affected a sizable portion of Russia's industrial enterprises. The second, by Professor Harold Noah, examines Soviet progress and problems in a relatively new field of investigation—the economics of education.

The Reforms: A Balance Sheet

By Keith Bush

In the last issue of this journal, Mr. Theodore Frankel discussed the background of the current reform of the Soviet economy and the first three months' experience of the 43 pilot enterprises that began operating under the reform in January 1966. The present paper will survey the further course of the reform program, stressing practical aspects of the progress achieved and the problems encountered during the past year.

At the start, it should be noted that the Soviet reform is an essentially cautious venture. Its provisions, as initially outlined by Kosygin in September 1965, are limited in scope, its implementation has been slower than expected, and it incorporates several temporary features that give the authorities leverage to control the pace of change. The degree of autonomy provided for enterprise managers is considerably less than was granted in experiments conducted prior to the reform's adoption. Moreover, much less decentralization is envisaged than in some of the East European reform measures, notably the Hungarian and Czech models. Official spokesmen have indirectly admitted the limits of the initial program in promising that the exercise of central control over such key indicators as the size of the enterprise wage fund and the extensive *nomenklatura* list will diminish as the reform progresses.

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Above all, it should be emphasized that Kosygin has no intention of presiding over the liquidation of central planning in the Soviet Union, despite reports to the contrary which have appeared in the Western press. By the end of Stalin's reign, the burden of decision-making and the sheer volume of communications had overloaded the capacity and clogged the arteries of the central planning organs and the branch ministries. Khrushchev's solution was to disperse the bulk of decision-making to over 100 regional economic councils, but more problems were created than were solved. Kosygin's answer is to relieve the center of the host of micro-economic problems which arise in day-to-day operation, thereby freeing the channels of command and control from millions of petty details. The relinquishment of "petty tutelage" over the daily activities of Soviet enterprises will have the effect of strengthening, not weakening, the center's power. Even when the present stage of the reforms has been fully implemented, the central planners will remain firmly in control of the "commanding heights" of the economy; they will control the product mix, major investments, the allocation of most materials and equipment, the wage funds, taxes and interest charges. It is true that for most enterprises the number of "success indicators" handed down to the director has been reduced to eight, but consider what they cover—namely: volume of sales; main assortment of products (*nomenklatura*); size of the wage fund; levels of profit and profitability; deductions into and allocations from the budget; volume of centralized capital investment and utilization of production capacity; preparations for the introduction of new machinery; and indices of material technical supplies.[1] This list in itself makes it clear that the managers have hardly been given a free hand in running their enterprises.

The Timetable

The transfer of enterprises to the new system of operation is running somewhat behind schedule. As noted, the first 43 enterprises were converted on January 1, 1966, followed by a further 200 on April 1.[2] At the 23rd Party Congress in April, Kosygin stated that "by early 1967, the total number of enterprises operating under the new system will comprise about one third of the total labor force in industry."[3] However, although a third batch of 430 enterprises was converted during the third quarter of 1966, the interdepartmental commission under the USSR Gosplan recommended in August that no further individual enterprises be transferred for the rest of the year.[4] Apparently this recommendation was followed with a handful of exceptions, for by the end of 1966 a total of 704 enterprises were reported to be working under the new system; they employed 10 percent of the industrial work-force and accounted for over 12 percent of industrial production. In addition to these industrial enterprises, 259 trucking firms, the Gorki and Sverdlovski railroads, 4 large sea and river fleets, 6 communications enterprises and 4 civil aviation units were also operating under the new conditions.[5] Several complete branches of the food ministry had been transferred, but by the end of the year no complete ministry had been converted, presumably since none had uniform profitability at the required levels under the existing price structure.

The schedule for 1967 is somewhat vague, but it appears that the target is now the transfer of about one half of industry by the end of the year.[6] By the end of the first quarter of 1967 some 2500 enterprises had been converted; these included all of the enterprises of the Ministry of Instrument-making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems, plus many complete branches of the light and food industries. During the first year, the enterprises to be converted were selected by the central authorities, but from January 1967 on, the union-republic councils of ministers were authorized to transfer housing and municipal service organizations on their own initiative.[7]

Early Results and Problems

Commenting on the achievements of the first 704 enterprises during 1966, A. Bachurin, the Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, reported that sales had increased by 11 percent, profits by more than 24 percent and labor productivity by 8 percent as compared to the 1965 plans.[8] The increases

[1] *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1965.
[2] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 18, 1966, p. 8.
[3] *Pravda*, April 6, 1966.
[4] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 35, 1966, p. 19.
[5] *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1966.
[6] TASS, March 7, 1967.
[7] *Izvestia*, Jan. 10, 1967.
[8] *Trud*, Jan. 17, 1967.

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registered by industry as a whole for the same period were: gross production, 8.6 percent; profits, 10 percent; and labor productivity, 5 percent.[9] The bulk of the enterprises reportedly performed well, although a few failed to meet sales plans, while at some plants the growth in wages exceeded that of labor productivity, and there were "difficulties" in the system of material-technical supply.[10]

The above comparison of the growth performance of the pioneer plants with that of the rest of industry is widely cited in the Soviet press. But it merely serves to confirm what we already knew—namely, that the majority if not all of the plants selected for conversion were well above average in efficiency and profitability (more than half of the 243 enterprises transferred to the new system during the first half of 1966 had previously registered a profitability rate of over 40 percent[11]). To get some idea of how the new system has affected the performance of these plants, we would need to know what their growth rates were in 1965 or 1964, but as yet the Central Statistical Administration (TsSU) has not made such data available. The profits growth of 24 percent is indeed impressive, but this is apparently a gross profit index; a more meaningful indicator would have been the rise in net profits, after operating expenses—including in particular the interest on capital and other fixed charges—had been deducted.

Those enterprises chosen for conversion during the first year had to contend with some special problems peculiar to the initial stage of the reforms. For example, their 1966 plans for volume of production, profits, and allocations to the budget had all been set and confirmed by the central planners. To operate successfully under the new system, they required an even higher rate of profitability than hitherto and were therefore obliged to uncover internal economies and production capacities in order to boost the planned profitability index. Furthermore, since the index of gross production (*val*) had been replaced by the index of goods sold, for the first few months the enterprises had to look around for customers who would purchase their centrally-planned assortment of products.[12]

The first enterprises to be converted faced the difficulties inherent in all piecemeal reforms; the Polish attempt to decentralize by installments led, it will be remembered, to recentralization in 1959, while the Czech conversion led to stagnation by 1963. The problems of attempting to function more flexibly within a rigid framework of supplier-and consumer enterprises still tied to the plan had already been vividly demonstrated by the experience of the "Bolshevichka" and "Maiak" associations in the experiments preceding adoption of the Soviet reform. In this respect, a complete and instant conversion of all industry would have been preferable, although this was ruled out in the Soviet context.

Other snags have been reported which should, hopefully, be put right before the bulk of Soviet industry is converted. These include the shortage of working capital at the time of transfer, due to excessive withdrawals by superior organizations, and the "frequent compromises and half-hearted decisions" reached by the interdepartmental commission which is supervising the conversion.[13]

Nonrecurring benefits which boost an enterprise's performance on conversion are the income from sales of surplus capital equipment and existing reserves of finished products; this latter explains why in many cases the index of sales rose faster than the gross output index.

Recently a number of cases have been cited of enterprises which were converted to the new conditions before they were in a sound economic position. For example, a machine-tool plant was ordered to transfer on January 1, 1967, even though it was laboring under a thumping deficit of 1.4 million rubles and could not even meet its planned-loss indices. In this particular case, the factory was transferred merely so that the parent *glavk* could report that all of its enterprises had been converted,[14] yet presumably there will be many more such "reluctant converts" as the reforms spread to embrace the average and the lagging enterprises.

The Struggle against Inertia

The basic procedures used in planning and administering Soviet industry have changed very little during two generations of bureaucrats, and it is the resistance to change which has so far proved the greatest single obstacle in carrying out the reforms. As the economist A. Birman has noted, it was the higher ranks of the entrenched bureaucracy

[9] *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1967.
[10] *Trud*, Jan. 17, 1967.
[11] *Pervye shagi reformy*, Moscow, Ekonomika, 1966, p. 127.
[12] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, 1966, p. 28.
[13] *Izvestia*, July 31, 1966; *Dengi i Kredit*, No. 9, 1966, p. 3; *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1966.
[14] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Jan. 20, 1967.

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that were most critical of the proposed measures during the discussions prior to their adoption at the September 1965 Central Committee plenum—and it is precisely these same functionaries who are now charged with implementing the reforms.[15]

Complaints aired in the press have ranged from criticism of "meddling" and "excessive concern" on the part of the bureaucracy in general to the spelling out of abuses committed by specific ministries. Many instances have been cited of ministries which continue to set the old indicators for enterprises operating under the new system.[16] True to form, some ministries adapted themselves so far as to issue the new indicators, but at the same time insisted on handing down the old indicators as well.[17] A certain Belikov, the head of one *glavk* of the Ministry of Construction and Road Making Machine Building, appears to have won the critics' award for the most obstructive official of the year. Not content with dictating all the old indicators to the Koliushchenko construction machinery plant, he also changed the enterprise's plans 16 times during the first nine months that it was struggling to make a success of the new system.[18]

One enterprise reported that its wage fund expenditures in a number of instances were being checked by ministries against gross output. Presumably the wage fund was being not only controlled but planned according to the *val* (gross output), which meant that, in essence, the "gross" was also being planned for the enterprise. "In general, the overthrown *val* once again creeps up to the throne."[19] Indeed, from many other complaints it is clear that the *val* has never been dethroned. The ministries' plans are still set in terms of gross output, which cannot but influence their directives to their subordinate enterprises. Gosbank still controls the enterprise's wage fund against its gross output performance. Norms for deductions from profits into the material incentives fund and the social-cultural and housing fund are related to the size of the wage fund, and this is linked with the enterprise's gross output. The influence of the *val* is ubiquitous.

Many disputes have also arisen over the question of how to interpret (and consequently how to plan) the index entitled "the main assortment of goods to be produced" (*osnovnaia nomenklatura produktsii*). For example, the same enterprise that complained about the *val* also reported that the Ministry of Heavy-Power Engineering and Transport Machine-Building, in accordance with the national economic plan, included in the production plan for major products a number of pieces of equipment for which there were no buyers. The enterprise's deputy director justifiably concluded: "From our point of view, this contradicts the resolution of the September plenum of the CPSU/CC since, in formal terms, it compels us (through the plan) to manufacture goods which cannot be sold."[20]

Illustrative of this reluctance to grant enterprise management the limited autonomy authorized by the September plenum was a lead article in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* which complained, *inter alia*, that certain enterprises were using their new powers to inflate their administrative staff.[21] Yet the point is that the enterprise manager is, in theory at least, perfectly entitled to hire or fire office staff as long as he makes the required profits and also stays within the centrally determined wage fund outlays.

The Ministry of Finance is occasionally criticized for particular malpractices—*e.g.*, "there are frequent instances where finance agencies insist on the production of goods which are unmarketable but which are subject to a high rate of turnover tax."[22] However, the main criticism heard is that finance officials at all levels, in their determination to prevent any abuse of the enterprise's new found degree of operational autonomy, subject the enterprises to precisely that "petty tutelage" from which the reforms are meant to have freed the enterprise staff.

Contract Discipline

Regulations governing functional finance, which were in force prior to the September 1965 plenum, penalize producer enterprises for delays and errors more severely than transport organizations and supplier enterprises. At a conference of the interdepartmental commission in May 1966, representatives of the pioneer enterprises leveled sharp criticism at the railroad, water-shipping and trucking organizations for delays in collecting,

[15] *Novyi mir*, No. 12, 1965, p. 12.
[16] *E.g.*, see *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1966, and *Pravda*, Oct. 8, 1966.
[17] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 46, 1966, p. 78.
[18] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 1, 1967, p. 10.
[19] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 31, 1966, p. 18.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*, No. 41, 1966, p. 3.
[22] *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1966.

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transporting and delivering goods; the worst offender would appear to be the railroads during harvest time.[23]

An example of the onesidedness of the fines was given by the chief economist of a soda plant. He complained that the plant's sales program was slowed down because the local railroad did not supply enough empty freight cars: "We cannot fine the railroad for this. But the enterprise is fined for freight car demurrage."[24] Typical of other complaints, a cotton combine was fined 14 percent of the value of a contract because of delivery delays, while the plant which supplied its dyes was fined only 3 percent for comparable delays.[25] An observer argued:

The responsibility of railroad administrations for non-delivery of scheduled railroad cars should not be less than the losses sustained by the customer. . . . It is necessary to define and regularize the amounts of fines, to coordinate fines for non-delivery of assemblies and finished products, in order to create equal material responsibility for the fulfillment of contracts for product deliveries.[26]

More recently, a minister pointed out that in many cases an enterprise cannot claim reimbursement when a customer refuses to accept goods delivered in accordance with the contract.[27]

In response to the many justified criticisms, a "Statute on Deliveries of Products" was in fact drafted. This provided for increased fines for suppliers who deliver goods late or in inferior condition. Instead of the previous 4.5 percent for late deliveries, the draft proposed 3 percent for delays of up to 10 days and 5 percent for any further delays, making a total of 8 percent of the value of the product; for unsuitable or incomplete products, the fine would amount to 15-20 percent.[28] However, the draft statute does not appear to have been adopted at the time of writing.

The inability of certain enterprises to pay for goods on delivery has been sharply highlighted by the experiences of those enterprises which were converted to the new system in 1966. Whereas previously the principal success indicator of an enterprise's performance was its gross output, the key indicator now is the value of products sold. Many supplier-enterprises have, with some justification, complained that receiver-enterprises were not paying promptly for goods delivered; this reduced the supplier-enterprise's revenues and curtailed its profits, thereby cutting into the material incentives payments which are drawn from profits. All of which was bad for morale. Aggrieved managers and plant economists have suggested that the indicator of sales be replaced by one of products *delivered*. This drew a sharp rebuff from Birman, one of the most astute critics of implemen-

[23] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 7, 1966, pp. 31-41.
[24] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1966.
[25] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 7, 1966, pp. 31-41.
[26] *Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy*, No. 9, 1966, p. 10.
[27] *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1967, p. 59.
[28] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 37, 1966, p. 13.

— Пахать пора, а вы здесь торчите!
— Потому и торчим, что пахать пора!

Рисунок В. ЖАРИНОВА

—"It's time to plow, and you're just hanging around here!"
—"*That's* why we're hanging around, it's time to plow.
(Petitions read "Request for Spare Parts." Sign on door: "Factory Office.")

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 10, 1967.

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tation of the reforms. The replacement of the sales indicator by an indicator of goods delivered would, in his words, "emasculate the money-goods mechanism, represent a return to distribution in kind . . . . be a blow to contract discipline, lead to the liquidation or economic accountability (*khozraschiot*) and to a serious weakening of monetary circulation." [29] Recalling the inflationary effects of the 1931 credit reform, under which credit was critically overextended in the interest of a rapid growth of industrial output,[30] Birman argued that on no account should the authorities allow a credit arrangement to replace the indicator of goods sold, but instead should tighten up on payments discipline.

Setting of Plan Targets

With input and output schedules so taut, Soviet enterprise directors have long sought "a little bit of fat" in their output targets "just in case." To encourage plants to adopt as high as possible *planned* targets, the norms of deductions from profits into incentive funds for fulfillment of plan indicators are appreciably higher than for their overfulfillment. However, there have occurred numerous cases where the pioneer enterprises continued to overfulfill their plan targets by excessive amounts. Sometimes this was attributable to inertia; for example, a chemical combine was reported to have understated its sales plan by 5-6 percent "just in case" accounts were not paid on time or lest insufficient freight cars were made available for shipping its products.[31] More frequently, the norms for overfulfillment had not been sufficiently reduced, so that enterprises still found it advantageous comfortably to overfulfill a modest target.[32]

Considerable propaganda mileage was derived from the overfulfillment of the industrial target in 1966; instead of a planned 6.7 percent, gross industrial production rose by 8.6 percent.[33] Yet such overfulfillment is far from uncritically welcomed by the planners. As an authoritative article pointed out in connection with the reforms, the output of additional production at one plant means a corresponding increase in production at the supplier-plants; this affects the overall evenness of production and introduces disproportion. The most serious problem arises with supplies. The supply organizations still operate according to plan, and additional output frequently entails over-plan expenditure of scarce raw materials and supplies needed for the fulfillment of the production programs of other enterprises. "As a result, the state sometimes loses more from the production of over-plan output than it gains." [34]

Distribution of Enterprise Profits

There are three categories of enterprise profit to be distinguished under the new system. The principal category is the *planned* profit, as arrived at by the central planners in conjunction with the enterprise itself. For most of the pioneer enterprises, this was inadequate to finance meaningful incentive payments under the new scheme, and the plans therefore undertook to find *additional* profits by exploiting existing resources and making further cost reductions.[35] As Bachurin put it:

One of the principles of the economic reforms is that enterprises in uncovering additional reserves and assuming plan assignments will themselves create the resources necessary to increase their capital and to provide the required economic stimulus.[36]

Another observer expressed this more succinctly: "That which has not yet been created cannot be distributed." [37] Of this *additional* profit, the enterprise is allowed to retain between 60 and 90 percent.[38] In the case of the first 17 enterprises to be converted in the RSFSR, 81.9 percent of the additional profits went to the enterprises, including 53.4 percent to the material incentive funds, 14.7 percent to the social-cultural and housing funds and 13.8 percent to the production development funds, while 18.1 percent was paid into the state budget.[39] Finally, there are the *above-plan* profits, of which a fairly high proportion is claimed by the state budget; the rationale for this, as has already been explained above, is to "encourage enterprises to discover reserves in time and to undertake higher commitments." [40]

[29] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, No. 2, 1967, p. 10.
[30] For details see Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 120.
[31] *Pravda*, Sept. 10, 1966.
[32] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 10, 1966, p. 27.
[33] *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1967.
[34] *Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy*, No. 6, 1966, pp. 1-12.
[35] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 5, 1966, p. 15.
[36] *Trud*, Jan. 17, 1967.
[37] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 8, 1966, p. 37.
[38] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 6, 1966, p. 31.
[39] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 8, 1966, p. 30.
[40] *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1965.

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Enterprise profits are distributed in the following order of priority: [41]

1) Payments for funds
2) Fixed rental payments
3) Interest on bank credits

After the above payments are made, the remaining profits are then allocated according to special norms in the following order:

4) The material incentive fund
5) The social-cultural and housing fund
6) The production development fund
7) Repayment of long-term credits
8) Financing of centralized investment
9) Additions to working capital
10) Additions to reserves
11) Other planned needs
12) Residual paid into the state budget

In theory, a major portion of the enterprise's profit should be withdrawn through the mechanism of interest (payments for funds) and only a minor part through the residual, in order to enhance the utilization of capital. Yet the experience of the first year of the reforms shows that this goal was not reached. As a rule, in the majority of enterprises, the residual paid into the budget proved to be two or three times greater than the capital charge. "Calculations based on the projected operations of the 673 enterprises in 1966 show that deductions into the residual fund will exceed capital charges by 2.5 times on the average." [42] The disparity was even greater in the case of the tobacco and tea industries converted in June 1966; the payment for funds by these enterprises accounted for not more than 10 percent of their profits, while the residual payments accounted for more than 80 percent.[43] Some observers have called for the raising of interest charges, while others have advocated the differentiated application of turnover tax to heighten the significance of the capital charge.

Material Incentives

For the overwhelming majority of workers and employees, the decisive criterion by which to judge the new system will be the size of their pay-packets: will the increased norms and productivity be rewarded with higher earnings? Unfortunately the reforms were launched in a year when inflationary pressures were already building up fast; the lower paid service workers were enjoying the first full year of the substantial pay raises originally announced by Khrushchev in July 1964, while the earnings of *kolkhoz* members increased appreciably after the March 1965 plenum and the resolution on guaranteed pay at *sovkhoz* rates. Whereas, on one hand, the planners would presumably have liked to stimulate productivity in the pioneer plants with increased earnings, on the other they were anxious not to let total money wages outstrip the supply of consumer goods and services. In any event, the increase in earnings during the first year was excessively modest, and the workers, who bore the physical brunt of higher norms, appeared to have fared particularly badly. In 699 out of the 704 enterprises transferred during the first year, productivity rose by 8 percent, yet the monthly earnings of industrial-production personnel rose by an average of only 2.8 percent.[44] In the same period the earnings of all workers and employees throughout the economy rose by 3.6 percent.[45] Moreover, in 522 of the converted enterprises, during the first eight months of 1966 the average monthly premia from the material incentives fund came to 0.5 rubles for the workers as against 4.2 rubles for all personnel.[46]

It is true that the workers still receive premia through the enterprise wage fund "since this guarantees a minimum scale of premia even when the assignment of profits to the material incentives fund turns out to be insufficient." [47] However, no meaningful data have been released on the size and/or growth of these bonus payments, and the overall increase in earnings of 2.8 percent would imply that the workers, who comprise some 82 percent of the work-force, have not greatly benefited.

It is not clear whether this disappointing increase in workers' earnings is attributable to excessive restraint from above, to inequitable distribution by enterprise managers, or to faulty norms for financing the incentive funds—probably it stems from a combination of all three. What is certain, however, is that considerable dissatisfaction has been aired over the scale and distribution of premia,[48]

[41] See *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 47, 1965, p. 25, and No. 4, 1967, p. 36; also Finansy SSSR, No. 12, 1965, p. 11.
[42] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 4, 1967, p. 36.
[43] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 8, 1966, p. 43.
[44] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1967, p. 31.
[45] *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1967.
[46] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1967, p. 35.
[47] *Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy*, No. 6, 1966, p. 7.
[48] *E.g.*, see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 45, 1966, 8; *Izvestia*, Dec. 3, 1966; *Dengi i Kredit*, No. 1, 1967, p. 25.

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and unconfirmed reports suggest that the fall disorders in Tula Oblast and in the Donbass, including one incident in which a militiaman was killed and several people injured, were sparked by these grievances.

The Social-Cultural and Housing Fund

Some criticism has been aired concerning the basis for formation of this fund. Its size is determined largely by the number of workers and employees at the enterprise, which means that an enterprise which raises productivity and reduces its work-force thereby suffers a cut in its social-cultural fund.[49]

A more pressing problem during the first year has been how to spend the money in the fund when local building organizations were fully committed to their annual plans and had no spare capacity. A typical example was a tire plant in Yaroslavl which reckoned on having 1.3 million rubles for employee housing by the end of 1966. Since a cash deposit of only 25 percent of the value of the contract is required, this meant, in theory at least, that the plant could place orders for 5 million rubles' worth of housing to be built during 1967. But, as the director complained, "it is impossible to find contractors—all the construction organizations have plans confirmed beforehand and their resources are limited." [50]

The Production Development Fund

The purpose of the production development fund is to finance capital investment for the initiation of new technology, for the replacement and modernization of equipment and for improvement of production efficiency. In 1964 these funds amounted to 120 million rubles, but by 1967 enterprise managers are expected to have some 4 billion rubles at their disposal for decentralized investment. Of this total, approximately one-third will come from retained profits and about two-thirds will come from a 30 to 50 percent allocation from the amortization allowance, with a small addition resulting from the sale of old equipment.[51]

In the retention and utilization of this fund, managers have been encountering considerable difficulties. Several cases have been reported where ministries have attempted to appropriate the contents of the enterprise's production development fund.[52] Enterprises which manage to retain their funds intact experience the same difficulties in utilizing them as with the housing fund. Where the bulk of the supply organizations work rigidly according to plan, it is almost impossible for the pioneer enterprises to purchase new equipment with their funds. As one chief engineer of a chemical combine put it: "The production development fund is growing. But we cannot buy anything with this money, since there is no provision made for this in the plans for material and technical supply." [53]

Now that they must pay a charge of between 3 and 6 percent for fixed capital, the enterprise managers are understandably anxious to dispose of underutilized or unused equipment. In theory they are permitted to sell their surplus equipment and to devote the proceeds to the production development fund. In practice, the 43 pilot enterprises sold only 6 percent of all disposable assets during the first six months of operation under the new system, and the proceeds from these sales were equal to a mere 0.1 percent of the value of the plants' basic funds at the beginning of 1966.[54] The principal reason for this low figure was that the enterprises possessed very little equipment which was wholly superfluous; most of it was merely underutilized to varying degrees. But in order to sell, say, some little-used lathes, it would first be necessary to recondition them and then to find purchasers, and until recently no second-hand trade organization existed. The decree which corrected this defect also made the revolutionary provision for supplies to be distributed through a wholesale trade network.[55] The second reason why sales were low was that most of the superfluous equipment was technologically obsolescent; although it was too useful to be written off, it was insufficiently attractive for prospective purchasers. Thirdly, most of the machinery was too specialized for reinstallation in other units. Finally, much of

[49] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1966.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1965, and *Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy*, No. 6, 1966, pp. 1-12.
[52] *E.g.*, *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1966, and *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1966.
[53] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1966; see also *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 9, 1966, pp. 93-95.
[54] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1966, p. 4; *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1967, p. 7.
[55] *Izvestia*, Feb. 26, 1967.

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A comment on managers' new staffing powers: Sign marks the Director's office. The only man not to bow carries a statement, "I ask you to fire me at my own request."

—*From* **Krokodil** *(Moscow), No. 20, 1966.*

the heavy equipment and plant was simply immovable or too costly to move.

Redundancy

It is in the area of staffing that the enterprise manager has received the greatest autonomy under the September 1965 reforms. As long as he remains within the centrally determined limits of the annual wage fund, he is theoretically empowered to take on or to dismiss staff and also to determine the scale of earnings. Of course, in practice he is not completely free to hire or fire at will. Before he can dismiss an employee, he must first obtain the agreement of the works trade union committee, and in the case of workers under 18 years old, he must consult the local youth commission. Moreover, although the compulsory quotas (*bronia*) of youths which every enterprise must hire have now been reduced,[56] managers come under considerable pressure to take on more youngsters than they might wish at times like the summer of 1966, when a double batch of school-leavers flooded the labor market.

The enterprises which were converted during 1966 were, for the most part, selected for their above-average efficiency, and it may well be that they had little surplus manpower. Although we know that the trucking depots which tried out the new system in 1965 reduced their work-forces by 7 and more percent,[57] as yet no data have been published on the number of personnel declared redundant by the 704 enterprises during 1966. The overall increases reported for the first nine months of the year of a 10.2 percent rise in gross output coupled with an 8 percent rise in productivity imply that additional labor was taken on, although it had been reported that individual plants did cut back their staff by unspecified amounts.[58] The fact that the enterprise wage fund, together with the material incentives fund and the social-cultural and housing fund, is linked with the number of workers and employees acts as a disincentive to the manager to reduce his staff.[59]

The problem of labor relocation will grow more acute during the next two years when the rest of industry, including many inefficient and grossly over-manned plants, is converted. Most Soviet references to this topic have been implicit and muted, but one economist was quite explicit, disclosing *en passant* that the draft industrial investment targets for the Five-Year Plan may have been reduced:

There is now an excess number of personnel at many enterprises and free manpower in small and medium-sized cities. As the reform develops, surpluses of manpower will increase, but the element for its absorption—capital investments—may even by reduced in compari-

[56] *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1966.

[57] *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1965, p. 69.
[58] *Trud*, Feb. 17, 1967.
[59] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1967, p. 8.

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son with the initial drafts. Problems of placing a large number of people in jobs will arise already in the current Five-Year Plan. . . .[60]

During the past few years, considerable hardship has resulted from frictional unemployment. The average loss of time in changing jobs appears to have been about 24 days,[61] yet a dismissed worker normally receives only two weeks' severance pay and the "dole" has not been available since 1931. However, early this year the Soviet authorities overcame their ideological reservations about reintroducing a system of labor exchanges and established "State Committees on the Utilization of Labor Resources."[62] Nevertheless, at the time of writing, they had not seen fit to revive the payment of unemployment benefits.

Payment for Funds

The final rates of interest (payments for funds) for specific industries have apparently not yet been published, but it seems that a differentiated rate of between 3 and 6 percent will be applied.[63] For the first 43 enterprises, whose profitability was well over 15 percent, the interest was set at 5-6 percent. The payment for funds comprised some 20 percent of total profits and 29 percent of the overall sum of payments to the state budget.[64] This latter proportion varied greatly with the type of enterprise; at the chemical combines, payments for funds amounted to 55 percent of all payments into the budget, while interest payments from light and food industry enterprises came to only 3 percent.[65]

No interest is charged on the following categories of assets: those created from the production development fund for a period of two years; those purchased with the aid of bank credits, until the repayment of the loan in full; the production assets of enterprises newly brought into commission, until production capacity is attained as established by the branch norms; and assets frozen by the state.[66] The total budgetary revenue from interest charges once the whole of industry has been converted to the new system has been estimated at between 10 and 13 billion rubles a year.[67]

Financing and Bank Credits

Previously enterprises received a considerable portion of their investment funds in the form of non-returnable grants from the state budget. Under the new system, approximately 80 percent of capital investment in fixed production assets will eventually be met from the enterprises' own funds and from long-term bank credits. The initial alteration in the sources of investment financing for the first 243 enterprises to go over to the new system was as follows, in percentage terms:[68]

Source of Investment Funds	*Before Transition*	*After Transition*
State Budget	25	. . .
Profits	19	42
Other sources	9	8
Amortization	47	41
Credits	. . .	9

Prior to the reform, a significant portion of the shortfall in non-centralized working capital was also covered from budgetary resources; in 1965 this subsidy came to about one billion rubles.[69] This budgetary financing will cease where the shortfalls are attributable to faulty operation by the enterprises and will be replaced by bank credits of up to two years' duration.

It will be seen from the above table that bank credits have played a relatively insignificant role in the financing of investment by the pioneer enterprises; indeed, more than 80 percent of them did not apply for credits at all.[70] This is largely explained by the difficulties encountered in obtaining the credits. At the outset, in January 1966, the central office of Gosbank is reputed to have sent a circular to all its sub-branches describing the new system of credits and accounting.[71] However, enterprises have complained that either the instructions were inadequate or else they were not fully implemented. Moreover, "the prescribed system of credits is excessively detailed, and the size of the loan to every enterprise is determined

[60] *Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody*, No. 6, 1966, p. 805.
[61] *Partinaia zhizn*, No. 17, 1963, p. 22.
[62] See *Zaria Vostoka*, Jan. 31, 1967, and *Pravda*, Feb. 18, 1967.
[63] *Izvestia*, Nov. 5, 1966.
[64] *Tekhnologiia i organizatsiia proizvodstva*, No. 5, 1966, p. 5.
[65] *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1966.
[66] *Finansy SSSR*, No. 6, 1966, pp. 3-11.
[67] *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1965, p. 10.
[68] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 32, 1966, p. 13.
[69] *Finansy SSSR*, No. 6, 1966, p. 20.
[70] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 11, 1966, p. 6.
[71] *Trud*, Aug. 27, 1966.

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from above"; thus calls have been made for increased autonomy for the local branches of Gosbank.[72] One chief bookkeeper summed up his experiences with Gosbank with the remark: "It is easier to obtain bird milk in its natural form than a bank loan." [73]

A plausible proposal relating to bank credits was recently put forward by the mathematical economists V. Belkin and V. Ivanter.[74] Since enterprises do not at present receive any interest on funds deposited in the state bank, they tend to keep deposits at a minimum level and often commence projects with inadequate resources. This leads to the dispersion of resources, ties up capital in unfinished projects, and is partly responsible for the low rate of return on capital. Belkin and Ivanter suggest that Gosbank should encourage enterprises to make their surplus capital available to others who could use it to better effect by paying a reasonable rate of interest on their deposits. This rate should be a little under that charged by the bank for credits. The interesting implications are, of course, that if such a capital market under the aegis of Gosbank were to be established, a logical extension would be the payment of a comparable rate of interest on the savings deposits of private Soviet citizens, which in its turn would provide a legal basis for unearned income!

Price Formation

The reforms provide for the enterprise manager to be guided to a greater extent than hitherto by the indices of profit and profitability. However, unless prices are rational, profit calculations cannot be rational and cannot yield rational decisions. It is to be regretted that in the sphere of price formation, where the need for radical change is most urgent, the Soviet authorities have shied away from relinquishing any significant powers to the forces of the market.

From the guidelines announced by Kosygin in September 1965 and elaborated by Sitnin the following January,[75] it is clear that the principles behind the price revision scheduled for this July differ only marginally from those on which its predecessor of July 1955 was based. This extreme conservatism may be deplored, but it is also understandable in the absence of any general agreement among Soviet economists as to what constitutes a price and among high Soviet officials as to how these prices should be formed.[76]

Some light was shed on the physical enormity and complexity of the task confronting the all-union, union-republic and local price-setting organs in a recent article in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* that described the tortuous calculation required in determining the price of just one item (in this case a pair of felt boots).[77] Yet there are some eight to nine million prices to be administered in the Soviet economy, which presumably means that there are many billions of price relationships to be adjusted simultaneously. No computer exists or is likely to be invented in the near future which could cope with such a task. Thus, although the price revision will doubtless be duly announced and lauded on July 1, 1967, price relationships are changing all the time and the new prices will already be obsolescent. On occasion Sitnin must long to change places with Sisyphus!

Conclusion

This review has focussed attention on the problems that have confronted the Russians in the course of reform, contrasting the provisions of the theoretical model with the realities of its implementation. Yet we must not overlook the very real improvements wrought by the new methods of planning, management and material incentives. Prominent among these are the reduction in the number of centrally determined indices, which will increase the operational autonomy of the enterprise manager and at the same time lighten the administrative burden of both the center and the production unit; the replacement of the *val* by the index of products sold, which cannot but reduce visible waste; the substitution of interest in place of the free grant of capital; the strengthening of material incentives and their closer correlation with results attained; the expansion of decentralized investment; the promotion of direct contacts between economic units; the more rational concentration of production units; and the price reform set for

[72] *Izvestia*, Oct. 20, 1966.
[73] *Trud*, Aug. 27, 1966.
[74] *Pravda*, Dec. 29, 1966.
[75] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 1, 1966, pp. 12-13.
[76] For example, Bachurin in *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1966, p. 43, and Komin in *Planovoe khoiaistvo*, No. 10, 1966, p. 13, have both openly contradicted Sitnin's stated positions.
[77] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 48, 1966, p. 28.

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July 1967, which, however imperfect, will undoubtedly improve the existing price structure.

While acknowledging that these refinements will improve the working of the Soviet economic machine, we should bear certain reservations in mind. As we have seen, the scope of the reforms is very limited and represents a compromise between what is economically rational and what is politically feasible. The fundamental powers of the central planners have not been diminished, and they will continue to determine input and output mixes. Thus although, for example, the index of profitability has been accorded more importance as a criterion of an enterprise's performance and will influence to a greater extent the scale of material rewards for the enterprise's staff, resources will not respond to higher profitability, and a high profit plant cannot expand output beyond the plan.

The first enterprises to be converted were above-average in their size, efficiency and profitability, so it is hardly surprising that they continued to register an above-average performance. Regrettably, the TsSU has yet to make available any meaningful data which illustrate the effects of the new system on the performance of these enterprises. The real problems lie ahead, when the average and lagging plants are converted, although by that time some of the present difficulties of instituting piecemeal reforms should be overcome.

The experiences of the first year have highlighted bureaucratic inertia as perhaps the most formidable obstacle so far encountered in the path of the reforms. No Soviet Rankovic, at the head of an "anti-party group," can be discerned to be actively sabotaging the implementation of the reforms; rather the blame should be attributed to the resistance to change displayed by Soviet officials at all levels and in all branches. These men have been following set procedures for two generations and can only with great difficulty be persuaded to accept innovations. As yet little managerial resistance can be identified, but it may well appear as the less successful enterprises are converted.

Certain provisions of the reforms, such as the enhanced significance of the production development fund and the extension of financing through bank credits, will take several years to show their full effect, and it is difficult to assess their merits at the present time. There is as yet little indication that the new system is overcoming or alleviating some of the endemic weaknesses of the Soviet economy such as the dissipation of resources, the continuing decline in the marginal efficiency of capital, and the negative aspects of overfulfillment. Many other problems still await solution. The new prices should ensure over-all *branch* profitability, but there will continue to be planned-loss *enterprises;* it is not clear how the incentives system will work in these. Birman and others have posed the question of how unprofitable a plant must be before it is closed down; to this no satisfactory answer has been published. Among other questions that occur: what safeguards exist against the monopolistic or oligopolistic powers of the increasingly powerful associations (*obedineniia*) in the absence of competitive imports? What can be done to curb the excessive zeal displayed in imposing *khozraschiot* (economic accountability) on all kinds of unsuitable sub-units? How much of the material-technical supply system can be operated on a wholesale trade basis in the face of the existing pressure of demand?

The greatest shortcoming of all in this modest program of reforms will prove to be price formation. So long as prices do not give the correct signals, non-optimal products will continue to be made, profit maximization will not necessarily improve the output mix, and plants will have to be compelled to produce non-profitable and less profitable items through the *nomenklatura* list. The second major weakness could well turn out to be the unfavorable reaction or just plain apathy of the workers and employees if substantial increases in productivity and work norms are rewarded with only marginal increases in earnings.

Ideally, to make even this limited decentralization work, it would be desirable to create a bit of slack, to take the tension out of the economy. Yet the reforms have been introduced at a time when the pressure on available resources is as high as ever. The main sources of this pressure are the continuing commitment to a high rate of economic growth; the long-delayed pumping of funds into the agricultural sector in the hope of raising it from its slough of despond; an unremitting endeavor to match the United States' offensive and defensive military capacity; a steady deterioration in the Soviet Union's international terms of trade; and increasing internal inflationary trends. These drains on the economy are not likely to lessen during the foreseeable future. In the meantime the chronic ailments for which the reforms provide a partial remedy will hardly disappear of their own accord. In sum, Kosygin was compelled to begin the course of treatment even though circumstances were far from favorable. It will be interesting to watch how the major part of the Soviet economic body reacts to the prescription during the forthcoming months.

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The Economics of Education

By Harold J. Noah

People have been so accustomed to regarding education as a cultural enterprise, concerned with inculcating in youngsters the great values of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, that the niggling questions of the economist ("What does it cost?" "What does it return?" "Is it distributed efficiently?" "Is it correctly priced?" "Is it being overproduced?" "Is it being underproduced?") smack of sacrilege, suggesting the laying of technocratic hands upon eternal cultural sanctities. When only a favored minority went through formal education, there was perhaps some justification for this unwillingness to examine the supply of and demand for education in the light of economics. The quantity of resources devoted to education was relatively small, and the entire scholastic exercise could be justifiably regarded as related more to the consumption than to the production aspects of the economy. However, the modern economy can no longer support this approach, for the processes of education absorb large and increasing fractions of the Gross National Product. Indeed, in the modern economy education takes on the aspect of a major investment industry, the product of which, in the current jargon, is "human capital."

In the Soviet Union, as in other societies, recognition of these economic facts has come slowly. While education in the USSR has been the object of an enormous amount of study both within and outside the Communist camp, to date investigation into the economics of the Soviet educational system has been limited. It is with this subject that the present paper will deal, concentrating discussion on three topics: (1) Soviet attitudes toward and applications of the relatively new "economic" approaches to education; (2) characteristic structural features of the Soviet educational system that cry out for treatment using the economist's box of concepts; and (3) a number of specific problems that have long troubled educational planners in the Soviet Union and that show no sign of quick solution.

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Concepts and Courses

As it has developed to date, the economics of education comprises three major branches. The first, and oldest, is most conveniently described by the German term, "*Betriebswirtschaft*"—that is, economics of the enterprise. For our present purposes, the "enterprise" is the school, or school district, and the questions asked by the economist are those concerned with financing, techniques of production (teaching), efficiency, techniques of cost-and-quality control, and the smooth integration of various parts of the educational enterprise. Soviet economists have shown a keen interest in one aspect of this branch of the economics of education. There

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is a voluminous literature in Russian on matters of budgeting, costing, and administering education.[1] But for the most part such study displays a slavish concern simply to explain official regulations, abjuring any theoretical discussion or critical approach. There is virtually no recognition of the problem of providing education efficiently, except in crude terms of how to keep expenditures per unit (per pupil, or per class) below the norms set by the central authorities. Discussion is almost totally absent concerning the desirability of substituting relatively cheap inputs for relatively dear inputs in the schools, or about ways of doing this, or about the limits to which substitution should be carried.

The second branch of the economics of education is concerned with attempts to relate the output of the educational system to the needs of the economy for educated labor. Of course, this too is an old concern of governments. Peter I established many schools of navigation, mathematics, and the industrial arts in order to lessen Russia's dependence on expatriate skilled manpower, although his educational and training innovations were hardly comprehensive in scope. When this is done on a broad scale, covering most of the manpower needs of an economy, we can talk about an "education and manpower plan." The Soviet regime inherited from the Tsars a population which had been making rapid strides in educational attainment, especially in the cities.[2] Ideology and economic interest both pointed in the same direction—toward an ambitious program of eliminating illiteracy and building an educated proletariat and peasantry from one end of the Soviet Union to the other. With the advent of the "planning era" in 1927, the first conscious attempts in history were made to relate the output of school graduates to the labor needs of developing industry on a comprehensive scale. The Soviet planners estimated not only in terms of raw material and intermediate product "balances," but also in terms of "labor balances." It was all done pretty crudely—for that matter, it still is done pretty crudely—but it was a beginning.

These first two branches of the economics of education are intensely practical in nature. They have direct applications to the enterprises which constitute the schools, and the value of studying them is immediately apparent to working administrators. The third branch of the subject presents a different aspect. It arises out of the attempt to estimate the importance of the educational factor in explaining such empirically observed phenomena as differences in pay and earnings, differences in unemployment rates, patterns of migration, demographic variations, occupational choice, economic growth, and so forth. The last ten years have seen an impressive growth in this branch of the economics of education in the West. If we designate the first two branches as the "engineering" aspects of the economics of education, this third branch is the "science" of the subject. It seeks causal explanations of observed phenomena, and is only indirectly concerned with practical applications and the making of educational policy.

In Russia development of this aspect of the economics of education has been hesitant and incomplete. It began early, in 1896, with the publication of a collection of articles which investigated the relationship between literacy and factory workers' earnings and between education and promotion to higher skill-grades, the ability to master new skills, and so forth.[3] The authors of this collection showed that they were not only acquainted with the preliminary work in the field that had been undertaken in the United States, England, France and Germany, but that they were quite able to carry these studies further in the context of burgeoning Russian industrialization. After 1896 there occurred a 20-year hiatus in such work. Then in 1924, S. G. Strumilin published his famous article, "The Economic Significance of National Education," in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*.[4] The opening paragraph

[1] See, for example, P. I. Zubok, *et al.*, *Finansirovanie prosveschcheniia: sbornik zakonodatelnykh materialov*, Gosfinizdat, 1946; N. A. Pomanskii (comp.), *Finansirovania prosveshcheniia i zdravookhraneniia: sbornik postanovlenii, rasporiazhenii, i instruktsii*, Gosfinizdat, 1949; E. I. Selina, *Finansirovanie kulturno-prosvetitelnykh uchrezhdenii*, Gosfinizdat, 1954; L. Potekhin, *et al.*, *Planirovanie raskhodov na soderzhanie uchrezhdenii prosveshcheniia i zdravookhraneniia*, Gosfinizdat, 1955; and the second edition of this work, published under a slightly different title in 1962.

[2] This is a fact that has been much ignored, overlaid as it has been by Soviet figures of illiteracy and lack of schooling under the Tsars, especially in the rural and Moslem areas. The census figures of 1897 reported a literacy rate of 21 percent; this had risen to about 40 percent by 1914. "Another decade of the same rate of development would have solved the problem of illiteracy and would have placed Russia amongst the most progressive countries"—Nicholas Hans and Sergius Hessen, *Educational Policy in Soviet Russia*, London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1930, p. 7.

[3] I. I. Ianzhul, *et al.*, eds., *Ekonomicheskaia otsenka narodnovo obrazovaniia*, St. Petersburg, 1896; 2nd edition, 1899.

[4] S. G. Strumilin, "Khoziaistvennoe znachenie narodnovo obrazovaniia," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 9-10, 1924.

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skillfully combined the practical and theoretical implications of the research he reported:

The work launched by the State Planning Commission on a ten-year plan for expanding the network of schools of the National Commissariat for Education, with a general view to reconstructing our national economy and with the particular aim of satisfying the needs of the country by improving the degree of skill of the labor force, has again presented us, though in a different guise, with the problem of the more important factors in the degree of skill of labor.

Strumilin then went on to report the results of empirical investigation into the relative importance of age, length-of-work experience, formal education, and on-the-job training for the skill-level of a group of Leningrad workers in the metal trades, and to estimate the returns which the country as a whole might expect from investment in universal primary and secondary education. The calculations of returns made no provision for discounting the value of future returns back to the date when the costs were to be incurred, nor did Strumilin make allowance for the probable intercorrelations between additional education and greater intelligence, better health, and parental and class factors —all of which must give an upward bias to his calculated figures of returns to education. But the article stands as a signal contribution to the development of the economics of education: it stood virtually alone in Soviet economic literature until the contributions of V. E. Komarov in 1959,[5] and it was paralleled nowhere in the West until T. W. Schultz's contributions in the late 1950's and early 1960's.[6] The intervening 30-35 years witnessed a gigantic expansion of Soviet education,[7] but as far as the published record goes, this was accomplished without the benefit of economic analysis of the alternative routes which expansion could have taken and of the set of routes actually followed.

As the economic problems of providing education multiplied and as the demands made by the planners upon the educational system increased, interest in the economic analysis of education finally revived in the Soviet Union. This coincided with an increased political acceptance of empirical studies of social phenomena (witness the recent mushrooming of empirical sociological research) and led to the establishment in 1964 at the Lenin Pedagogical Institute in Moscow of a "problem laboratory" devoted to the "socio-economic problems of education" and dedicated to pushing forward with empirical study.[8] A couple of conferences have been held, and a book containing papers read at the first conference has been published under the general editorship of V. A. Zhamin,[9] an economist who also happens to be Rector of the Institute. One can safely forecast that the laboratory will have much work to do, for despite Soviet insistence on planning both educational and economic development, the study of the economics of education has been as neglected in the Soviet Union as it was until quite recently in the West. At last, however, the need for study seems recognized. After all, the Soviet Union is not a country with resources to squander, and in trying so hard to reach and overtake the advanced countries of the West, the planners have created a host of competing demands upon its wealth. Education secures a formidable slice of these scarce resources,[10] and is therefore expected to make the best use of what it is given and to help as much as it can in solving some of the pressing economic problems of Soviet society.

The Structure of Education: Assets and Liabilities

Turning from these general remarks to some of the characteristic structural features of Soviet education, let us try to determine where economic analysis might be applied with profit.

[5] V. E. Komarov, *Ekonomicheskie osnovy podgotovki spetsialistov dlia narodnovo khoziaistva*, Izd-vo Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1959; and V. E. Komarov, "Ekonomicheskie problemy vosproizvodstva kvalifitsirovannykh spetsialistov," in *Problemy politicheskoi ekonomii sotsializma*, M. Rabinovich, ed., Gos. izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1959.

[6] See Theodore W. Schultz, *The Economic Value of Education*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963, for a summary of Schultz's own contribution and a survey of the contributions of others.

[7] By 1960, there were 36.2 million enrolled in formal general education, 2.1 million in secondary specialized education, and 2.4 million in VUZs, compared with 12 million, 189,000, and 169,000 respectively in 1927. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1964*, p. 667, and *Cultural Progress, loc. cit.*

[8] G. Vokhmianin and V. Ermolaev, "Ekonomiki obrazovaniia," *Uchitelskaia gazeta*, Oct. 29, 1964, p. 2.

[9] V. A. Zhamin, ed., *Aktualnie voprosy ekonomiki narodnovo obrazovaniia*, Izd-vo "Prosveshchenie," 1945. This work will be published in English by F. A. Praeger, New York, in December 1967 (tr. & ed. by Harold J. Noah).

[10] In 1962, schools of general education alone cost the state 3.9 billion rubles. This was a sum large enough to cover the annual salaries of 3.75 million Soviet teachers. (For the US in 1966, the comparable figure was 3.6 million teachers.) The state spent 9.1 billion rubles in 1962 on all formal education activities—or about 11 percent of the entire state budget. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo v 1964*, pp. 636-47.

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In the educational system of the United States the unit of control is usually quite close to the unit of production. Thus, there are thousands of relatively independent local school boards, each running one or two schools and each with its own taxing powers, salary schedules, and administrative rules. (There are exceptions—*e.g.*, the huge New York City school network and the state-administered system of schools in Delaware—but these are not typical.) In American higher education, too, there is not one system but a multiplicity of systems, each composed of a single institution or a very limited number of separate institutions.

By contrast, the outstanding administrative and economic characteristic of the Soviet educational system is the degree of central control over the more than 220,000 producing units that make up the system, enrolling in all about 53 million students.[11] Although there is formal decentralization of control from Moscow to the Union-Republic ministries of national education and of secondary-specialized and higher education, in practice the republic-level ministries are little more than executive arms of the central ministries and exercise only minor policy-making powers. Again, although financing of the schools is formally arranged through Union Republic channels, in all matters of budget and finance federal prescription and control is predominant.

Now this bears directly on one of the most critical areas of the economics of education: the problems occasioned by the external capture of returns to education. In the United States, with its myriad of small school administrations, any particular school board knows that a large fraction of the returns to the schooling it provides will be captured in the future by other areas. The children at present in the schools will move out of the district during their adult lives, and those other areas will become the beneficiaries of their schooling. Some school boards can hope that what they lose on the swings of out-migration they will gain (or more than gain) on the roundabouts of in-migration, but there can be no guarantee that this will be so. There is thus a considerable incentive for an area which believes it will be a net loser on account of migration to reduce its commitment to education, and to follow the precept that returns which it will not capture will not be considered when fixing the size of the investment to be made. Although each area of the country has a tangible interest in the level of educational provision of all other areas, to date only the most rudimentary apparatus has been devised for expressing that interest in the form of incentive grants, federally-impacted area grants, equalization payments, and so forth.

In principle, one of the great economic advantages of any centrally administered and financed system of education, such as the Soviet system, is that it can deal with the problem of externally-captured returns. It can take the long view and the broad view. Although young people in the rural areas of the Soviet Union display as intense a desire to move to the towns as do young people in the West, no rural *oblast* or *raion* education authority has a fiscal incentive to cut back on its provision of schooling. All returns can be regarded, and it seems are regarded, as going into one big collective pot. In consequence, no single authority need think in terms of equating costs and returns on its own separate investment. Indeed, this writer's research seems to indicate that the Soviets have succeeded in reducing the differences in elementary and secondary education from one republic to another (as measured by expenditure ratios) far below the level of the differences between states in the United States[12]—which is no mean achievement, if one recalls the gross differences between levels of school provision in the various provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

Centralized control of the Soviet educational system goes far beyond the regulation of enrollment totals at all levels and the standardization of admissions, curricula, textbooks, graduation examinations, and teaching qualifications and conditions of service. It extends from these types of "physical" planning controls to some interesting aspects of "pricing." All-Union legislation sets forth uniform salary schedules according to which all school teachers and university instructors in the Soviet Union are paid. There are the usual provisions for increments, for additional years of training and pedagogical service, but these provisions do not meet the common problem which has to be faced by any wage system based upon a relatively small number of arbitrary wage-differentials—the prob-

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 668, 678.

[12] Harold J. Noah, *Financing Soviet Schools*, New York, Russian Institute of Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 1966, pp. 142-52.

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lem of ensuring not merely equilibrium of supply-and-demand in the *aggregate*, over the entire market, but also in each separate section of the market. The Soviet Union has an extraordinary number of somewhat unpleasant (or at least unpopular) and remote places in which teachers are needed but to which they are normally reluctant to go. To meet this problem, teachers (like all other workers in the Soviet Union) who elect to work in the less favored areas are eligible for *nadbavki* (supplements), which are calculated as percentage additions to their total pay. These supplements can go as high as 100 percent for work in the Far North and on the Sakhalin Islands. But even these incentives can prove inadequate, so that one device has been retained long after its general abandonment in the labor market: that of assigning newly-minted graduates, for periods of two to three years, to jobs which they would not voluntarily undertake.

Pricing policy for teachers' labor affects not only the total supply of labor offered in teaching and the geographical distribution of that supply, but also its sex composition and "quality" distribution. Soviet teachers are heaped with honors and praised in the mass media. They serve in the Soviets of Deputies at all levels of government, and represent their country abroad. But they are paid very poorly. Average earnings in school teaching do not exceed average industrial earnings.[13] This has its inevitable effect on recruitment into the profession, which is overwhelmingly female and heavily weighted towards the humanities. Science and mathematics teachers, who have good opportunities for better-paid work outside the schools, are exceptionally scarce. Uniform salary schedules for all Soviet teachers produce the usual result associated with rigid, administered wage systems: while it is not too difficult to ensure equilibrium between supply and demand in the aggregate, it is very difficult to achieve a balance within the important submarkets of the teaching profession.

In higher education, by contrast, even though there are similar all-Union regulations governing rates of pay and hours of work, earnings are much more flexible. The university teacher has available a potentially wider array of sources of supplemental income: royalty income from writing (especially textbook writing), consultation work, extra teaching and, most important of all, the "personal supplements" which can be paid to him quite unrelated to his formal income from employment and which may double, treble, or quadruple his official base pay. In consequence, most of higher education seems to suffer from few of the labor supply problems of the schools. Not only does the instructor in a VUZ (higher educational institute) receive his full measure of praise in the contemporary Soviet social hagiography, but the economic value of his services is recognized in cash to a highly satisfactory degree. Or at least this is so in all those branches of higher education that enjoy high planning priority—the natural sciences, mathematics, engineering, and the medical schools. Teachers in pedagogical VUZs and those concerned with training language specialists, economists, lawyers, and social scientists are much less generously treated.

Centralized regulation of rewards for the labor inputs of teachers into the educational system is paralleled by similar controls over the "price" of

On "Buying" an Education

—"You mean those students competed to get in? The rascals!" (Sign upper right: "Admissions Committee.")

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 20, 1966.

[13] Average earnings of professional school staff in the year 1959-60 were between 784 and 831 (old) rubles a month, compared to the factory workers' estimated monthly average of 800 rubles during the 1950's. Noah, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79, and Leon M. Herman, "The Seven-Year Haul," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1959, p. 14.

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student labor inputs. Over 80 percent of all students enrolled in secondary specialized and higher education are supported by public grants.[14] Most of the remainder are on paid study-leave from enterprises or farms. Very, very few students are supported at VUZs entirely by their parents' contributions. Thus, in the Soviet Union the students' further education beyond secondary school takes on the aspect of a job (albeit an exceptionally ill-paid one) in the service of the state. Now, although *teachers* of different subjects do not, in principle, receive different rates of pay, *students* of different subjects do. Students planning to enter the high priority areas of the economy receive more favorable treatment than those who wish to spend their lives in archaeology, linguistics, or school teaching, for example. And not only are stipends higher, but there are more places available in the natural sciences, mathematics, and engineering departments.

Moreover, students and their families make the decision about what line of training to enter not just on the basis of the level of current student stipends ("pay for study"), but also by reference to future awards ("pay for work"). The still considerable degree of centralized control over wages and income gives the Soviet planners a means to make their preferences felt directly in the labor market—and indirectly in all post-elementary education, through the influence exerted on the student's choice of career field.

In the Soviet education system, therefore, not only is the supply of schooling in all its separate parts "administered," but the shape and structure of the demand for education is controlled to an awesome degree. Nevertheless, recent concern expressed about the shortage of students for pedagogical training, and the massive imbalance that has developed between the number of graduates from higher education and those from secondary-specialized institutions (on which more later), are evidence that the manipulation of supply and demand does not always operate smoothly, even when most of the levers for regulating the system are in the planners' hands.

Soviet education planners have certainly not yet adopted linear programming techniques, and give no sign of even preparing to do so, though they are clearly in a unique position to make the experiment. Once one agrees to examine education as if it were an industry, interesting constructs analogous to production coefficients in industry appear. Pupil/teacher ratios, pupil/classroom-space ratios, pupil/equipment and textbook ratios all present themselves as the required production coefficients for deriving solutions to problems aimed at optimizing the allocation of resources under given constraints. Although there is even less likelihood in the Soviet Union than in the West that prices of inputs will reflect relative factor-scarcities at the margin, techniques of shadow-pricing are available to deal with that problem. Now, one of the brute facts about the production of schooling is that the most important input into the process, the children, is normally very immobile. Thus, even if we know that it would be immeasurably more efficient to close down all the village and small-town schools and collect the children together for concentrated education in a well-staffed, magnificently equipped central "educational plaza," this solution is excluded for other reasons. Education, like retailing, tends to be dominated by small-scale units located more or less where the customers are. In a vast territory such as the Soviet Union, which embraces a multitude of cultures and languages, and which ranges from densely populated urban areas to great stretches of empty wasteland, it is quite clear that not only will the optimum pattern of distribution of educational resources differ from locality to locality, but even the target variables (what one is trying to maximize or minimize) will almost certainly differ.

A quick example must suffice. One of the most important inputs into the educational process is the energy, interest, and eagerness of the students —all those intangible but vital factors we include under the term "motivation." Levels of motivation are linked to culture patterns, which differ markedly even in small homogeneous countries, to say nothing of vast nations with heterogeneous populations. A systematic planning approach to education would want to take these differences into account, by feeding into the decision-model data describing the different quantities of other inputs (teacher time, equipment, school time, homework time, etc.) that have to be combined with different groups of pupils in order to achieve a given level of educational output. It is fair to say that not only is no approach being made to this mode of decision-making in Soviet education, but that the very existence of the problem is not even recog-

[14] Komarov, "Ekonomicheskie problemy . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 163.

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nized. Instead, one uniform set of regulations governing the principal "production coefficients" in education is applied across the entire country. Lip service alone is paid to "local differences." This is most evident in matters of curriculum. Each year since 1931, a single curriculum has been enforced for all schools of general education, whether they serve town children or rural children, Russians or Kirghiz, young workers or old, and day students or correspondence students (apart from some relatively minor variations to take care of language problems).

It is inevitable that variations in students' ages, aptitudes, and abilities as well as differences in their vocational and personal goals make such a straightjacket curriculum highly wasteful of effort and resources. But the very term "individual differences" has been highly suspect in the Soviet Union. Orthodox opinion has held that all children have it within them to succeed through secondary school: failure is attributed to environmental factors (neglectful parents, poor teachers, unhelpful classmates, or temporary and remediable personal failure to meet specific stresses during the process of growing up). Systematic testing of children and especially intelligence and aptitude tests are dismissed as bourgeois frauds, inventions designed to lend an appearance of science to a cynical policy of denying working-class children equal educational opportunities by labeling them "less intelligent."

It is highly interesting that during the last two years there have appeared the first small hints that Soviet educational planners are prepared to accept the idea that individual differences exist and should be provided for. A vast curriculum reform is currently being worked out for every level of Soviet general education, and for the first time in 36 years there will be electives, beginning at present in the upper grades, but possibly extending halfway down the general-education schools in later developments. If this should lead to the development of significant regional variations of curriculum, it will mean a long step forward toward a more efficient use of resources.

In this section on characteristic features of Soviet education, one last point should be touched upon briefly—the treatment of education in Soviet national income accounting.[15] Soviet national income accounts distinguish between the "productive" and the "unproductive" spheres of economic activity. Broadly defined, "productive" activity is one which is directly concerned with the output of material goods. Therefore, most services (freight transport and business communications are the usual exceptions) are deemed "unproductive." In Marxist terminology, they do not create a fund of value out of which they are paid, but instead they are remunerated out of the value created in the "productive" sector. The entire education industry in the Soviet Union is thus allocated to the "unproductive" sphere. The interesting point is that in an advanced society where labor power is itself a produced means of production, and where education plays a vital role in preparing people for productive work, a correct interpretation of Marx's own writings on this subject would lead to the inclusion of the value of most education (certainly all secondary-specialized, vocational, and higher education) in the total of produced wealth. As early as 1925 Strumilin offered cogent arguments for treating teaching services as a productive activity,[16] yet there is no evidence to suggest that his views have had any influence whatsoever on Soviet national income accounting.

Some Economic Dilemmas

Let me now turn to three specific problems that have long plagued Soviet educational development and that hold special interest for the economist studying the Soviet system.

The first problem concerns the correct allocation of resources *to* education and *within* education. It is not irrational for a community to decide that there is a given minimum of education which all citizens will receive, irrespective of the returns to be expected. Thus, the achievement of seven or eight years of compulsory, free and universal education has been a Soviet social goal now mostly attained.

However, there comes the point when flat assertions of universal rights must give way to a more prosaic calculation of costs and benefits. As far as the total allocation of resources to education is concerned, there is every indication that while

[15] For a fuller treatment, see Harold J. Noah, "The 'Unproductive' Labor of Soviet Teachers," *Soviet Studies*, October 1965, pp. 238-44.

[16] S. G. Strumilin, "The Economic Significance of National Education," *Ekonomiki Truda*, 1925. English translation in E. A. G. Robinson and J. E. Vaizey, eds., *The Economics of Education*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1966, pp. 276-323.

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huge strides have been made, it would have been worthwhile to devote more resources to the schools —even if it meant smaller allocations to the development of physical capital.[17] The best evidence of this is the amount of costly capital equipment lying idle, underutilized, or even damaged for want of cadres with appropriate skills. There is no indication that Soviet planners are doing the kind of calculations required to determine what is the optimum allocation of resources between education, other forms of human capital investment, and physical capital investment. Instead they work, as do planners in all other countries, by rule-of-thumb and in response to a congeries of inchoate political, social, and economic pressures—and in the Soviet case, without the benefit of a system which, however imperfect, allows those with resources to invest to choose their individual goals for investment, thereby creating a capital market in which resources are allocated in relation to some criteria of profitability.

The situation is equally unsatisfactory when it comes to the allocation of resources *within* the educational system, especially in the case of post-compulsory education. There has been a vast overproduction of specialists trained in the VUZs relative to the numbers trained as semi-professionals in *tekhnikums*.[18] The Soviet aim has been to match each professional worker trained through higher education with an average of three semi-professionals. This target has never been met; indeed, current enrollment and graduation trends are taking the Soviet labor force farther and farther away from the desired 3:1 ratio. Moreover, there is no evidence that either the overall target ratio or the specific ratios established for different industries are the result of calculations of relative costs of training and returns from employment. The consequence is that while Russia has startled the world with sputnik triumphs, shown significant achievements in a few branches of basic science, and undertaken monumental projects in civil engineering and housing, the quality of output in many vital sectors of the economy is still exceedingly low. Best Soviet theory is too often startlingly different from average Soviet practice, which gives rise to the suspicion that the "head" of Soviet education may be too large and its "abdomen" too small.

A second problem of interest concerns the incorporation of economic considerations into plans for pedagogical reform. One of the prime motivations for school reform in every industrialized nation is itself economic: the shortage of teachers. The labor supply in education has become relatively more and more expensive. As labor productivity in other sectors of the economy increases, while the technology of the classroom remains unchanged, the cost (in terms of alternatives foregone) of keeping a teacher in front of a class of children, rather than employed elsewhere in the economy, rises inexorably. Movements in the relative wage rates of teachers and industrial workers tend to reflect these differences in rates of productivity growth. The result in the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) is that primary and secondary schools are now facing a phenomenon long familiar in the West—a shortage of teachers. Throughout the 1950's, while the reduced age-cohorts born during 1935-1945 were working their way through the schools, the problem of a teacher shortage was masked. Now it is these smaller age-cohorts themselves that must begin to bear the burden of staffing the classrooms, when a greatly increased number of children are enrolled. Presumably one rational way to deal with the problem is to try to introduce pedagogical techniques which are relatively more capital intensive (for example, mechanical and electronic teaching machines, programmed learning systems, and television teaching). Soviet education experts are pursuing such possibilities vigorously, though no estimates have been published of the prodigious amounts of capital that effective action along these lines would require in the short or long run.

The history of Soviet education has been characterized by only one really radical change in direction. In 1931, the progressive, relatively unstructured educational methods of the 1920's were officially abandoned, and the schools were clamped into the rigid, highly codified system which has lasted to this day. But within this second period some experimentation has taken place, mostly on a small scale, although in one or two instances reforms have been major. Thus, in 1958, Chairman Khrushchev announced that Soviet education was to be rebased on the polytechnical ideal, and after a half-year of vigorous debate in the pro-

[17] This point is interestingly discussed in Branko Horvat, "The Optimum Rate of Investment," *Economic Journal*, December 1958, pp 754-55.

[18] Nicholas DeWitt, "High-Level Manpower in the USSR," in Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part III, pp. 808-811. US Government Printing Office, 1966.

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fessional and general press, the school reform law of December 1958 was passed. Apart from the extension of the length of general secondary education from ten to eleven years, the most spectacular feature of the reform was the requirement that all pupils in the three senior grades of secondary school were to be occupied for one-third of their school time (two days a week out of six) working in factories or on farms. Pupils were required to master two different production trades during the three-year period, and without these qualifications they could not expect to receive their *attestat zrelosti* (high school diploma). At the same time, it was emphasized that most young people of 15-16 years of age would in any event be expected to stop *full-time* schooling after Grade 8, and to complete their secondary schooling by studies on a part-time basis.

While in the Soviet Union there was only one (official) explanation given for this upheaval—the desire to "bring the schools closer to life"—in the West it was suspected that pressing manpower shortages also had something to do with both the nature and the timing of the reform. The suspicion was no doubt justified—but this does not mean that the educational reforms of 1958-59 represented carefully thought-out plans based on a considered view of the economic needs of the country. On the contrary, the discussion at the time, as well as subsequently when the reforms were abandoned, showed them to have completely ignored important economic aspects of education. V. A. Zhamin, who has already been mentioned, had this to say:

It is no secret that because of lack of system and the episodic character of economic calculations, reforms in education have led in many cases to serious errors which have caused great material loss to the state. Let us take, for example, the question of production training for students in senior grades and the introduction of 11-year education in secondary schools. It was decided upon without any serious preparatory calculations of any kind. . . . According to survey data in Moscow, Kiev, Lugansk, and Sverdlovsk, only 11 to 12 percent of graduates from schools with production training actually entered work in production. Moreover, only a quarter of them were employed in those specializations for which they had been trained in school. Plans to train pupils for specific trades did not correspond with the needs of the national economy for those types of personnel. . . . From 1959 to 1963 almost as many workers were trained as sewing-machine operatives as would be needed for the complete replacement of the labor force currently engaged in this specialization. . . . It is impossible to estimate even now how much was wasted because preparatory economic work in the reform of education was neglected. Not only in individual schools or localities, but in the country as a whole, there were no data concerning the cost of the lathes, tools, production and instruction shops which were allotted to, or were especially constructed for, the production training of school children.[19]

These charges are not merely the familiar standard Soviet denigration of the fallen leader. They pinpoint a very important weakness of Soviet educational planning, with roots deep in Soviet society: while the literature and official statements emphasize that foresight, planning, cost-consciousness, and social priorities are built into Soviet educational planning, in practice it has been characterized by a well-nigh breathtaking spirit of "voluntarism," improvisation, and wastefulness. Clearly, the educators must play an important part in finding a remedy, but the job will not be theirs alone; in particular, the economists should find plenty with which to busy themselves in the next few years.

The final problem to be considered concerns the costs of education. The Soviet government exercises strict control over every detail of school expenditure. Administrators are hedged around by a thicket of regulations, budgeting precedures, and audits which make it very difficult indeed to spend extravagantly. Yet during the whole of the 1950's, when enrollments in schools of general education fluctuated quite widely, ruble outlays per pupil rose remorselessly. Specifically, between 1950 and 1961 money outlays per pupil in the schools rose by 56 percent (this in a period when prices generally fell); in terms of constant rubles, expenditures per pupil rose by no less than 79 percent. In higher education, the cost picture was brighter, but only because of the widespread introduction of correspondence and evening instruction. This meant that although costs per student *enrolled* in higher education declined by about 10 percent in real terms during the decade, lower success rates caused costs per student *graduated* to follow the same sharp upward path as in the elementary and secondary schools.[20]

All the signs point to a continuation of these trends. The Soviet school system is one of the most labor-intensive in the industrialized world. This is reflected in the low average pupil/teacher ratio (about 19:1) and in the high fraction of the total budget for the schools which goes to pay

[19] V. A. Zhamin, "Aktualnye problemy ekonomiki narodnovo obrazovaniia," in Zhamin, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
[20] G. Vokhmianin and V. Ermolaev, *op. cit.*

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wages and salaries (about 73 percent in 1960).[21] If the government is intent on maintaining this high staffing ratio, it is going to have to raise teachers' salaries substantially above the rates in force during the 1950's. Indeed, at the end of 1964 teachers received a raise generally increasing their pay by about one quarter, and this in itself will do much to keep the cost-curve of schooling on an upward path. One may speculate that the Soviet authorities are just at the beginning of their difficulties in trying to keep the schools staffed with an acceptable number of well-qualified teachers, while also managing to keep costs within bounds.

In the United States there may be some justification for the hope that new techniques of education, using relatively less labor and relatively more capital, will keep costs down. The writer sees no hope that this will be so in the Soviet Union, where it can be assumed that the relative scarcities of labor and capital are just the reverse from the situation in the United States. Substituting capital for labor in the Soviet Union is still likely to mean replacing scarce resources with still scarcer resources. This can never be a cost-reducing process in real terms, whatever the accounting benefits may be—for the latter are the wholly misleading consequences of the failure of prices and incomes to reflect relative resource costs at the margin.

The main "cost-raisers" in the Soviet system are the small, so-called dwarf schools for Grades I-IV in the rural areas, each with about 30-40 pupils. In 1962-63, there were still no less than 105,000 of these tiny schools, enrolling 4.3 million children out of a total rural enrollment of 10.4 millions in Grades I-IV. These figures mean that every other institution for education in the Soviet Union is a tiny rural elementary school, which is very expensive to maintain in terms of costs per pupil. It is upon the elimination of these "dwarfs" that the economists concerned with school costs in the Soviet Union pin their hopes. Thus V.A. Zhamin contends:

It is evident that it is worthwhile substituting wherever possible large schools (with a 500 to 1,000 enrollment) in place of small schools, and organizing the transport of the children. In those localities where good roads do not exist, it is necessary to build boarding schools.[22]

The writer is by no means convinced a consolidation of schools would in fact reduce costs under Soviet conditions. A consolidation program would mean substituting one bundle of costs for another, and there is no guarantee that the combined total of extra costs for transport and/or boarding schools would be less per pupil than the present wasteful use of pedagogical labor and resources in the dwarf rural schools. What consolidation might do (though nobody has proved it) is to improve the effectiveness of instruction, in which case the Soviets would be getting more for their money.



Занятия начались... Рисунок Г. АНДРИАНОВА

A Comment on "Dwarf" Schools

Caption: "School's Open . . ."
Signs on School: "Closed," "Repairs."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 25, 1966.

[21] Noah, *Financing Soviet Schools*, p. 131.
[22] Zhamin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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But per pupil costs could still be as high, if not higher, than before, and if the Soviets should decide to try to solve the cost problem by resorting to boarding schools, the costs could go very high indeed.[23]

Conclusion

For all the problems described above, there can be no doubt that Soviet educational policy—in line with Soviet social policies in general—is entering a new phase of development based upon an empirical orientation. Soviet planners and policy-makers in education are finally throwing off the blinders of simple ideology. Increasingly they are prepared not merely to take the brute facts of Soviet society into account when framing their plans, but also to acknowledge publicly that those facts must be diligently searched out, whether or not they correspond neatly to the textbook categories of orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory. Thus, part-time and correspondence training is now acknowledged to be an unacceptably costly way of producing skilled workers for the national economy, whatever the ideological benefits may be of integrating the student into the world of work and the worker into the world of study. Similarly, it is recognized that neither propaganda nor incentives have succeeded in raising the ratio of semi-professionals to professionals to the desired level.

Soviet education faces the prospect of a critical labor shortage in the coming years, and it is clear that no amount of pedagogical rhetoric based on Marx or Makarenko will be a substitute for the required massive investment in developing labor-saving educational techniques. Meanwhile, Soviet educational costs have been exhibiting a distressing upward tendency; the late 1950's marked the end of the halcyon period when the Soviet planners could still count on a relatively cheap and adequate supply of good-quality teachers. In such circumstances, we can expect in the future to hear much more about the economics of education from the Soviet Union.

[23] Boarding schools are very expensive relative to day schools. In 1960, for example, the average annual cost to the state of boarding school education amounted to 6,450 (old) rubles per pupil, seven times more than the annual cost per day-pupil. Capital outlays are no less burdensome proportionately. Construction per place costs four times more than the construction of a day school place. For details, see Noah, *Financing Soviet Schools*, pp. 108-09.

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Totalitarianism Reconsidered

By Hugh Seton-Watson

IN THE UNLAMENTED age of Stalin, Soviet politics had a certain grisly simplicity. Western students of the subject were well aware how little concrete information there was, but the general pattern was clear, like the outline of a great mountain peak looming through the mist. In the age of Khrushchev everything was in flux. The amount of factual material increased every year, but the frequent reorganizations of institutions made it difficult to discern the shape of the structure. To change the metaphor, the Soviet system made one think of an old house with several wings, each of which was being rebuilt in a different manner, some portions being on one floor only and others having twenty stories, with a whole series of barns and outhouses being added and demolished in rapid succession. Since the removal of Khrushchev there has been even more information—but no less confusion.

The three books under review * will help the inquirer after truth, though none of the authors could hope fully to satisfy him. Professor Barghoorn is a veteran in the field. His latest work maintains his high standards. He is especially illuminating on the role of propaganda, indoctrination and training, and he has an excellent chapter on recent trends in the Soviet judiciary. The occasional deadpan references to his incarceration by the KGB give a special personal flavor to his narrative. His experiences certainly did not affect his fairmindedness or scholarly application. Professor Meyer, who already has to his credit three interesting works on Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice, has produced a general survey of the Soviet political system, full of thoughtful discussion and based on a mastery of detail which is all the more impressive because it is comparatively unobtrusive. Mr. Azrael's book covers a subject that is more limited but of the greatest importance—the relationship between the managerial elite and the political rulers. He provides an excellent historical survey of the relationship, explaining the successive phases of Communist Party policy—the employment of "bourgeois specialists," the use of "red directors," the training of experts in the period of the first two Five-Year Plans and the nature of the managerial elite as it has developed since the Great Purge. In his Introduction and in his brief Conclusion, he gives us some perceptive observations on the role of the managers in contemporary Soviet society and the prospects for the future.

As it is impossible in limited space to comment even on all the major problems treated in these three works, I shall confine myself to two themes: the political role of the managers and the utility or irrelevance of the concept of "totalitarianism" in relation to the Soviet regime.

MR. AZRAEL QUESTIONS the view that the managers are the "gravediggers of communism." This was first put forward, I think, in a stimulating book by a young Soviet exile, German Achminow,

* Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the U.S.S.R.*, New York, Little Brown & Co., 1966. Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation*, New York, Random House, 1965. Jeremy R. Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.

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entitled *Die Macht im Hintergrund*, published obscurely in Ulm in 1950. Since then it has been taken up and elaborated both in sophisticated treatises of political science and in the half-baked clichés of the daily and weekly press. Mr. Azrael argues that the fact that this view "has remained so widespread and so intellectually respectable in the face of such overwhelming counterevidence is graphic testimony to the powerful hold that economic determinism exercises over modern political analysis." He is absolutely right, of course, and he is also right to note that economic determinism is not confined to Marxists, but has deep roots in Western liberalism. Some of the most naively optimistic views of the Soviet Union, as already ruled by managers, come from highly conservative Western businessmen or their journalistic mouthpieces. In reality, Soviet managers have had little political power, and the institutions which they dominate have little influence on the making of policy. "The only periods during which they have acquired a certain independence have been those in which the central leadership has been internally split . . . Managerial power has been both marginal and contingent. . . . The probability is high that this power will be used in the future, as it

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has in the past, for essentially functional, system-supporting goals."

But there is more to the problem than that. Though power continues to be held by the party hierarchy, it is unlikely that the type of party bureaucrat is not being changed by the evolution of Soviet society. It is at least arguable that the mentality of the party bureaucrat and of the manager are coming closer to each other, that the ethos of the governing class is changing, and that this will in time modify the whole nature of the regime.

The point may perhaps be clarified by a comparison with Imperial Russia. In 1900 there was no homogeneous bourgeoisie in Russia: rather there were three middle classes whose highest levels reached into the upper class, but which were divided from each other by vertical compartments. There was a bureaucracy, whose ethos was derived from the traditions of the Muscovite and post-Petrine service nobility. There was a business class, concerned only with its business, and completely subservient politically. There was an intelligentsia, which had begun to be infected by the ideas of Western bourgeois liberalism, but whose prevalent attitude was a rejection of bourgeois values. This rejection combined the arguments and emotions of pre-capitalist noblemen and modern socialists.

In the Soviet Union, too, three functional groups exist in the upper and middle strata of society: bureaucrats, managers (in place of capitalists), and intellectual professions (an expanded equivalent of the old intelligentsia). But fifty years of Communist dictatorship, industrial development, education and indoctrination, intensified for brief periods by purges, have produced a much greater cultural and social homogeneity than existed in the old Russia. The three groups are bound together by an official ethos compounded of potted Marxism, Great Russian chauvinism, and artistic philistinism, which inevitably recalls the mixture of puritanism, imperialism, and philistinism which marked the triumphant bourgeoisie of the age of Joseph Chamberlain, McKinley and William II.

IF A POLITICAL threat to the ruling party from managerial gravediggers of communism is non-existent, the cultural *embourgeoisement* of the Soviet upper and middle strata seems to be a reality. Whether these trends amount to the formation of a new upper class, and whether this should be called a "state bourgeoisie" (in contrast to the "private bourgeoisie" of 19th-century capitalism, so many of whose characteristics it shares) or by some other name, are matters for further argument.

The revolt against the conventional wisdom of this self-satisfied and self-righteous upper stratum comes from the same direction as the revolt against the Autocracy, Orthodoxy and National Principle of Nicholas I—from the intelligentsia in the narrowest sense, especially from the imaginative writers. At present these few can easily be defeated, as Belinski and Herzen were defeated, but they can no longer be completely silenced as in Stalin's time.

That there are differences of outlook within the upper stratum, that the professional criteria of the managers are different from the ideological criteria of the party officials, can hardly be doubted. It is also reasonably certain that many party hierarchs themselves have divided minds—that considerations of efficiency and orthodoxy pull them in different directions. But it seems likely that the long-term trend is towards secularization, towards the diminution of ideological fanaticism. It seems likely that party hierarchs, bureaucrats, managers, scientists and teachers will accept increasingly similar values, which however will be subject to continuous if slow change.

Secularization and *embourgeoisement* are not necessarily grounds for satisfaction, either for Soviet citizens or for the rest of the world: the prevalent ethos of the Soviet upper stratum contains strong doses of arrogance and self-righteousness which are likely to make them hard masters and uncomfortable neighbors for many years to come. However, if one wishes to hazard a moderate optimism, one can hope that revolutionary zeal will continue to decline, that the criticisms of the independent intellectual minority will be increasingly tolerated, and that the leaders of the party will eventually come to the point of abdicating their sovereignty over morality and spiritual life. When that happens, the Soviet Union will have ceased to be totalitarian: what will remain will be the normal struggle for power and social justice that has always existed in dictatorial or democratic states.

OUR THREE AUTHORS are not happy with the word "totalitarianism." While recognizing its inadequacies and the unsuitability of some of the "models" that have been "constructed" on it, Professor Azrael feels that on balance it is worth retaining. I agree with him. Professor Meyer seems to feel that the term has been used in so

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many senses—whether in good faith by political scientists describing different phenomena, or with ideological bias by "political warriors"—that it is no longer a useful part of the vocabulary of politics. Professor Barghoorn's rejection of the word is milder and less emphatic. While Professor Meyer wishes to replace it by more precise terms taken from the English language, Professor Barghoorn shows some signs of being fascinated by the gobbledygook of "systems analysis."

One sees the force of their arguments. Too much was claimed for the notion of "totalitarianism." Some of those who most fiercely argued that the phenomenon was "new" in history only revealed the inadequacy of their historical knowledge. Others exaggerated the importance of features, such as police terror, which, though both odious and important, were not exclusive features of the regimes in question. Some clumsy attempts were made to equate communism with Nazism, in order to pass on to each regime the odium deriving from the other. Often the word "totalitarian" is simply used as a term of abuse for one's opponents—whether in a West European parliament, an African military junta, or a North American student meeting. Underlying many disquisitions on totalitarianism by Western writers is a strong assumption of moral superiority: *our* system is free from these deplorable vices. One recalls the Victorian lady's comment on the affairs of some foreign state: "How unlike the private life of our dear Queen!"

Yet I would put in a plea for a little more reflection before we discard the word "totalitarianism." The word has been misused. It has also suffered from the verbal inflation which is perhaps even more characteristic of our times then monetary inflation. But what about "democracy," "socialism," "liberalism," "dictatorship," "war," "aggression," "security" and "peace"? How much agreed meaning do these retain? Yet can we do without them? And do we make things easier for ourselves if we replace them by the strings of polysyllabic nouns that are so dear to the "systems analysts"? And should one's choice of vocabulary be determined by memories of McCarthyism, doubts about Vietnam, dislike of the mores of American business corporations, or even the desire to escape the smears of the inverted McCarthyists of the New Left?

IT STILL SEEMS to me worthwhile to try to define the characteristics of the Stalin regime, to see how it differed from other forms of government, and to ask in what respects the contemporary Soviet regime differs from it. As a point of departure for discussion, I would suggest the following essential features:

1) the concentration of all political, economic and spiritual power in the same hands;

2) the denial of all moral authority independent of the will of the political leadership; and

3) the denial of any autonomy to private life.

These features, I suggest, were specific to the Stalin regime. Other features were essential to its operation but were not specific: the possession of armed forces, security police, and the most modern means of mass communication, information and mobilization. These were essential, because without them Stalinism could not have operated: they were not specific, because all modern advanced industrial states possess them.

The first of the three specific conditions does, it seems to me, represent something new. Combination of political with economic power has been possible only in this century, but of course this combination has been found, at least in wartime, in states other than Stalin's Russia. The political and spiritual powers were not combined in any Christian medieval monarchy, and it is doubtful whether they were so combined in Moslem states. Perhaps a case can be made for Calvin's Geneva, and there were of course brief episodes such as the Anabaptists of Münster. In Stalin's Russia the party claimed complete spiritual control over its subjects; only one doctrine was tolerated; it was formulated not by a separate priesthood but by the political leaders; and the whole population was forcibly indoctrinated with it by school, press and radio. This was not the case in medieval Europe, still less is it the case in the secularized, morally and ideologically permissive Western societies of today. To compare the status of Marxism-Leninism in Stalin's Russia with that of Christianity in Europe (even in Franco's Spain) or North America, or of Islam in Moslem countries (even in Saudi Arabia) is absurd.

The second specific condition also has no parallel in Western societies (or in Asia or Africa), whether their governments are "democratic" or "dictatorial." It may be argued that modern Western governments are increasingly indifferent to moral considerations, that public moral relativism is leading to moral anarchy, and one may think this a desirable development or not, but no one can maintain with any seriousness that these governments themselves formulate and impose moral criteria.

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The same holds for the third specific condition. However, it is important to note that though the Stalin regime certainly recognized no autonomy of private life, and certainly claimed the total allegiance of its subjects in private and in public, this claim was never made effective. Private life and family life continued to exist. Moreover, individual Soviet citizens continued to observe traditional moral criteria. But we are discussing the regime, the principles and motives and policies of the leaders. And from this point of view, the essential point is that these claims were made.

A regime which possessed these specific features differed fundamentally, it seems to me, from both "democracies" and "dictatorships" of the traditional type, and also from past tyrannies, theocracies, monarchies and republics. To what extent these specific features were also found in Hitler's Third Reich, and whether the differences between the Third Reich and Stalin's Russia were more important than the similarities, are complex questions which cannot be discussed here.

There still seems to me to be a good case for giving a specific descriptive name to a regime which possesses these specific features, and "totalitarianism" seems to me the best which has yet been devised. The essence of this type of regime is that it makes *total* claims on its subjects' lives.

A government either is or is not totalitarian: it cannot make "partly total" claims. But the extent to which the total claims are made effective can of course vary widely. Some regimes created by totalitarian rulers are more efficient than others. The complete totalitarian model has never existed in reality: the nearest approaches have been Soviet Russia from 1936 to 1952 and China since 1958. We also find an indefinable intermediate zone if we consider the political attitudes of leaders of some one-party states. Some persons who begin as dictators, without making total claims on their subjects' lives, may become infected with a virus which begins to turn them into totalitarians: Kwame Nkrumah appears to be an example. Others who begin as unquestionable totalitarians may give up such important parts of their claims that they can no longer be considered totalitarian: Tito and Gomulka seem to fall into this category.

WHAT OF THE Soviet Union of Brezhnev and Kosygin? It is clear that the total claims once made by Stalin are now seldom, if ever, made effective. The present rulers of the Soviet Union interfere very little with their subjects' private lives. Considerable areas of freedom are permitted outside the political sphere, but these are precarious, as both writers and artists have discovered to their cost. The police machine is sparingly used. However, it still exists, and it is still subject to the unfettered will of the leaders. There is perhaps less insistence on the sovereignty of Marxism-Leninism over all morality, yet this remains official doctrine, and it remains a fact that Marxism-Leninism is what the leaders of the Central Committee of the party say it is. Russians include as many civilized, sensitive, humane and charming people as any other nation, and many of these are found inside the party, and even inside the party hierarchy. But this, of course, was always true. Any Westerner who, in the McCarthy era, found it necessary to believe that Russians were barbarians and monsters because they had a Communist government was a fool; and if the same man now finds it necessary to believe that communism must be an ideal form of government because he sees that Russians are civilized, sensitive, humane and charming, he is still a fool. No serious student of politics (whether he be an academic political scientist, a "systems analyst," or a plain citizen) should pay any attention to what such a person says.

On balance, it seems to me that the Soviet Union is still essentially a totalitarian state, and that it makes sense still to call it such, using the word "totalitarian" not as a pejorative but as a descriptive adjective. The regime presses much less heavily on its subjects than it did in Stalin's time, and new generations are rising to power. There are good reasons to believe that the basis of totalitarianism is being gradually eroded, but for the time being the foundations stand. The time may come when the leaders no longer claim to possess a monopoly of wisdom, when they no longer assert that Marxism-Leninism is an exact science of human society, when they recognize the independence from the state power of private life, of morality and of man's spiritual development. That time has not come yet, and the Soviet regime remains totalitarian. Life can be enjoyable for those who live under this regime, and it is clear that most of them are not only grateful for recent improvements but believe that the improvements will continue. One hopes and believes that they are right, and wishes them luck.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT and Soviet society are infinitely complex: not even the meticulous analysis of Professors Barghoorn, Meyer and Azrael

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can do justice to all its aspects as they themselves would be the first to admit. This complexity is hardly surprising in a populous, highly industrialized, multinational empire. This does not however seem to me a reason to discard the concept of totalitarianism. The use of the concept does not commit us to a simple demonological view of the Soviet Union. It need not in fact commit us to any belief in our moral superiority at all. It means only that we start from the hypothesis that totalitarianism is a different kind of government from classical liberal democracy, traditional dictatorship, modern mass democracy, or other forms, and should be studied as such.

The last sentence of Professor Meyer's book reads: "Humility, self-criticism, and doubt are among the most essential equipment of all who wish to study the Soviet political system." I agree with him, but I would extend his meaning by omitting the last four words.

Changing Realities in Eastern Europe

By Viktor Meier

IN THE LAST TWENTY years the analysis of developments in the Communist world has built up a virtual science utilizing firmly established concepts and a fixed terminology. This is not without its dangers, for not only communism itself but actual conditions in the Communist countries are currently changing their character with extraordinary rapidity. The conception of the Communist system bequeathed from Stalin's time is no longer valid. Ideological motivations are being increasingly displaced by political ones, and there are individual East European countries where the fact that the regime is Communist has already ceased to have scarcely any relevance for the practical handling of national problems. The logic of a "special" Communist development is giving way to one that is inherent in all authoritarian regimes, whereby ever-increasing importance is placed on national particularities and traditions.

Under these circumstances certain concepts that have arisen from past analysis of the Communist world system must lose their meaning. For example, what justification is there today for continuing to talk of polycentrism when it is clearly apparent that not only those Communist states which seek to pursue a course independent of Moscow, but also those which still rally to Moscow's banner, base their conduct on their own individual interests and historically-developed needs?

Various papers presented at the Fifth International Conference on World Politics in the Netherlands in September 1965, and published in book form last year,[1] inquire into this problem without arriving at any definitive conclusions about it. Yet, one of the participants, Andrew Gyorgy, advances a considerably more realistic view of the question than does the editor of the compilation, Kurt London, who still endeavors to explain the whole process of emancipation in the Communist world as arising above all from the dynamic of communism as a unique system. This is something that seems questionable today. One cannot deny the present East European Communist leaders the label "nationalist" merely because they still profess themselves to be Communists and lean on the Soviet Union, for the nationalist leaders of the 1930's

[1] Kurt London, Ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.

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and 1940's in this part of the world also placed themselves very willingly under the leadership of another great power and joined together in a three-power alliance just as their leftist successors have joined in the Warsaw Pact.

SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS of developments in the Communist world must today start from the specifics of each individual country and must draw its conclusions on the basis not so much of ideological as of political perspectives. In their joint study, *Eastern European Government and Politics*,[2] Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk meet this requirement to a substantial degree. Above all, it is to the authors' credit that they seek to present developments in historical perspective. Indeed, it would not have detracted from the timeliness of their work if they had gone even farther back to include the prewar background not just in some but in all cases. The more the individual East European countries fall back upon their own traditions, the stronger their tendency to reconsider their general development from the point when a radical Moscow-prescribed communism was forced upon them. This tendency "to go back to the starting-point" has been and is being strengthened by recognition of the failure of the Communist system. The forces which shaped the political and intellectual life of the individual countries in the prewar period are slowly coming to the surface once again, albeit in a modified form conforming to new conditions.

The tendency to look backward is especially pronounced in Czechoslavakia, which already in the days of the first republic and the immediate postwar period had realized everything—a free democracy and a highly productive economy—for which the elite of the Czech and Slovak peoples are today striving so assiduously. When Vaclav Benes points to Czechoslovakia as the testing ground of communism,[3] he is without doubt correct, for the catastrophic effects of the Marxist-Leninist system on all aspects of life are nowhere more apparent and undisguised than in the republic of Masaryk. Revisionism can hardly exist here, for whoever begins to scratch the surface of dogmatism in this country does not uncover some "original Marx" or "original Lenin", but quickly runs into the patriarchal figure of the first president. Perhaps this and the country's geographical position are the main reasons for the slow and hesitant pace of change in Czechoslovakia.

In his paper on Yugoslavia in the same book, George Stambuk could profitably have devoted less space to the portrayal of political and socio-economic developments in order to give greater weight to the national question. If one looks primarily to the former in seeking a solution of the problem of Yugoslavia, one risks falling into the simplistic kind of optimism which, for example, one finds in the 1962 study of G. W. Hoffman and F. W. Neal.[4] It is not in workers' self-government nor primarily in the new economic system, but rather in the national question, that the key to the future of Yugoslavia lies.

In the process of differentiation now going on in Eastern Europe, how and to what extent the Soviet Union manifests its interest in the individual East European countries is obviously of considerable importance. The USSR has a vital interest in its position in Germany and therefore maintains troops in the East German Democratic Republic as well as on the intervening territory of Poland; similarly, it continues to station troops in Hungary, but not in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. Already today, in the "unoccupied" countries, there exists a far more optimistic and positive atmosphere which, in the final analysis, stems from the feeling of being somewhat the masters of their own destiny.

IT IS SIGNIFICANT that those who write about Poland or Hungary today generally tend to look backward to the era of 1956 and after, while in the present epoch they can discern few developments that point towards a more hopeful future. This is true of Adam Bromke's paper on Poland in *Eastern Europe in Transition*,[5] as well as of the same author's book, *Poland's Politics: Idealism and Realism*, published under the auspices of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.[6] It is also true of the commemorative volume on the Hungarian revolution of 1956, *Ten Years After*, edited by Tamas Aczel.[7]

[2] Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk, *Eastern European Government and Politics* (in Harper's Comparative Government Series), New York, Harper & Row, 1966.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[4] *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.
[5] Pp. 67-92.
[6] Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.
[7] *Ten Years After—The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966.

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Bromke, like many other authors before him, tries to represent Gomulka's policies as an expression of Polish realism such as had manifested itself in the mid-19th century in the "organic work" (*praca organiczna*) of Wielopolski. This might be true of the immediate post-1956 period, but today this judgment of Gomulka must be revised, for he has since revealed himself as a man of such mediocre stature that his era in Poland must be characterized as one of unparalleled immobilism and a total lack of vision. Gomulka's sole accomplishment lay in the reinstallation of a below-average bureaucratic apparatus after the disintegration of 1956, though he could not return to a totalitarian party dictatorship. As far as reform measures go, Gomulka has taken advantage of only a minimal fraction of the possibilities created by the new relationship with the Soviet Union established in 1956. The economy has generally remained as it was, and in the realm of internal politics the party first secretary has stubbornly indulged in needless controversies with the Church, so that the 1966 celebration of Poland's millenium as a nation, instead of being a demonstration of national solidarity, produced only petty incidents. Out of a barren and unnecessarily exaggerated subservience to the Soviet Union in foreign affairs, the Gomulka regime has also taken on more and more a crudely xenophobic character. Enmity towards Germany, though perhaps necessary to the nation in order to rectify the transfer of its territory, and to the regime as a political rallying cry at home, has nevertheless been built up to such an excess that it has created a pressure on other Communist countries which take a more realistic position on this question. Gomulka's Poland, with its atmosphere of stagnation, depression and anarchy, is well on the way to taking its leave from the modern community of states. Its policies no longer have much to do with "realism."

In Hungary, the existence of a basically analogous set of conditions is veiled by the policies of a more flexible regime which has managed to bring about a certain degree of internal adjustment, and which realistically tries to make the best of any situation. Vaclav Benes rightly leaves open certain possibilities of future Hungarian development.[8] That these possibilities can however only be limited is recognized not only by Benes but also, directly or indirectly, by every one of the authors represented in Tamas Aczel's *Ten Years After*. Hungary today is characterized by a generally state-centered outlook, and one almost has the impression that the question of Transylvania serves in certain circles to make up for the lack of national perspectives. George A. Schoeplin gives a generally objective presentation of this and other minority problems,[9] although he evaluates the situation of the Transylvanian Magyars too pessimistically.

As for Rumania, there has been no comprehensive treatment of that country's politics since Ghita Ionescu's book,[10] which could not take into account the entire conflict with the Soviet Union. J. M. Montias, who has published various noteworthy articles inquiring into the economic aspects of Rumania's independent course, again offers his observations on this subject in his contribution to *Eastern Europe in Transition*.[11] In the same compilation, R. V. Burks appropriately summarizes the results of Rumania's independent policies so far as they were already apparent at the time his paper was presented.[12] Today one would undoubtedly have to call Rumania's attempt to bring into being a new form of general Balkan collaboration based on national interests and to make this region as free as possible from the direct influence of the great powers a vital element of Rumanian policy. One cannot yet foresee whether this attempt will have any lasting success. However, the fact that it is being made can be taken as an indication that East European nationalism need not necessarily lead, as so often claimed, to national dissensions and the splintering of the region.

AMONG THE EAST EUROPEAN Communist states, the German Democratic Republic occupies a special position. Welles Hangen, in his book *The Muted Revolution*,[13] asserts that the process of consolidation in the GDR has reached a point where it is no longer permissible simply to ignore the East German state or to seek to force it into isolation. This thesis is doubtless correct to the extent that the GDR, as the guardian of vital Soviet strategic interests, is closely tied in with Moscow's political objectives, and that it would consequently require a fundamental change in the USSR's German policy for Moscow to acquiesce in

[8] *Loc. cit.* (fn. 2), pp. 140-76.

[9] In *Eastern Europe in Transition*, pp. 117-44.
[10] *Communism in Rumania*, 1944-1962, London, 1966.
[11] Pp. 173-206.
[12] Pp. 93-116.
[13] Welles Hangen. *The Muted Revolution, East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.

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the dissolution of the East German state. It is also true that within the Soviet bloc the GDR represents a significant economic potential and can use this as a means of political leverage, as earlier demonstrated in the case of Czechoslovakia.

What Mr. Hangen does *not* take into sufficient account, however, is the fact that the GDR necessarily remains excluded from the mainstream of present East European development towards greater national consciousness, because with the best of will East Germany can be neither "nation" nor "fatherland." Its only *raison d'être* has been the existence of a Soviet-dominated bloc directed against the German Federal Republic, against Western Europe, and against the West in general. But as actual development in the East moves in a different direction, the GDR—without any action on the part of the West—finds itself falling into an isolation which would continue even if it were to be accorded increased entry into the international community, whether with or without recognition by the German Federal Republic. In such an eventuality, the GDR would still be only the second and lesser German state, without a convertible currency, with second-rate economic performance, and with a permanent need to restrict foreign travel by its citizens, many of whom would otherwise leave.

Antagonism toward the general direction of East European development produces in the East German leadership an irritability which manifests itself in arrogant attempts to influence the policy of the other East European states, in turn provoking matching responses by the latter. Indeed, the day is not far off when the Soviet Union will no longer be able to use the German question as a means of unifying the bloc, and the contribution of the GDR itself to this development is not inconsiderable. Furthermore, there appears to be no compelling reason for always looking at Western policies towards the bloc in terms of whether or not they promote German reunification.

THE MORE THE INDIVIDUAL East European states commit themselves to their own independent lines of action, the more the politico-military as well as economic organizations of the whole bloc tend to lose their cohesiveness. It would be unrealistic to view this East European trend simply as a by-product of the Sino-Soviet conflict, although it cannot be disputed that the conflict did prove highly beneficial to Rumania, for example, in the pursuit of the latter's policy of emancipation from Moscow. The development of East Europe is taking its own independent course, and accordingly the time has come on the side of the West when the policy of "building bridges" to the East can progress from the realm of idealism to that of *Realpolitik*.

In his book *Alternative to Partition*,[14] Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski takes a rather critical view of nationalist currents in Eastern Europe, seeing in them the danger of a new "Balkanization" of the area. His essential argument is that the United States, as a world power, must strive above all for a dialogue with the Soviet Union and therefore can care little for the anti-Soviet oriented nationalisms of Eastern Europe. This thesis seems to reflect the attitude of the present American administration, which would like to recommend "regionalism" and "regional cooperation" as a general remedy for many world problems. One can only point out, however, that any policy must take things as they are, and that so long as the USSR, by reason of its whole character, position and strength, remains the antipole to the Western world, everything that weakens the Soviet Union is, fundamentally speaking, to the West's advantage.

It is perhaps by no means unfortunate that the United States, burdened as it is with the Vietnam conflict, presently feels itself constricted in Eastern Europe. The latter is first and foremost a European problem. Pierre Hassner makes this point very convincingly in his contribution to *Eastern Europe in Transition*.[15] To be sure, certain of the more powerful European states will also be forced to the recognition that they cannot seek a dialogue with the Soviet Union as "world powers" and simultaneously pursue an East European policy that is intrinsically anti-Soviet. At the same time, any effort to draw the Soviet Union into a European system in which the United States would not be equally represented would be not only dangerous but also senseless. A *European* policy for Eastern Europe can have tangible success only if it seeks to counterbalance a lessening of American influence in Western Europe with a like reduction of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Such a European "bridge-building" policy based on reciprocity can perhaps count on only partial success, but it conforms to the realities—and politics is after all the "art of the possible."

[14] Published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. See review by Max Beloff in *Problems of Communism*, No. 4, 1965, pp. 46-50.

[15] Pp. 325-54.

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Labor and Women in the USSR

EMILY CLARK BROWN: *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations.*
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.
NORTON T. DODGE: *Women in the Soviet Economy, Their Role in Economic, Scientific and Technical Development.*
Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

Reviewed by Peter Wiles

SOME ENDS OF COMMUNISM are in contradiction to its chosen means, and some are not. The word "chosen" here implies that they are, in a sense, ends. Intolerance, centralization, command rather than consent, power monopoly, secrecy in government, are *chosen* means. Socialism—or something near enough to it—might be attained without them, so they are not neutral, but in fact ends in themselves. One simply cannot say that such means must necessarily be employed to achieve the particular form of socialism chosen, for there is no scriptural warrant for so rigid and distasteful a form: it did not have to be chosen. The two books before us admirably illustrate this distinction.

In the labor market the democratic and pro-proletarian ends of communism stand in stark contrast to those means which many Communists in fact regard as ends, for example, little free choice between jobs or between techniques, and above all no collective bargaining. And this remains true even if, as does this reviewer, one disapproves of collective bargaining and free trade unions in the first place. If my lack of sympathy with them appears Communist, it is in fact individualist, and the overlap of prejudices is coincidental.

In the treatment of women, on the contrary, there are no such difficulties. The equality of women is eminently compatible with the suppression of free individual choice—indeed it can be enhanced thereby, since many women do not desire "equality." Again the equality of women positively demands the suppression of collective bargaining since such procedures are, in fact, in the hands of men. All radical social changes, indeed, are more likely to be achieved by those who do not fear force. Here, then, is an ultimate end that does not stand in contradiction to the means-that-are-in-fact-ends.

WE HAVE LONG AWAITED an up-to-date "Solomon Schwarz": a blow-by-blow account of what has happened in the Soviet labor market since 1941, when effectually Schwarz leaves off.[1] Miss Brown's is not quite the book needed, though it is sufficiently nearly so to be required reading, at least in parts, for everyone in the field. The author is too deficient in Marxism, in statistics and in economic theory—indeed, too much the old-fashioned type of labor economist—to have done a perfect job; but she has certainly done a very adequate job.

With more Marxism, she would have asked why the phrase "labor market" is never used (p. 11). The answer, of course, is that it is absent from Marx's view of socialism, for it implies an unplanned economy in the hands of non-laborers. Hence

[1] *Labor in the Soviet Union*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1952.

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wage differentials are often not used, but, say, Komsomol pressures substituted, which in the long run do not work; a rate of turnover no higher than in the West is regarded as appalling (p. 34), and great efforts are made to reduce it; it was possible for Stalin to take the entirely retrograde step of abolishing labor exchanges. The *damnosa hereditas* of Marxism has made it very difficult to change these things.

We all know that the Soviet working week is no longer than the American (p. 304). But with real income at about one-third the US level (p. 307), are we not owed an explanation? We would choose to work longer hours to increase our incomes—are Russians so very different? The answer, not given here, appears to be that they are not—but Marxists are.

Greater attention to ideology would also have thrown more light on the role of factory committees, whose genuinely increasing and wholly beneficent role is well described in chapter VI. Why did they come to the fore precisely in 1958? The answer is, of course, the immense attraction of Titoism at that moment, and the need to counter the workers' councils with a more manageable substitute. But Marx, Tito and their"-isms" do not figure in the index.

A labor economist must of course be a good practical statistician to compare real incomes between times, places and persons. The passage on these comparisons (pp. 305-8) is so perfunctory as to leave the reader puzzled: should there not be more than four pages on such things, with appropriate statistical tables? I simply do not believe Professor Brown is as bad a statistician as her omissions imply.

The pure, and even the not so pure, theorist will miss a number of applications of valid theory. What, for instance, is the underlying institutional model of the Soviet nationalized sector? What is the effect of low direct and high indirect taxes on initiative, not to mention the diversion of effort into the black market by the mere height of taxation? Is there any cost-push inflation? Or, better, why was there so much and is there now so little?

To paraphrase George Orwell, inside every average fat book there is a good thin book trying to get out. The thin book in this case is on trade union structure alone. Take the phrase "defense of workers' interests" and its prominence in successive trade union statutes and laws. The story of its absence (after 1928) and reappearance (after 1957) constitutes a thrilling Kremlinological whodunit (p. 65). And did you, gentle Sovietologist, know that workmen's compensation was sometimes chargeable to enterprises (p. 165)? The whole of chapter VI on local unions is, to repeat, a vital contribution to recent Soviet history. We should note in particular the man-in-the-street's increased confidence in his local union (pp. 169-171).

MR. DODGE, ON THE OTHER HAND, has set himself a dry and modest goal, and drily and modestly he has achieved it: a statistical picture of the economic position of women. His task was facilitated by the wealth of Soviet data, which often give the proportion of men to women in this or that group even when the absolute total is concealed. The Bolsheviks have almost achieved their aims in this field, and are proud of them. Even though the economic equality of women falls off at the highest Soviet levels, it is far more nearly achieved in the USSR than in the West. There are, for instance, no professions closed to women—except the military and the priesthood.

However, as we move away from sheer statistics, it is possible to fault Mr. Dodge. For example, he professes (p. 106) not to understand why the separation of the sexes in the high schools, begun in 1942, was abandoned in 1954. Surely, sexual segregation was all a part of Stalin's patriotic-militaristic-traditional-pronating-Russifying phase. The author also detects an anti-feminine bias in Khrushchev's reform of higher education (pp. 3, 115-7) on the grounds that the preference given to those with two years' work experience militated against young married women, and the preference for war veterans excluded them. Yet Khrushchev himself was consciously in favor of women (p. 214). The anti-female bias of Khrushchev's educational reform was surely an accident. The author further speculates that the Soviet authorities have covertly recognized the lower profitability of funds invested in the higher education of women. But since Mr. Dodge's book went to press, Khrushchev's reforms have been rescinded.

Of course, statistics of participation in the labor force and in higher education do not tell us what it is *really* like to be a Soviet woman. For that we must turn to refugee and literary evidence, not exploited by Mr. Dodge. Nevertheless he is not simply a counter of heads, and he does give us a few case-histories. More important, he is a versatile and imaginative exploiter of the hard data, from which he builds up a case for those Soviet women who, despite their professional qualifications, fail to reach the top or to be professionally

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creative (ch. 12). In view of the uniquely favorable opportunities for such performance in the USSR, women's continued failure is very striking, indeed, and needs further study. Mr. Dodge's explanations for this failure perhaps are rightly universal and have nothing to do with the peculiarities of Soviet society—loss of time through childbirth, loss of energy through housework, loss of promotion through being tied to a husband's place of residence, etc. There is also the regional problem of Islam. If there is a genetic factor, Soviet data on student examination performance conceal it as successfully as similar Western data.

Is communism in some way responsible for this? Does it in some subtle and doubtless unconscious way keep women down? It is certainly very striking that women have risen to high political office *less* often in the Soviet Union than in the Western democracies, although they bulk large as judges, doctors, managers, etc. Thus there has been only one Presidium/Politburo member since 1917: Yekaterina Furtseva. This makes her 2% of all Politburo members since 1917. It may be that the Politburo, being freer to disregard the Communist sanctities, allows more anti-feminism to itself than to the state machines or the lower party organs. Indeed much the same applies to the Central Committee; the percentage of women on it varies between two and four (p. 214).[2]

Different in subject-matter and style, these two books nevertheless teach one lesson in common. Leaving aside economic performance, Soviet *society* is an improvement on our own in many respects. If Soviet trade unions cannot bargain, neither can they obstruct. If the Western right to strike produces balanced management and government, the strike itself is social poison. If some official Soviet proposals for the fruitful employment of leisure time are deplorable—how can the country that invented the *druzhinniki* ("people's guards") criticize the Red Guards?—others are easily superior to the offerings of Madison Avenue (Brown, pp. 134, 172). And of course, in the domain of economic equality for women, the USSR is very far ahead of us indeed, even allowing for overwork and a great deal of defeminization distasteful even to career women. It may be that competitive coexistence will become more sociological than economic.

[2] Corresponding Western figures (my calculations): United Kingdom Cabinet, 1928-66—four percent; House of Commons—two to four percent.

Lest He Be Forgotten

EDWARD CRANKSHAW: *Khrushchev: A Career.*
New York, The Viking Press, 1966.
MARTIN PAGE: *The Day Khrushchev Fell.*
New York, Hawthorn Books, 1965.

Reviewed by Richard T. Davies

NEITHER OF THE BOOKS under review is a definitive political study of Khrushchev, nor were they apparently intended for readers who specialize in the study of Soviet affairs. Such readers already have at their disposal three works which plot in detail the political life of the ex-First Secretary: Lazar Pistrak's *The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power* (New York, 1961); Robert Conquest's *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynastics* (New York, 1961); and Michel Tatu's *Le Pouvoir en URSS: de Khrouchtchev à la direction collective* (Paris,

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1967; to be published in English later this year). Those who have read these studies will find little in Mr. Crankshaw's and Mr. Page's books to deepen their knowledge.

Drawing upon his long experience as an observer of Soviet developments and upon some of the sources necessary to an understanding of the Khrushchev era (in particular, he pays a well-deserved tribute to the above-mentioned work of Lazar Pistrak), Mr. Crankshaw has striven to provide a study of Khrushchev in the setting of his times—and presumably one which would inform those who want to go beyond the newspaper headlines, if not those already closely involved with Soviet affairs. How well has he succeeded?

As a generalized summation of Khrushchev's career, Mr. Crankshaw's book has merit. He sees many of the reasons for the First Secretary's fall and for his failures along the way to it. He sees why the people of the Soviet Union not only were not his enthusiastic supporters, but were quite indifferent to his fate just as, in a more general sense, they are indifferent to the behind-the-scenes maneuvers which constitute the essence of politics in the USSR. He sees the irony in the history of a man who was able to fight his way to the top and then was unable either to consolidate his position or to use the enormous power he held to accomplish decisive changes in the state.

Some of the merit of Mr. Crankshaw's view of Khrushchev appears in his summary of the reasons for the First Secretary's removal from office:

He went not because he was reactionary and not because he was liberal, but because he was erratic, unpredictable, unmanageable, now increasingly dictatorial; because, after a solid decade of incessant uproar about agriculture, food production was once more static and showed no signs of rising; because, after all his economic plunging, industrial growth was slowing down most dangerously, consumer goods were still in short supply, and the quality of what was being turned out was often atrocious; because the country was confused and bewildered, not stimulated any more, by his restless dynamism; because in pushing the very necessary quarrel with China to extreme lengths, and concentrating now not on ideological differences, not any longer on China's reckless belligerence, but on the great-power aspects of the dispute, he was shattering to small pieces what was left of Communist unity; because in pursuing his understanding with America, he was giving too many hostages to fortune; because, in the end, he was showing signs of megalomania—as, for example, his essay in personal and private diplomacy through his son-in-law Adzhubei, aimed at coming to an understanding with West Germany (p. 272).

All true enough, no doubt, but one seeks in vain for an answer to the question, "Why did he go in October 1964?" For most of the accusations advanced against Khrushchev in Mr. Crankshaw's summing-up were just as damning a year earlier.

The author's description of the climacterics of Khrushchev's career also lacks precision. The 22nd Party Congress figures only fleetingly in his account, and then only in its relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Cuban missile crisis is seen as little more than a passing episode, following which the sole aim of Khrushchev's foreign policy is said to have been to achieve a détente with the United States. Even Mr. Crankshaw's description of the struggle against the "anti-party group" leaves the reader wondering how Khrushchev really pulled it off.

THE MAIN TROUBLE with the book, perhaps, is that Mr. Crankshaw fails to provide a convincing explanation of the nature of Soviet leadership politics. He asserts that Khrushchev "was never to be the supreme autocrat, as Stalin was the supreme autocrat, though at times he came very near it. . . . the men who had raised him up could, and one day might, pull him down. In the end they did just this." He adds: "It is important to be clear on this immediately . . . it is the key to our understanding of Khrushchev's own rule, and it is the key to our understanding of the country over which he ruled . . . and of the men who ruled with him, the survivors of whom destroyed him when he tried too hard to make himself an autocrat, and who continue to rule without him" (pp. 202-3).

This points toward the truth. But Mr. Crankshaw does not show us in detail, as the story of Khrushchev's career unfolds, how the processes he refers to operated in fact. Thus, he describes many of Khrushchev's acts as motivated by the desire to accomplish certain general goals, without however giving sufficient weight to those factors in the Soviet political environment which enjoined Khrushchev constantly to embark upon risky endeavors, which just as consistently failed.

The absence of real analysis leads Mr. Crankshaw to mistakes in emphasis. Thus, he holds that "from 1960 until the end, the course of Khrushchev's career was dominated by the Chinese quarrel," and he finds it "quite impossible to understand Khrushchev's foreign policy, and a good deal of his domestic policy too, except in the light of his life-and-death struggle with China" (pp. 276 and 277). To be sure, in writing of Khrushchev's foreign policy, something has to be said about the dispute with China. But, leaving aside Mr. Crank-

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shaw's characterization of it as "life-and-death" (no one can yet know whether it will be so for the Soviet Union), it is difficult to see how the conflict with China can be related in any specific way to such undertakings as the Berlin wall and the emplacement of missiles in Cuba. If we were to accept Mr. Crankshaw's emphasis on this point, we should wonder why even more desperate foreign policy ventures are not being undertaken today, when the polemics with the Chinese have risen to new heights.

Mr. Crankshaw sees in Khrushchev's maneuvers of the summer of 1964 his intention of "moving to an accommodation with West Germany. He was getting ready to sell Comrade Ulbricht down the river" (p. 286). Perhaps, but no evidence is offered. Something was in Khrushchev's mind on this score; that is clear. But can we simply assume, without further ado, that he intended to sell East Germany out?

In his final assessment, Mr. Crankshaw considers that Khrushchev "brought the Soviet Union through the great change; he had acted decisively and boldly when others had been afraid to act; he had secured the peace and laid the foundations for prosperity" (p. 287). Now change there had indeed been since Stalin died, but Mr. Crankshaw himself shows that the system, as Khrushchev left it, was fundamentally little altered—Mr. Crankshaw calls it "Stalinism without tears." As for securing the peace, that achievement is better ascribed, for the period of the early 1960's, to President Kennedy. And the current Soviet leadership's continued preoccupation with the basic problems of the economy casts a strange light upon the author's claims that it found the foundations of prosperity already laid.

MR. MARTIN PAGE'S *The Day Khrushchev Fell* was written, according to a statement on the dust jacket, in collaboration with Mr. David Burg, a Soviet-born writer now living in England. Notwithstanding its anecdotal breeziness and calculated appeal to the general reading public, it does a better job than Mr. Crankshaw's book of answering the specific questions to which Khrushchev's fall gave rise. Thus, Messrs. Page and Burg correctly see the immediate precipitant of the Presidium's decision to remove Khrushchev in the First Secretary's insistence upon ramming through yet another "reform," specifically, another scheme of agricultural reorganization, to be considered at the Central Committee plenum scheduled for November 1964.

Mr. Page was the Moscow correspondent of the London *Daily Express* during the period leading up to Khrushchev's fall and beyond it. Employing a minimum of formal documentation, he relies mainly on his own first-hand observations and the reports of other journalists (in particular, he gives general credit to the Moscow reports of *The New York Times* and *Le Monde*) to sketch the events of the first half of October, 1964. His account is accurate. The book is fleshed out with a good description of the life of foreign correspondents in the Soviet capital and with accounts of the reaction in the West and in Eastern Europe to Khrushchev's fall, of the character of the new regime, and of life in the USSR.

Mr. Page does not pretend to provide a study in depth. He does tell what happened and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions. As an approach to producing an account for the general reader, Mr. Page's seems preferable to that of Mr. Crankshaw.

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Reviews in Brief

Soviet Politics

LEONARD B. SCHAPIRO: *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union* (2nd edition). London, Hutchinson University Library, 1967.

THIS EMINENTLY authoritative textbook appears to be more suitable for harried young instructors caught unprepared before a lecture than it is for any but the least ambitious college courses in Soviet area studies. In our age of rapid reading and minimal retention, a text which a student can devour in half an hour has obvious disadvantages. In addition to being short, Leonard Schapiro's book invites the kind of reflection which might be found in the Great Books Clubs but hardly in the classroom, with its current trend away from old-fashioned learning and toward free-wheeling and frequently ill-informed discussion.

It is a pity that *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union* will not be widely read in the one place where it would be most useful, *i.e.* the Soviet Union. We seldom realize how exceedingly narrow and subjective is the Soviet citizen's perception of his political reality, and how unhelpful are indigenous Soviet writings in providing him with a fair and meaningful view of his own world. The Soviet Government, ever anxious to retain a maximum of freedom in the implementation of its policies, is loath to explain to the public the interrelations of its various "measures" or their underlying significance. Nor is the citizen enlightened by the Soviet equivalents of western political scientists, whose discussions of political developments in the USSR amount to little more than embellishments of the current party "line."

In spite of his tendency to blur the picture by excessive use of qualifiers, Professor Schapiro's introductory historical chapters are quite lively. He seems to dislike Lenin more than his successors; he somehow succeeds in making even the cataclysmic seizure of power by the Bolsheviks anticlimactic. His evaluation of Stalin's era is rather circumspect. While deploring high human costs and the violence of the economic policies of the early 1930's, he stresses Stalin's "solid gains," the main one appearing to be his successful leadership in the conduct of the war against Germany. Prof. Schapiro also assumes that the Soviet system "could really only work effectively where one man was in undisputed command." As for the post-Stalin period, he believes that Khrushchev's great innovations have survived his personal demise. He is not sure whether the Soviet Union "still remains in essentials the totalitarian police state which Stalin built on Lenin's foundations," but is cautiously optimistic that "it may prove very difficult to reverse the process to which Khrushchev gave such a powerful initial impetus," and which "may have started the Soviet Union along a path of evolution of which the end cannot be foreseen."

The remaining two-thirds of the book correspond more closely to its title, representing a very competent, dispassionate, and up to date analysis of the components of the Soviet government, their interrelations and functions. Put in clear, unambiguous prose, these chapters readily fill factual gaps in our knowledge of the subject—gaps which, unfortunately, all but the best of us rarely seem to be able to fill.

Vladimir Petrov

Soviet History

JOHN M. THOMPSON: *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.

THIS VOLUME is a detailed, painstaking account of how the peacemakers tried to deal with the problem of Russia during the brief period from the armistice in November 1918 until January 1920. Mr. Thompson based his study on a prodigious amount of research: in addition to reading a large body of published material, he consulted over twenty archival collections and interviewed several participants in the proceedings in France. His work is no doubt the final word on the subject.

The problem of Russia was extraordinarily complex, and Mr. Thompson has succeeded in lucidly presenting all the intricacies. Although the peacemakers were agreed on the wickedness of bolshevism, they differed on the way to cope with the revolutionary regime. There were those, particularly the French leaders and Winston Churchill, who advocated a tough policy in order to crush communism. They were opposed to inviting the new rulers to send representatives to the peace conference and favored massive military intervention to overthrow Lenin's government. Lloyd George and President Wilson, however, pointed to the unwillingness of the people in the Allied countries to fight another war and stressed the enormous expense of new military ventures. Moreover, they feared that intervention might play into the hands of the Communists by making it possible for them to exploit patriotic resentment against foreign interference. In Lloyd George's and Wilson's view, trade with

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Russia and a program of economic relief were the best means of dampening the revolutionary ardor of the Soviet leaders.

The peacemakers not only had to devise a policy toward Russia. They also had to take into account the "Bolshevik menace" threatening Western Europe, an issue that intruded itself into practically all the deliberations. Every country represented at the conference maintained that if its claims were not satisfied, bolshevism would triumph. Not surprisingly, these claims made it extremely difficult to reach rational decisions. The Germans, for instance, insisted that a severe treaty for their country would produce such despair that the people would inevitably turn to communism. But Clemenceau asserted, with no less conviction, that a mild peace for Germany would demoralize the French nation and surely pave the way for bolshevism in France. Mr. Thompson skillfully shows how these conflicting arguments bewildered and frustrated the peacemakers and led them to move from one policy to another, none of which proved to be successful. Ultimately, as the author points out, the difficulties of the diplomats stemmed from their adherence to two assumptions: "that the wicked Soviet regime could not last, and that Allied power could shape the course of affairs in Russia." Operating on the basis of these false premises, the statesmen at Versailles were bound to end their negotiations without formulating an effective policy toward Russia.

Abraham Ascher

The Soviet Army

MICHEL GARDER: *A History of the Soviet Army.* New York, Praeger, 1966.

STUDENTS OF SOVIET military affairs familiar with Michel Garder's *Histoire de l'Armée Soviétique*, published in 1959 and generally regarded as the best historical treatment of the subject in the French language, will not find a great deal new in the present volume. With the exception of some updating of the material in the last of its four parts (dealing with the period 1958 to 1964), and some amplifying footnotes by John Erickson of Manchester University, Colonel Garder's new volume is essentially a straight translation of his earlier book. Nevertheless, it comes as a welcome addition to the relatively small library of competent works available in English on the historical development of the Soviet military system. While not to be compared with John Erickson's own *Soviet High Command* for depth of analysis and wealth of documentary backup, Colonel Garder's book is doubtless more broadly instructive for anyone seeking an overall picture of the genesis and growth of Soviet Russia's armed forces.

As seen by Colonel Garder, a French officer of Russian-German extraction, the Soviet armed forces today represent a synthesis of two heritages—one stemming from traditional Russian values and the other from the Communist revolutionary experience. The fusion of these two heritages was achieved during World War II, when Stalin was obliged to soft-pedal Marxist-Leninist ideology and appeal instead to Russian patriotism in order to rally the country behind the war effort. In the postwar period, the pendulum swung back toward emphasis on Communist values, as the Soviet leaders acted to reassert party dominance within the armed forces, but this did not essentially undo the process of "Russianization" stimulated during the war.

While Garder regards the "Russianization" of the Soviet armed forces as irreversible, he does not suggest that this process threatens party control over them. Indeed, by serving as a medium for the psycho-political education of youth, and as a kind of mixing bowl for party and non-party members as well as different nationalities of the Union, the armed forces have become, in his opinion, a rather effective link between the party and the people. As for the place of the armed forces in the Soviet Union's global strategy, Garder ascribes to them a role that is essentially psychological—to deter outside attack on the socialist world and to help in expanding socialism by "morally" supporting the historical process, as interpreted, of course, by Marxist-Leninist theorists. Only in extreme cases —such as the need to repel a "counter-revolutionary" threat to a Communist regime, as in Hungary in 1956—does Garder judge it likely that Soviet arms would be used to accelerate the process of history through a direct policy of force.

Thomas W. Wolfe

Soviet Medicine

MARK G. FIELD: *Soviet Socialized Medicine: An Introduction.* New York, Free Press, 1967.

THE CHIEF VALUE of this slender volume lies in its comprehensive description of the Soviet medical establishment and how it works. Written for the layman, it broadly surveys the main features of the Soviet system of health administration and presents a fairly up-to-date statistical picture of the physical magnitude and categories of Soviet medical facilities, medical personnel, medical education and research, as well as of various facets of medical cost and financing. Several introductory chapters briefly sketch the historical background, the ideological or theoretical aspects, and the social functions of the system of socialized medicine as it has evolved in the USSR over the last five decades.

Mr. Field has already proven himself a capable and lucid expositor of Soviet medical institutions. In his earlier *Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia* (1957), he focused his attention on the sociology of doctor-patient relations. In his new book, he attempts a more encompassing, albeit largely quantitative, description of Soviet medical institutions and services. By and large, he has produced a highly useful survey, though one that is not without certain shortcomings.

For one thing, it is difficult to understand why Mr. Field attaches so much importance to the fact that the Soviet Union today has 20 to 25 percent of the world's doctors, or why he should view this fact as "disturbing (for Americans, at least)." He seems to perceive some kind of a threat in the prospect that "the USSR, if it so chooses, soon will be able to export physicians to the underdoctored areas of the world (and) has already done so on a limited scale" (p. 204). But if the superpowers are to clash on neutral battlefields, by all means let the weapons be scalpels and hypodermic needles, and let us not fret if the Soviet arsenal of these weapons exceeds all others.

A more fundamental shortcoming is that the author consciously refrains from discussing—and, indeed, provides little information which could serve as a basis for discussing—the question of perhaps greatest interest to his readers: How *good* is Soviet medicine? It

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is not that Mr. Field feels incompetent to treat the issue, but rather that he considers the quality of Soviet medical services a separate question which can be safely laid to one side while he treats the structural and quantitative aspects. He promises to deal with the question of quality in another book, two or three years hence, which will be "intended primarily for scholars in the field of medical organization and administrators of medical programs as well as those specialists interested in Soviet affairs."

This highly unusual procedure raises some interesting questions. Since Mr. Field's future book will by design have a readership "far more limited than that of the present volume," does he not do a disservice to readers of his present book by offering them less than a full loaf? More important, does not an unrelieved presentation of quantitative data on Soviet medicine—data based largely on statistical tables from the *Bolshaia Meditsinskaia Entsiklopediia* of 1959 and other Soviet sources, with only passing comment on the important biases and lacunae these data are known to contain—give the book a certain imbalance which might mislead unsophisticated readers? It is like stating the case for only one side in a dispute, with a promise to clarify obscure points another day. Over-reliance on Soviet official data, simply because they are the most easily, or in some cases the only ones, available, involves as high degree of risk in the field as in any other. The validity of the message conveyed by these data (which are generally designed to demonstrate phenomenal growth rates) is simply too dubious for them to be allowed to stand alone, without benefit of critical scrutiny or explanatory comment.

Comparisons of the Soviet health system with its antecedents or with those of other countries, particularly with the rather singular American model, admittedly pose very complex problems. Perhaps, in fact, there is no entirely acceptable way of comparing like elements in totally unlike settings. How is one to judge, for example, whether more limbs are needlessly amputated, or more deaths caused by faulty diagnosis, under the Soviet medical system than under the American? But if one elects to avoid the sticky comparisons, he should perhaps also forego the easy ones which may tell a misleading story. For instance, the information that except for Israel the USSR has the highest ratio of doctors to patients in the world (20.5 for each 10,000 of population, a ratio double that of the United States) cries out for elucidation.

The fact that 75 percent of all Soviet physicians are women is in itself merely an interesting piece of information. Whether physicians are predominantly male or predominantly female would seem to be largely a matter of taste, or of choice (at least, where a society enjoys the right of choice). But the fact that Soviet physicians as a group seem to have the status of poorly-paid shiftworkers, spending 5½ to 6½ hours a day "on duty" at a clinic or on perambulatory assignment and an equal amount of time at a second job or running the family household, suggests a picture of the Soviet medical profession that is, to say the least, at considerable variance with the situation in other major countries, including some with health services hardly less "socialized" than those of the Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that Mr. Field will soon supplement his present survey with a comparative study based on a much wider range of sources and providing the curious observer with at least some estimate of the quality and human effectiveness of Soviet medicine.

Albert Boiter

Soviet Music

JAMES BAKST: *A History of Russian-Soviet Music*. New York, Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1966.

ENGLISH-LANGUAGE histories of Russian music are scarce. The last was published in 1957 and has been out of print since 1964. Written by the American critic Richard A. Leonard, its usefulness was somewhat marred by a traditional Western point of view and an almost exclusive reliance on material available in English.

James Bakst's new history uses a novel approach—one diametrically opposed to that of Leonard. Bakst's approach to Russian music, of both the past and present, embraces the views of Soviet musicology since the 1930's. Moreover, Bakst bases his work exclusively on Russian and Soviet sources (some of which are available in English). The author recounts the rigid and somewhat stale dogmas of Socialist Realism, trying to remain impartial by avoiding critical dissent. Yet he ascribes a number of evaluations and statements to "Soviet estheticians" or "Communist thinking," failing to contrast the ideologically "safe" approach with the recent flexibility displayed by Soviet musicologists. As a result, his evaluation of Russian composers suffers from subtle imbalances and preconceptions.

In dealing with Russia's musical past, standard Soviet textbooks minimize factors such as the church, the court, the nobility, and foreign influences, and portray the Russian people as the sole creators of Russian music. Bakst reflects this emphasis on native Russian sources: as early as the 18th century, he says, Russian composers "consciously opposed the tastes of the court aristocracy" and pursued a "national democratic musical art." Indeed, virtually all Russian composers are pictured as having been nationalists, realists, folklorists, liberals, and potential rebels. This stress on national roots leads to the neglect of certain international, Western-oriented tendencies within Russian art circles; no mention is made, for example, of the "Evenings of Contemporary Music" (an offshoot of the Mir Iskusstva movement) which played such an important role during the first decade of the 20th century. (At one point, Bakst does address himself to the East-West antagonism in a sensible manner: he explains that "Tchaikovsky and 'The [Mighty] Five' represented various aspects of Russian nationalism and . . . absorbed, in their own way, Western musical influences.")

Bakst's history of the Soviet era is curiously detached. Again, seeking to avoid political complexities, he discusses music on a purely ideational level. The two chapters, "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of Art" and "Music and Soviet Realism," say little about Soviet reality. The question as to what extent these philosophies were used to control and direct musical creativity goes unanswered. Historical highlights—the ideological struggle of the 1920's between the "Association for Contemporary Music" and the "Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians" and the decrees of 1948 and 1958 that so deeply affected Soviet music—are given marginal attention. Such cultural-political figures as Zhdanov or Lunacharski do not appear in the index; and the ideological shifts under Khrushchev (in 1962) and his successors are not considered. In fact, the book seems to conclude with the year 1962.

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Altogether Bakst's efforts to remain non-political finally damage the objectivity of his book, for Soviet politics and Soviet musicology are indubitably intertwined. In the biographical chapters, particularly in those dealing with composers during the Stalin era, the humiliations suffered by Prokofiev, Shostakovich, and other masters are treated so incidentally that the uninitiated reader cannot gauge the immense cultural crudity of Stalin's "cult of personality." For example, Bakst goes so far as to imply that the official castigation of Shostakovich in 1936 was not entirely undeserved—an opinion that seems to reflect the author's lack of distinction between esthetic and political criteria. Indeed, not only does Bakst take a light view of the consequences of non-conformism, he literally invokes the importance of political compliance: "Soviet composers are not expected to be nonpolitical and cosmopolitan but to be nationalists . . . to create representations of heroic Soviet men and women, and reflect the Messianic tendency of the party . . ." (pp. 234-35). And finally, Bakst does not mention the rebellious *avant-garde* that has been battling the musical establishment since the late 1950's. For a growing minority of young Soviet composers the confining guidelines quoted above are unacceptable.

Professor Bakst, who has taught music at Brooklyn College since 1936, planned this book for the "general reader." His review of musical matters is thus largely non-technical, and he devotes much attention to the interrelationship of music and the other arts. However, the general reader will find the all-Russian bibliography inaccessible, and the scholar will be frustrated by its arbitrary selectivity.

Boris Schwarz

Soviet Agriculture

ROY D. LAIRD AND EDWARD L. CROWLEY, EDS.: *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis*, New York, Praeger, 1965.

THIS THIN BOOK (in both senses) contains a dozen papers and background reports presented at a symposium held in February 1964 at the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich. The papers were apparently written and edited after the poor 1963 harvest and before the removal, a year later, of the man who most obstructed real solutions to farm problems. It was a gloomy period, when observers inside as well as outside the USSR could easily have wondered if agricultural policy was ever going to get back on the rails.

With all due allowance for the mood of the time, the title of the collection still seems tendentious, and the complacently dismal tone of several of the contributions recalls nothing so much as Professor Higgins' vision of Eliza's downfall: "How simply frightful! how humiliating! how delightful!" In his summary of the symposium results, Professor Alec Nove regrets the failure of some participants to distinguish between defects caused by a low priority for agriculture and those rooted in the system itself. This is part of the trouble, but blindness to the adaptability of the system is even more pervasive and misleading. There may be such a thing as "Marxist dogmatism," but policy shifts in the past and the range of views now expressed in Soviet journals suggest that it is more of a nuisance than an iron fetter on the system.

Among the formal papers, the most useful are Nove's on agricultural administration, and Carl Zoerb's comparison of grain production patterns in Kazakhstan and Saskatchewan. Eugene Wädekin's exploration of similarities and differences in regional developments suggests the insights to be gained from this approach, but is rather unfocussed and inconclusive.

Henry Wronsky manages to write his piece on peasant incomes without ever explaining the crucial term "work-day unit." In most cases he seems to mean the collective farm *trudoden* (workday), a synthetic accounting unit that weights the duration of a task by its arduousness, importance, and skill requirements. But he speaks also (p. 130) of the "work-day unit on state farms" (which have never used the *trudoden*), and describes a collective farm employment figure for 1959 (p. 131) as being in work-day units when it is specified in the Soviet source as referring to man-days.

Some of the saltiest pages in the book are provided by Boris Wjunow, a Soviet agronomist who emigrated to West Germany in the early 1960's. His commentary on Nove's paper contains word pictures that are worth a thousand tables—for example, of a pig farm "where you could not tell whether the animals were pigs or crocodiles; they had sinewy snouts and were blue in color because they had no proper fodder."

There are the usual unlucky misprints, a few of which might lead to confusion (Braginski, Dumnov, Obolenski, and Ovechkin are misspelled, and there are errors in sign or decimal in the tables on pp. 45 and 166).

Nancy Nimitz

Marxism and China

DONALD M. LOWE: *The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin and Mao.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966.

THIS BOOK IS AN extremely useful, if not wholly successful, effort to analyze the conceptions formed by Marx, Lenin and Mao of such non-Western societies as Russia and China. It is useful because it assembles and comments on many relevant passages from a century and a quarter of Marxist thought. It is not entirely successful because it fails to focus sufficiently on the unifying theme of the book, which is the question for non-Western intellectuals of the psychological equivalence of their "backward" societies with the dominant Western countries. For Marx, the problem was one of alienation from, but still within, the mainstream of development of Western civilization, but for Lenin, and even more for Mao, there was not only alienation from their own societies, but also the alienation of their societies as a whole from the modern West. Hence, the Marxist solution, both "scientific" and yet anti-Western, seemed ideal to many "Eastern" radicals.

Professor Lowe, as a student of Professor Levenson, is very much aware of the significance of this sense of alienation, and he frequently mentions it. However, by trying to make his central theme the idea of "China" rather than the larger problem of the identity of non-Western societies in a Westernized world, the author fails to make the book a cohesive whole. Thus, the relevance of the sections on the development of 19th and 20th-century Russian radical thought to the idea of "China" is questionable, although much light is shed on the problem of how to modernize a non-Western so-

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ciety. This is not just a matter of semantics, but of tying together a complex set of problems and statements.

The most important defect stemming from this conceptual difficulty is the author's failure to deal with the key question of the relation between nationalism and communism in Russia and China. Demonstrably, concern for the fate of their own respective societies led Lenin and Mao to embrace Marxism, just as this same concern led others to turn to orthodox forms of nationalism. The Communists, of course, proposed vastly different solutions, but their conviction that only the overthrow of the old society could enable the growth of a new one contained seeds of "socialism in one country" and of "national communism." This development, so central to the world of the 1960's, grew out of the very considerations raised in Professor Lowe's book. But he deals with these considerations in terms of strategy and tactics more than in terms of their psychological implications. The result is either an over-theorized study of Communist strategic principles towards China, or an under-theorized study of the intellectual roots of communism in China.

Despite these conceptual problems and some lesser deficiencies—*e.g.*, the tendency to use an overtechnical vocabulary and some questionable statements regarding Chinese Communist fears of Japanese invasion (pp. 102, 113)—the book represents an impressive effort to present key materials and conceptions of China in the three major stages of Marxist development.

James P. Harrison

Students in China

JOHN ISRAEL: *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937.* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution, 1966.

THE "NATIONALIST DECADE"—extending from 1927 to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937—was the only sustained period when the Kuomintang might have consolidated its control of China's millions. Obstacles were formidable, though scarcely greater than those faced by the Communists in their struggle for survival and expansion. Still, many would argue that it was and is impossible simultaneously to build a nation, deal with a Communist insurgency, and defend against foreign invasion. Certainly, the Kuomintang did not succeed in any of these tasks, although it made some progress, especially in nation-building. Its failure was marked in the most crucial field of all, and the one in which the Communists succeeded best—in the mobilization and organization of the population for national goals. One of the keys to this problem, in turn, surely lies in the attitudes of student activists, who are the cadres of social organization in any developing society. The important study reviewed here looks at these considerations from the perspective of the Chinese student movements of the late 1920's and 1930's.

The book offers much valuable information and many insights. It complements two earlier studies in English by Tsi C. Wang and Kiang Wen-han, who dealt mainly with student attitudes, while Israel relates these attitudes to student activities and national problems and policies in the decade after nominal unification in 1927-28.

There are weaknesses. The author does not analyze sufficiently the relation of Nationalist policy either to its roots in the anti-imperial movements of the 1920's or to the dilemma of the Kuomintang's weakness in dealing with Japan and its consequent vulnerability in the face of rising nationalism—a vulnerability which proved the greatest single disadvantage it faced in relation to the Communists. Nor does he adequately consider the reasons for the importance of student movements in the Chinese and similar societies.

The author does, however, shed light on many of the crucial questions of the decade, such as the debates within the Kuomintang over the issue of taking an activist approach to the student movement as favored by Ch'en Kuo-fu, or adhering to the position of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and others who held that the students should be kept out of politics as far as possible. It was the latter line which came to dominate Kuomintang policy. Concerning ties between the Communists and the students, Israel concludes that in the most important student movements—those against Japan in 1928, 1931-32, and 1936-37—the demonstrations were spontaneous at first, but suffered from lack of leadership and from factionalism, which helped Communists and leftists to emerge later as leaders of the more militant groups. Student opinion, he finds, became increasingly radical, but this was due largely to the pressure of events and to dissatisfaction with the Kuomintang policy of "pacification first, resistance second," rather than to Communist indoctrination. Stressing the ineptness and unpopularity of the Communists at least up to the adoption of "united front from above" tactics after 1935, the author concludes (p. 188) that "the decade reflects Kuomintang failure rather than Chinese Communist Party success." Even after 1935, he estimates that no more than one-third of Chinese college students (who totalled only 44, 167 in 1931) were "ideologically" pro-Communist" (p. 181).

Above all, the author captures much of the excitement of the decade and conveys the compelling interest and importance of the Chinese student movements. A lesson that might be drawn from this is that a government in a fast-changing society must try to lead change regardless of the dangers involved. In the case of Nationalist China, increased Japanese military pressure was a lesser long-term danger than the erosion of nationalist loyalties to the government. Popularity, of course, was—and is—not the ultimate determinant of political control, whether in the China of 1927-37, or in Vietnam today. Rather it is the capacity to mobilize and organize the population. But only policies which can win the enthusiasm of a country's youth can serve as a basis for viable social organization. In a developing country only the youth can provide leadership for modernization since this requires new solutions. Professor Israel's book provides a valuable case study of the problems involved in the mobilization of youth in a society under stress.

James P. Harrison

International Communism

GEORGE D. JACKSON, JR.: *Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919-1930.* East Central European Studies of Columbia University; New York, Columbia University Press, 1966.

WHY HAS THE theoretically proletarian Communist movement succeeded mostly in predominantly peasant coun-

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tries? Many writers have sought a theoretical explanation by analyzing Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of anti-capitalist revolution in backward countries. In this fine contribution to the Columbia East European series, George Jackson, Assistant Professor of History at Hofstra University, seeks part of the answer in the Comintern's shifting tactics toward the peasants of East Europe. But his conclusions suggest that communism's later success in peasant countries had very little connection with its dismal experience in East Europe between the wars.

East Europe in the years of Russia's NEP and Stalin's "Left Turn" was the stronghold of the peasant political parties known loosely as the "Green International." In the first part of his book Mr. Jackson describes the Comintern strategy toward this movement, —in particular, toward its curious counterpart, the Krestintern, or "Red Peasant International," which was launched in October 1923 with the mission of enlisting or creating pro-Communist peasant organizations everywhere. The brainchild of a Polish Communist named Tamasz Dabal, the Krestintern was not endorsed by the Soviet leadership until after the failure of Communist purism in Bulgaria. But it never became a living institution, and after the fall of Bukharin, it was defunct, although its formal dissolution was not announced until 1939.

Mr. Jackson's second part—the attempts of the Communists in each particular country to find a peasant base – is considerably more substantial. The experience in Bulgaria, where the Communists let the Agrarian leader Stambuliski collapse unaided in 1923, and then failed in their own attempt at a rural uprising, shocked the Soviet Communists into adopting a rigid policy of alliance with peasant parties. The new line was applied with fair success in Poland, yet the Communist-backed peasant group there found significant support only among the Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities.

Yugoslavia was the scene of the one genuine alliance of Communists and a powerful peasant movement, the Croatian Peasant Party of Stjepan Radic. Here again nationalism superseded class, and it made the Yugoslav ally so strong that he could dispense with the Communists (in 1925) when he had a chance to enter the government. (The parallel with China in the same years is remarkable: the Comintern's first response to the 1927 break was to insist all the more inflexibly on the alliance, even though the ally had become an enemy.) However, later when the Croatians were ready to deal again with the Communists after the assassination of Radic in 1928, the Left Turn had forbidden the Communists to form any such alliance.

Progress in Poland and the very limited success of the Rumanian Communists were similarly undercut by the intransigence demanded by Stalin. This also happened in Czechoslovakia, the one country where the Communists under their own name had achieved some success among the peasants (again, mainly non-Czechs).

Mr. Jackson shows repeatedly that the Russians did not impose a single Soviet model of tactics on all the foreign Communists, but rather forced them to shift from one model to another, often at the most inopportune moment. Moreover, the oscillations between alliance tactics and revolutionary tactics dictated by the Soviet leader of the Comintern had little to do with the circumstances in any other country; they were by-products of particular political phases and factional controversies in the Soviet Union itself.

If there was any rationality in Soviet Russia's Comintern policy, it was only in respect to the struggle for power in CPSU and the urge to establish absolute Soviet control over the Communist movement, however this might compromise the success of communism in any other part of the world.

Robert V. Daniels

Yugoslav Communism

SVETOZAR PEJOVICH. *The Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia.* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

JACK C. FISHER: *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State. Regional Difference and Administrative Response.* San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Company, 1966.

NATIONALLY heterogeneous, economically adventurous and innovative, politically unorthodox and ambivalent, Yugoslavia is still, in many respects, a trailblazer in Eastern Europe. That is why each new book on the Yugoslav experiment deserves careful scrutiny, for our knowledge in this field is far from complete. While both of these books contribute to this knowledge, Professor Pejovich's is clearly the superior work and merits an attentive readership. Professor Fisher's book, though commendable in some respects, is on the whole rather disappointing.

Pejovich's thesis is that the Yugoslav experiment, measured in terms of the freedom to innovate, the availability of economic power to experiment, and a system of adequate incentives, "seems to justify reliance on Schumpeter's theory of economic development." Whether one agrees with this or not, it is an intriguing suggestion. However, it would have been helpful if the author had devoted more attention to the justification of his arguments.

The five chapters (six Appendices and notes take up the rest of the book's 160 pages) describe and analyze the turbulent history of economic reform in Yugoslavia. The study of the legal structure of the economy, economic planning and performance, the role of the enterprises, and finally the relevance of the Shumpeter theory to the Yugoslav experiment contributes a great deal toward an understanding of what is one of the most complex economies in the world. The author deserves praise for stressing the international significance of the Yugoslav model and for pointing out that the increasing use of market instruments "does not mean a change in the socialist character of the country." He also dismisses many commonly asserted and misleading generalizations about the Yugoslav tendency to become either pro-Western or pro-Soviet on the basis of annual political and economic "balance sheets."

Although the study is admittedly not based on current data, a reference to the substantial changes which were instituted in July 1965 would have helped to confirm the author's conclusions. For example, the upward price revision has improved the agricultural situation, consumer durables are more widely available (the number of private cars has increased from 75,000 in 1961 to 240,000 in 1966), the banking system has become more flexible and budgetary spending less important than was the case in the earlier period from which the author takes his material. There are also some minor errors. The reference to Tito's reversal, within a few months, of the stand he had taken in May 1962 in favor of the "cen-

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tralists" is incorrect, as shown by the documents on the plenary meetings of July 1962 and May 1963. Tito actually sided with the reformers only in 1964, and it took another year or so before the latter could overcome the resistance of the centralist "establishment."

Despite these minor omissions and errors, *The Market-Planned Economy of Yugoslavia* offers a careful analysis of a unique experiment in the Communist world and constitutes a refreshingly original contribution to our understanding of Yugoslavia.

Professor Fisher's *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State* offers an impressive quantity of scattered and hitherto unavailable data together with an analysis of the communal system and, in particular, of 55 urban centers (based on 26 variables combining demographic, occupational and other indicators), which provides the reader with valuable information on regional variances in the urban structure of Yugoslavia. But the author's handling of the basic political, social and economic issues, without which the dynamics of the national question cannot possibly be grasped, suffers from naive generalizations. This striking imbalance between the descriptive and analytical sections of the book may be due to a lack of familiarity with the decision-making mechanism of Yugoslavia's extremely complex system.

Even before the Ranković affair, there was considerable evidence of the many economic, political and cultural disputes between Belgrade and Zagreb, between the Serbs and the less numerous national groups such as the Slovenes and Macedonians. Yet Mr. Fisher makes the statement on page 146 that "the prewar nationality question was quite different from the present conflicts because there is cultural determination by the various peoples and there is no attempt to Serbianize the population." In this connection, the author might have paid more attention to the long drawn-out struggle over the New Fund for the Underdeveloped Regions. More astoundingly, he describes the institutional role of the party as "actively passive" and "never actually taking (an) overt position on a concrete proposal" (pp. 171-172)—which is hardly the case. His failure to understand the real depth of the contradiction between economic and administrative decentralization on the one hand and the monopoly of power held by the League of Communists on the other can perhaps be ascribed to the fact that he has relied primarily on material he gathered during two visits to Yugoslavia in 1960 and 1963 and has neglected to study, among other things, the policy statements and speeches published before and during the Eighth Party Congress in December 1964—well before May 1965, the date of his foreword.

Even more naive are his concluding remarks in the summary (pp. 184-85.): "We may well be witnessing the evolution in Yugoslavia of the basic institutional forms of government anticipated for an assumed and vaguely and variously defined state of 'full communism'—a theoretical stage of societal development achieved after the transformation from socialism. . . . The existence of similar institutional forms in other socialist countries makes this a subject deserving further study and explanation." What indeed are the similar institutional forms in other Communist-ruled countries? What other Communist-ruled country has 300,000 of its workers abroad, has liberalized its trade and foreign exchange system, and has thrown its door open to the influx of Western know-how and capital? How "full communism" can be achieved under such circumstances is indeed an intriguing question. Professor Fisher further predicts that the Republics will gradually fade away under the "vaguely assumed and variously defined state of full communism." Yet as everyone slightly familiar with past and recent events knows, the Republics show no desire to be liquidated or "eased out gradually by the communes." The steadily increasing role of the Republics has, in fact, been the single most important trend of recent years, testifying to the fact—so reluctantly viewed by diehard Marxists—that nationalism is something the "proletarians" the world over are not anxious to lose.

Paul Lendvai

Korean Communism

DAE-SOOK SUH: *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

THE OFFICIAL history of Communist North Korea attempts to picture Kim Il-song, the Soviet-installed leader of the Communist regime established at Pyongyang in 1948, as the virtual father of the Korean Communist movement. Yet, as all well-educated and informed Koreans, both Communist and non-Communist, know, this is a gross distortion of historical truth, and Dae-Sook Suh's study—the first comprehensive historical account in English of the origins and development of the Korean Communist movement between 1918 and 1948—documents its falsity in scholarly and convincing fashion.

Making abundant use of original documents as well as important secondary sources in Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Russian, the author relates the beginnings of the Korean Communist movement in the Russian Maritime Province and Siberia in 1918, its early relations with its Russian mentors, its penetration into Japanese-ruled Korea in the early 1920's and the subsequent development of the "mainstream" (*i.e.*, indigenous) Communist movement within Korea up to 1948, as well as the activities of Korean Communist groups abroad—in Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. He describes the many obstacles faced by the indigenous movement under brutal Japanese police suppression and the incessant involvement of the Korean Communists in unprincipled and petty factional rivalries, which drew a severe condemnation from the Comintern in 1928.

The main point that emerges from Mr. Suh's study is that it was not the veteran leaders of the indigenous Communist revolutionary movement who came to power in North Korea after the 1945 partition. Instead, it was the Korean-born but Soviet-trained Kim Il-song who was installed as head of the North Korean regime by the Soviet occupation authorities wielding decisive power in the North during the post-1945 military occupation. Kim had been an obscure anti-Japanese Communist guerrilla leader in southern Manchuria in the late 1930's but had played no part whatever in the indigenous Korean Communist movement. Subsequently trained in the Soviet Union, he returned to North Korea in September 1945 in the uniform of a Soviet Army major. The Soviets, who had never forgiven nor forgotten the egocentric and disruptive factionalism of the "domestic" Korean Communist movement in the past, and who were determined to create a Soviet-oriented satellite in North Korea, turned a cold shoulder toward both the domestic "mainstream" group and the returned Korean Communists from Yenan, China, instead placing subser-

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vient and trustworthy "Soviet-Koreans" in key positions of power and influence. Later, Premier Kim consolidated his dictatorial power by successfully crushing almost all his domestic and Yenan rivals. Having done this, he had the history of the Korean Communist movement rewritten in such a preposterous way as to portray himself as its central figure and hero.

Suh's book deserves high praise for its scholarly presentation of the pre-1948 Korean Communist movement. The biographical sketch of Premier Kim Il-song's ambiguous and controversial past (his real name is Kim Song-ju) is especially good and reliable. This study is commended to all who seek to understand Korean politics and history in the modern period.

Thomas S. An

Italian Communism

JOHN M. CAMMETT: *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1967.

THE HISTORY OF Italian communism is indissolubly linked with the life and work of Antonio Gramsci—yet his role as a creative Marxist thinker and gifted political leader is little known to the younger generation of Italian Communists, let alone to outside observers. Gramsci belonged to a group of young Italian intellectuals who attended the University of Turin during a critical period in European history, when World War I and the winds of social change, reinforced by Marxist ideas and the successful Bolshevik Revolution, exerted a powerful influence on the thinking of the Italian Left. Besides Gramsci, this small gathering of young men included some of the most prestigious names connected with the establishment of the Italian Communist Party—notably Togliatti, Terracini, and Tasca.

Of these few, only Togliatti and Terracini survived the rigors of prolonged political persecution in Italy, bolshevization, the Stalinist terror, and exile, to reap the benefits of high party and public office in later life. Tasca broke with communism in the late 1920's and died a broken and embittered man more than a decade ago. Gramsci, always in frail health, suffered probably most from his long imprisonment under the Fascists and died in Italy shortly before the outbreak of World War II.

In retrospect, it is difficult to assess Gramsci's influence on the current evolution of Italian communism. But it may be fair to say that his leadership as well as his personality represented an intellectual leavening in the early history of the Italian party that caused it never to surrender easily or completely to the ministrations of Moscow. Gramsci remained always an eclectic Communist intellectual who could not suppress his penchant for combining his Marxist outlook with non-Marxist ideas, notably those of Croce. Thus he can be readily cast in the role of an early, if premature, exponent of an "Italian way to socialism"; this is in essence what he advocated in 1924, although the concept was not officially revived by the Italian party until after February 1956.

In the current volume on Gramsci, Professor Cammett, of Rutgers University, has done yeoman work in bringing the man and the period in which he lived into better focus. Using a wealth of heretofore untapped Italian sources, the author offers an interesting account of the many conflicting strains within the Italian Left that joined forces in the founding of the new Italian Communist Party. Professor Cammett also deserves the gratitude of his English-reading public for summarizing two fragments from Gramsci's extensive writings while he was imprisoned, the so-called "Prison Notebooks." The selections chosen deal with the nature and tasks of the political party and the historical role of Italian intellectuals. Both subjects were close to Gramsci's principal interests, and their treatment reveals his often original and undogmatic approach.

Eric Willenz

Trade and Politics

CAROLE A. SAWYER: *Communist Trade with Developing Countries: 1955-65.* New York, Praeger, 1966.

THIS JUDICIOUS and well-ordered treatise is rich both in statistics and in persuasive deductions. Nonetheless, it is concise rather than discursive: the text without appendices is only 87 pages. Based on the author's doctoral dissertation, it could well provide the framework for a more extended study directed to the general reader.

Much of the published material on Communist trading activity has to be treated very warily. On one hand, the Communists produce a constant spate of large-sounding claims and forecasts. On the other hand, there are too many Western assessments that simultaneously inflate both the gains and the failings of the Communist traders-and-aiders—always on the premise that Communist trade and aid are to be deprecated in principle. Miss Sawyer, while making circumspect use of Soviet data, keeps Soviet propaganda in its place. At the same time, she strips down "anti-Communist" arguments to the foundations for which there is verifiable evidence.

The author depicts a trade pattern that is restricted in scale, unstable in direction and composition, unresponsive to local requirements, but nevertheless useful to the participants, and capable of expansion given certain necessary adjustments in the Communist countries' economic policies. Putting the matter in perspective at the outset of her study, she points out that in 1964 the volume of trade between the Communist area and the developing countries amounted to little more than one percent of world trade. However, for a few countries such as the UAR and Afghanistan, trade with the Communist countries has accounted for a critical share of foreign trade turnover. The author shows that the volume of trade has fluctuated widely from year to year, belying Communist claims concerning the stability of trading partnerships. She also confirms the fact that the African or Asian partners are not always too happy about the range of products offered for exchange. But she is cautious about accepting arguments that the Communist countries overcharge, stating "there is no conclusive evidence to indicate that this is generally the case."

While holding that the growth of trade between Communist and developing countries is "largely explicable on economic grounds," the writer also emphasizes that Comecon policies are directed towards regional autarky, so that only specifically tropical products or others naturally deficient in the Comecon area (and not yet replaced by synthetic substitutes) have any as-

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sured future as exports to the Communist countries. It is worth noting that a study on this subject prepared by the ECE Secretariat for the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development arrived at the same conclusion.

The author treats "Communist economic aid" as a subsidiary theme to that of trade, although she shows that "the two components are quite intimately linked." The aid question is, of course, too large to be dealt with adequately within the compass of a modest monograph. But in listing some of the conditions that are necessary to put the Communist area's "third world" trade on a sound footing, Dr. Sawyer does get over one message: that trade can and should be a rational proceeding, whereas aid, which must be periodically re-examined, rescheduled, and backed by new funds, is becoming increasingly irrational.

David L. Morison

A Guided Tour

MARVIN KALB: *The Volga: A Political Journey through Russia.* New York, The Macmillan Co., 1967.

A YEAR AND A HALF ago Mr. Marvin Kalb—former CBS representative in Moscow and now its diplomatic correspondent in Washington—put together a fine television documentary of his trip along the Volga River. This was not an Odyssey, but rather an organized series of city-stops that Mr. Kalb exploited to bring to the American citizen a vivid portrait of his Soviet counterpart. During the television screening, Mr. Kalb acted as our guide. The strong line of his narration helped the viewer select the most significant observations from among the reels and reels of video reportage.

Yet it is the very same strong narration which unfortunately keeps *The Volga* from being an equally fine book. Where Mr. Kalb's presence on the screen was a welcome aid, it is now an imposition. At times, indeed, Mr. Kalb seems to stand between the reader and the Russian people and to prevent their acquaintance. This is explained, oddly enough, by the frustrations and tensions that Mr. Kalb and crew suffered at the hands of their own Soviet guides. The first half of *The Volga* is overwhelmed with tales of woe at the machinations of the Moscow-assigned escorts and security men (introduced as "editorial consultants"), and of the Americans' reactions to being plied with vodka at every turn. This sort of petty tutelage would try anyone's patience and sense of humor; and Mr. Kalb became exasperated early in the journey.

Add to this the emotionally colored reactions of typical Western tourists in the Soviet Union—or for that matter of Soviet specialists at home—when they are obliged to digest not the food, but the ideological fare. Perhaps it is this mixture of exasperation and emotionalism that is to blame for the inclusion of a number of too clever and tendentious remarks—for instance, one describing the sermon of a Kazan Mullah who attacked European imperialism in Vietnam, the Congo, and Algeria: "He was ever so slightly out of date" (p. 97); or another referring to the sale of products of the Biriulinski Fur-Breeding State Farm to Britain and the United States: "The sables and the minks did not recognize ideological differences in their business dealings" (p. 133).

As a book aimed at the general rather than the specialized reader, *The Volga*, then, is quite successful. Mr. Kalb writes well, and his descriptions of the river, of Volgograd and Kazan, and of the peasants' life and habits are notably good. If his sympathy runs short, his stamina as an observer does not. Some of his anecdotes and asides —the Soviet waitress who needled him to specify what kind of juice he wished for breakfast, then with a deadpan announced that she had no juice at all—are revealing gems of humor.

At the same time, as a student of Soviet affairs, this reviewer must point out that *The Volga* contains a number of inaccuracies which more skillful editing could have eliminated. It is no longer true, for example, that "more than half" the Soviet people are rural; latest figures, evidence of the enormous rural exodus since the war, show that 55% of the population is now urban. Moreover, while the author's sentimental view of Russia's rural heritage may have its charm, his reading of Russian history is unfair to the obvious achievements of the Soviet government. After detailing the Soviet purchases of wheat from Canada, Mr. Kalb advises the reader that "Significantly, before the revolution Russia had always been an exporter of wheat" (p. 136), without a word of explanation as to the economic miseries that accompanied such exports then and well into the 1930's, as Stalin sold wheat for hard currency to buy machinery.

The one hundred photos that accompany the text do illustrate admirably the strange juxtaposition of modernity and backwardness that Mr. Kalb, as a knowledgeable tourist, points out to the reader. A number of them appear to be stills taken out of a movie or by a telescopic lens where the ubiquitous Soviet guides kept the author from freely filming what he saw. Realizing the caprices and obstructions that plagued the journey, we can commend Mr. Kalb's tenacity in proposing and reproposing the Volga project to the difficult Soviet authorities, and in pursuing his idea through the television and book stages.

Rosalind Vee Avnet

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HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

The Day Stalin Died

By Wolfgang Leonhard

Recent years have seen the appearance in the West of a great many memoirs, reminiscences, and eyewitness reports written both by disillusioned Communists who broke with the party and by non-Communists who spent some time in Communist-ruled countries and thus experienced events there, so to speak, "from the inside." In addition to these, an increasing number of memoirs have been published lately in the Communist countries themselves. While most of the latter are, understandably, so slanted as to be of little value as contemporary records, some reveal a personal touch that makes them both useful and interesting.

In particular, these writings afford us a picture, albeit an incomplete and fragmentary one, of moments and events of especially great importance in the history of the "socialist camp" and the world Communist movement. Here the author proposes to gather together excerpts from this store of personal recollections relating to one such historic event—the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. This was an event of particular historical significance not only because Stalin for a quarter of a century had been the supreme ruler of Soviet Russia and acknowledged leader, arbiter, and ideologist of the world Communist movement, but also because it occurred amidst a hectic internal campaign of vigilance that was obviously preparing for another big purge, and because it was to mark the beginning of a whole new phase in the development of world communism.

The manner in which Stalin's illness and death were announced to the public led to a multitude of rumors and conjectures which are mentioned by many eyewitnesses in their memoirs. First, on Wednesday, March 4, at 6:00 AM, Radio Moscow suddenly broke off its broadcast without signing off. Then, at 6:30 AM, there came an official announcement of Stalin's illness by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, followed by the first medical bulletin. According to these statements, Stalin had suffered a stroke affecting the vital centers of the brain on the night of March 1—more than 60 hours previously! He was said to have lost consciousness and the power of speech, his right arm and right leg were paralyzed, and his breathing and heart functioning were impaired. A further official statement said that "for the time being" Stalin would not engage in state and party activities. At 3:00 PM the same day, Radio Moscow again interrupted its broadcast without explanation, remaining off the air until 3:18, when it returned with classical music.

Mr. Leonhard is one of Germany's leading Sovietologists. His last work was Sowjetideologie Heute *(Frankfurt, S. Fischer Verlag, 1962).*

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At 4:35 AM on Thursday, March 5, Radio Moscow broadcast a second medical bulletin stating that Stalin's condition had deteriorated further during the night. *Pravda*'s leading editorial the same day was entitled "Unity of Party and People" and mentioned only one living Soviet leader by name—Malenkov. The third medical bulletin, broadcast at 6:30 PM on March 5, revealed that Stalin was suffering from acute disturbances of the cardiovascular system and severe shortness of breath and that his condition was extremely serious.

On Friday morning, March 6, Radio Moscow began its broadcast with a funereal rolling of drums, followed by the Soviet national anthem. The announcer then read a lengthy official communiqué in the name of the party Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, stating that Stalin had died on March 5, 1953, at 9:50 PM. The communiqué referred to Stalin as the "comrade-in-arms and brilliant continuer of Lenin's cause" and as the "wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party and the Soviet people."

The Impact in Moscow

Among those who personally lived through this event in the Soviet Union and have recorded their recollections of it is the prominent Soviet writer, Ilya Ehrenburg. His account, contained in his autobiography,[1] is of particular interest because it was written and published in the Soviet Union itself. Ehrenburg recalls the happenings of these days as they unfolded in Moscow:

At 9:50 P.M.—The medical findings spoke of leucocytes, collapse, fluttering arrhythmia. We had long since forgotten that Stalin was mortal. He had been transformed into an omnipotent and mysterious deity. And now the god had died of a hemorrhage. It seemed incredible. . . .

A commemorative meeting of writers was held in the Theater of Cinema Actors on Vorovsky Street. They were all depressed, bewildered, spoke incoherently, as though, rather than experienced men of letters, they were mathematicians or ditchdiggers addressing a meeting for the first time. There were many speakers. I also spoke; I don't recall what I said, but most likely it was the same as the others.

The next day they brought us to the Hall of Columns. I stood honor guard with the writers. Stalin lay embalmed and solemn, without any traces of what the doctors had mentioned, but rather with flowers and medals. People went by, many in tears, women lifted their children, funeral music blended with the sobbing.

I saw people weeping in the streets as well. From time to time cries were heard; people would burst into the Hall of Columns. There were stories of people being trampled on Trubnaya Square. Detachments of militia were brought in from Leningrad. I don't think history had ever witnessed such a funeral.

I was not sorry for the god who had died of a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of 73 as if he had not been a god at all, just an ordinary mortal; but I was frightened: What was going to happen now? I feared the worst. . . .

During the night Stalin's name was inscribed on the Lenin Mausoleum. Malenkov, Beria and Molotov spoke at the funeral. The speeches resembled one another, but Malenkov recalled the need for viligance in a spirit of "irreconcilability and firmness in the struggle against internal and foreign enemies," and Beria, whose name frightened everyone, promised Soviet citizens to "guard their rights, . . . recorded in the Stalin Constitution."

The next day Moscow returned to normal life. I saw streetcleaners diligently sweeping Gorky Street, people on their way to work, boxes being unloaded in a courtyard, boys indulging in mischief. It was all familiar, I told myself—just like a week ago. Unlikely as it seemed, Stalin was dead but life went on.

In the afternoon I made my way to Red Square. It was heaped with wreaths. People stood trying to read the inscriptions on the ribbons, then silently left.

In the Vorkuta Camp

Understandably enough, the news of Stalin's death evoked quite different reactions among the inmates of Soviet forced labor camps, a number of whom have since published accounts of their experiences. One of these is Joseph Scholmer, a former German Communist who played an active part in the anti-Nazi resistance movement and subsequently held a high post in the East German Central Health Administration before being arrested by the Soviets in April 1949. A prisoner in the Vorkuta Camp at the time of Stalin's death, he writes of this event as follows:[2]

When Radio Moscow announced the historic stroke of apoplexy, a wave of hope surged through the camp: surely he wouldn't recover! The medical bulletins were couched in pessimistic terms, preparing for the end. Every spare minute the prisoners crowded around the loudspeaker. Thus passed four days of increasing tension. . . .

"Tell me, Batya—you're a doctor—what does it mean that they're giving him oxygen? Will it make him well again?" [a fellow prisoner asked me.]

[1] Ilya Ehrenburg, *People, Years, Life*, Part VI, English translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), Vol. XVII, No. 23, June 30, 1965, pp. 7-8, 9-10. The successive parts of Ehrenburg's memoirs have appeared in English as follows: *People and Life, 1891-1921* (New York, Knopf, 1962); *Memoirs, 1921-1941* (Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1964); *War, 1941-1945* (World Publishing Co., 1965); and *Post-War Years, 1945-1954* (London, MacGibbon, 1966).

[2] Joseph Scholmer, *Die Toten kehren zurück*, Köln, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1954, pp. 204-206. (Published in English as *Vorkuta*, New York, Holt, 1955.)

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I replied, "If what the radio says is true, he'll die. Maybe he's dead already and they're not announcing it to the people until they have a new government."

When the report of his death finally came, bearded muzhiks with tears in their eyes knelt and prayed.

"I've been in the camp for nineteen years now," said a Georgian, "but never have I received such good news!"

"God has saved the Jews," whispered a Polish Zionist who had escaped the Gestapo only to be sentenced [by the Russians] in 1940 to fifteen years' imprisonment. "If he hadn't died, there would have been pogroms again as at the time of the Black Hundred, or of Petlyura or Hitler." . . . .

The mourning of the new rulers for the dead dictator is a cold mourning. They know how unpopular Stalin was, and they are aware of the sighs of relief going up everywhere these days in the Soviet Union.

In the camp a Moscow journalist said: "At bottom they are happy the old man is dead. They worked with him, but he terrorized them, and they hated him. Each of them was threatened with the fate of Voznesenski, whom Stalin caused to disappear because he had acted too independently."

John Noble, an American citizen, was also a prisoner in the Vorkuta Camp at the time of Stalin's death. First arrested in Dresden in July 1945, he had already spent several years in jail in the Soviet zone of Germany before being shipped off to Vorkuta to serve a 15-year sentence at forced labor. He had already been there for several years when Stalin's death occurred. In a later-published book,[3] he recalls how he and his fellow prisoners reacted to that event:

In the first days of March came the news we had waited so long to hear. Stalin had been stricken with an apoplectic fit. "May the devil take his soul today!" the prisoners prayed, on their knees. The morning of March 6, 1953, his death was announced over the loudspeaker in Mine 16.

I stood among a mixed crowd of soot-covered slave laborers, free workers and Red officials, and watched their expression. My fellow slaves lit up with hope. "He lived too long—the old dog!" one prisoner yelled. An old man got down on his knees in the water. "Thank God, someone still looks out for the wretched." The faces of the free people were immobile. No one uttered a word of praise for the dead dictator. The next day, the cautious administration had Stalin's portrait removed from the front of the coal locomotive and replaced it with Lenin's picture. "Who knows?" one of the department managers commented to me in the washroom. "In a few months' time maybe the old one will be called a traitor."

Stalin's death sent a wave of frenzied expectation throughout Vorkuta. "Maybe Uncle Zhorka (Malenkov, the new premier) will close all the slave camps and free us all?" Vaska asked me one day. "What do you think, Johnny?"

I wasn't quite that optimistic, but for the first time in its history, Vorkuta awaited each new day hopefully.

Another German prisoner at Vorkuta was Bernhard Röder, who also has described in graphic terms how Stalin's death was received by both inmates and officials at the camp. He writes:

On this day work was at a standstill in Vorkuta. The prisoners stood around in groups and talked excitedly. We could see the free workers in the distant mining area scurrying from one office to another, and outside in the settlement women gathered together in small groups and then quickly dispersed again. We heard the sentries on the watchtowers speaking agitatedly to one another on the phone, and soon afterwards the first drunks began raising a row. By evening all Vorkuta was drunk: the prisoners, the free people, and the soldiers—but most of all the *nachalstvo* (officials).

"The Devil has taken their beloved leader and teacher. See how they loved him. They're all getting drunk with joy because the old man is finally dead."

"Yes, thank God, the man with the moustache has gone to hell. Now everything will be fine again."

"No, nothing will change. The dictator is dead, but the apparat remains. . . . First there will be confusion; then a new man will appear and will get a firm grip on the apparat. Then everything will be just as it was before, if not worse."

These were the things being spoken in the barracks, around the stove and on the plank beds, late into the night. . . . In our corner, too, no one could sleep. "Today is a great day!" said Sasha the Ukrainian, in the bunk next to mine. "Today an era of history has come to an end."

. . . . immediately after Stalin's death the rumor started up in Vorkuta that the other party leaders had themselves done away with the dictator. This rumor was a reflection of how acutely the tension released by Stalin's death was felt.[4]

In Budapest

The inmates of Soviet labor camps were not the only ones who received the news of Stalin's death with feelings of joy and renewed hope; political prisoners in Rakosi's Hungary reacted in much the same way. Among them with Jozsef Kovago, a former leader of the Hungarian Smallholders' Party and Mayor of Budapest for several years after the end of the war, who had been imprisoned by the Communists in May 1950 and was still confined in a Budapest jail at the time of Stalin's death. In a book of memoirs published after he had regained his freedom, he recalls his thoughts on that historic occasion:[5]

On returning from our walk, one of the translators, Pal Ignotus, whispered into my ear at the door: "Stalin is dead."

I can hardly describe the happiness I felt when I heard this news. I was anxious to get back to the cell

[3] John Noble, *I Was a Slave in Russia*, New York, The Devin-Adair Co., 1968, pp. 140-41.

[4] Bernhard Röder, *Der Katorgan*, Köln, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, pp. 183-85.

[5] Jozsef Kovago, *You Are All Alone*, New York, Praeger, 1959, pp. 94-96.

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and tell it to all my friends. So Stalin is dead, the bloody hangman! What would follow, no one could tell. There would be factional struggles for power, and the Western nations would want to take advantage of this. Nobody knew what approach they would use. They might try a series of political actions, perhaps even combined with military steps. One thing, however, was clear: the Western world would not pass up such an opportunity for action.

We all agreed that with the death of Stalin a new era in world history had begun.

I remember clearly my words that evening: "Please don't be impatient, for it may take quite a while, even years, before Communist tyranny comes to an end. Communism is a bankrupt system, and this is becoming obvious to the whole world. I have no doubt that sooner or later even the Soviet Union is bound to change."

We all believed this, but almost a year passed before we were able to detect any effect of this big change in the Communist world.

Meanwhile, however, the official obsequies held in Stalin's honor were marked by fulsome tributes to the memory of the dead dictator whose statue was to be demolished only a little more than three and a half years later in the Hungarian revolt of October 1956. Hungarian Communist writers Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, both Stalin Prize winners, who eventually joined the fight against Stalinism in Hungary and sought refuge abroad with the collapse of the 1956 revolt, have since given us an account of the Budapest ceremonies honoring Stalin's memory:[6]

In Budapest, in Stalin Square, at the foot of the gigantic statue of the dead premier, the Hungarian people gave expression to their grief. Tens of thousands of Hungarians had gathered here, and the speaker on this occasion was Ernö Gerö, Deputy Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers. Gerö said, "You have come to the statue of the great immortal Stalin to pay tribute to the memory of the man who has done more than any other to free the peoples of the world and to lay the foundations for universal peace and human progress. . . ."

The Hungarian Parliament also convened in Budapest [and] . . . unanimously adopted a resolution dedicated to the memory of the great leader. Introducing the resolution, Imre Nagy, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, declared: "My heart is heavy in coming to the speaker's stand and seeing our griefstricken people before me. . . . To express their deep love for our great friend, liberator and teacher, the Hungarian people are rallying around the party, the government, and our beloved Comrade Rakosi; and all are dedicating their entire strength to carrying Stalin's great cause forward to victory in our country."

At a solemn meeting of the Hungarian Writers' Union, Union President Jozsef Darvas stated: "We Hungarian writers vow that we will be worthy of him, who has shown us the way to all knowledge." In the pages of the official literary monthly *Irodalmi ujsag* and the official party daily *Szabad nep* appeared long columns of statements by poets and writers bidding farewell to the departed Stalin in words filled with emotion. Shortly afterwards a book bound in red leather was published in Budapest containing a collection of these and earlier writings glorifying Stalin. The contributions included poems and prose by Tibor Dery, Peter Veres, Gyula Illyes, Laszlo Benjamin, Zoltan Zelk, Gyula Hay, Tibor Tardos, Peter Kuczka, Lajos Konya, Gyorgy Hamos, and by Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, the authors of the present book.

In East Berlin

Among those who witnessed the impact of Stalin's death in Communist East Berlin was Fritz Schenk, then personal secretary to Deputy Premier and State Planning Commission Chairman Bruno Leuschner and himself a leading official of the East German planning apparatus. As such, he was in an excellent position to observe how the higher echelon of East German officialdom reacted to the news of Stalin's passing. In a book published after his later defection to West Germany,[7] Schenk recalls that on the eve of Stalin's death the state apparatus was feverishly engaged in drawing up a new annual plan and at the same time preparing new regulations concerning secrecy and a campaign for increased vigilance which seemed to foreshadow an impending purge.

But then something happened which caused all this hectic activity to come to a standstill and brought all speculations to naught: on March 5, 1953, Stalin died. With one stroke the situation was changed. No one was interested any longer in special activities and campaigns; the machinery simply came to a halt. All of a sudden, the highest officials had time to sit quietly in their offices and cut black mourning bands out of carbon paper for their Red Corner. And then they went to funeral meetings and sat with serious expressions on their faces as if completely absorbed in thoughts of the "wise leader of all workers." But only the naive could have felt any trace of real emotion. All others were dominated by the question: What will happen now?

Another former East German party official, Herbert Prauss, has given us a description of the effect of Stalin's death on a different and younger group of people—the students at the Institute of Social Sciences, which is actually East Germany's highest school for the ideological indoctrination of party members. Prauss had joined the Communist Party in 1945 at the age of 19 and, after first attending and later teaching at party schools, had been admitted to the Institute, where he engaged in advanced study while

[6] Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, *Revolte des Intellekts*, Munich, Albert Langenmuller, pp. 12-13. (Published in English as *The Revolt of the Mind*, New York, Praeger, 1959.)

[7] Fritz Schenk, *Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur* (In the Anteroom of the Dictatorship), Köln, Kipenheuer & Witsch, 1962, pp. 181-82.

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also serving as party secretary in the Department of Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Later becoming disenchanted, he escaped to the West and published a book recording his experiences. In it, he writes:

When Stalin fell seriously ill, many of the student candidates were filled with fearful concern for the Soviet leader's life. They besieged the radio stations to learn if there was still hope. When Stalin's death was announced, many had tears in their eyes. I saw many ordinary party members among the housekeeping personnel weeping, too. Embarrassed silence prevailed, as in a mortuary.

Lene Berg and the Party Secretary of the Institute, Walter Berthold, immediately ordered a prolonged wake. Two comrades at a time had to stand watch for fifteen minutes to the right and left of a bust of Stalin adorned with a funeral wreath, remaining motionless with their countenances fixed in an expression of grief. As party secretary of the Department of Basic Political Questions of Marxism-Leninism, I was given the doubtful honor of opening the wake along with Lene Berg. . . .

After Stalin's death there were party members at the Institute who took the view that the very history of the party would now come to a standstill. In keeping with the unbounded cult of the individual which had been built up around Stalin, many comrades believed that his death represented an irreplaceable loss for international communism, and that inaction and stagnation would now set in. From the very start I took a stand against such views, arguing that the Politburo collectively had always held the leadership, and that this collective body could get over the loss of an individual, no matter how much of a genius he might have been. Even this Marxist interpretation, however, made me suspect, in the eyes of the more devout admirers of Stalin, and they accused me of lack of respect and heartlessness. . . .[8]

In Western Prisons

In the West, too, there were Communists who experienced a genuine sense of loss at the news of Stalin's death. One of them was Ralph Giordano, who had joined the Communist Party in West Germany in 1945, had worked as a journalist for West German Communist newspapers (then still legal), and had also written books reflecting his Communist leanings. After the party was outlawed in West Germany, Giordano was arrested and confined in Bergedorf Prison, where he kept a colored portrait of Stalin hidden under the mattress of his cell. Upon learning of Stalin's death, he recalls in a book published after his break with communism,[9] he took the picture out from its hiding place and hung it on the side of his locker, "sat down before it and left off doing anything." Transferred the next day to a disciplinary cell, he took the picture with him but, instead of keeping it hidden, "hung it on a hook under the window for everyone entering to see."

Another who received the news of Stalin's death while in prison was the American Communist John Gates, who was later to turn away from the party. A Communist from 1931, he had fought in the Spanish

From "A Thousand and One Nights"

Heinz Brandt was a Communist from the time he joined the German Communist Youth League in 1929. Arrested by the Gestapo, he lived through eleven years in Nazi prisons and concentration camps—including Buchenwald and Auschwitz—and, after the war's end, threw himself with new hope and enthusiasm into party work in Communist East Germany, becoming a district party official in East Berlin. By the end of 1952, however, he had become thoroughly disillusioned and, as a Jew, was deeply alarmed by rumors of an impending purge of "comrades of Jewish origin." Living once again in fear of sudden arrest, he felt that he and his family must be prepared at any time to escape to West Berlin. It was just at this juncture that he received a telephone call from Hans Herzberg, head of the East German Communist news agency ADN, telling him of the Moscow announcement of Stalin's death. In a book just published in West Germany,* where he eventually sought asylum, Brandt describes his feelings at that moment:

In the Tales of a Thousand and One Nights, a messenger who brings tidings of great relief to the Sultan is rewarded with a gift of precious jewels. But I was no Sultan, and not for a moment could I let Hans suspect how much his tidings meant to me.

My first thought was: this time things have taken a different turn. This time it is not Stalin who has liquidated his Politburo, but the Politburo which has done away with him. Stalin is old, but this "illness," coming at this moment, immediately after the unleashing of the danger-fraught "Doctors' Plot" campaign, could hardly be just a natural happening. A decades-old dream seems to have come true: a palace revolution in the Kremlin!

***Heinz Brandt, Ein Traum, der nicht entführbar ist, Munich, List Verlag, 1967, pp. 192-93.**

[8] Herbert Prauss, *Doch es war nicht die Wahrheit* (And Yet It Was Not the Truth), Berlin, Morus-Verlag, 1960, pp. 91-93.

[9] Ralph Giordano, *Die Partei hat immer recht* (The Party Is Always Right), Köln-Berlin, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1961, pp. 71-73.

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Civil War as a volunteer and, after serving in the US Army in World War II, had become one of the principal editors of the American Communist organ *Daily Worker*. Sentenced in 1950 to a five-year term in prison, he was still serving his sentence in March 1953, when Stalin died. In his later-published autobiography,[10] Gates writes:

I had enormous regard and admiration for him [Stalin], and his death left a void in my scheme of things. But developments after his death forced me to question whether my absolute faith in Stalin had been justified. Immediately following his death, the Soviet government launched a peace offensive that resulted a few months later in the settlement of the Korean war. Soviet foreign policy had a new quality now, different from when Stalin had been alive. Had he been at all responsible for the Korean War? Had he been an obstacle to its settlement? The strange phrase, "cult of the individual," began to appear in the Soviet press. What did it mean? Who was the anonymous "individual"? To me it was obvious that the reference was to Stalin.

Communist Officials Abroad

Among Communist officials serving their governments outside their own countries, there were some to whom, for different reasons, Stalin's dealth brought a sense of relief, if not joy. Nikolai Khokhlov, for example, was a trained agent of the Soviet state security service and at the time of Stalin's death was stationed in East Berlin on a special assignment. He had, however, already begun to dislike the work of a secret police agent and had made repeated attempts to get out of the network, with only temporary success. For him, Stalin's death was an unexpected reprieve, for Beria, now in full command of the Soviet secret service, immediately began a reorganization and ordered most of the agents stationed abroad back to Moscow. Khokhlov, who later defected to the West and wrote of his experiences, describes his reactions on that occasion:[11]

When on March 8 I called up [my wife] Jana again and informed her that I would be back home the following day, the joy in her voice signified more than merely joy at our reunion. . . . She and I, all of us, millions of Russians, hoped in those days that Stalin's death would bring about changes in the Soviet system. . . .

Pawel Monat, a former Polish Communist military intelligence officer who was then serving as a political-military attaché in North Korea, also had the feeling that Stalin's death might change things for the better —at least so far as the Korean war was concerned. After receiving the news from Moscow, he recalls:

We sat around the embassy that night, drinking vodka and saying out loud how sorry we were that the great, beloved leader of communism was gone. But somehow we felt that the end of the war was now in sight. Later that month we learned that both sides had agreed to a tentative first step: they would trade their sick and wounded prisoners as a token test of good will. I was playing checkers with Colonel Nikolai Smirnov, one of the Soviet advisers, when the word came. "That's it," said Smirnov. "In a week or so we will be driving into Pyongyang with our lights on."[12]

In China and Vietnam

At the Chinese Communist Party's international party school on the outskirts of Peking, which served as a training center for Communist cadres from other Asian countries (in particular, Indonesia, Burma, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand) and from Australia, the news of Stalin's death evoked genuine grief. According to Keith McEwan, a former Australian Communist who at that time had already been studying at the Chinese party school for nearly two years, "the whole institute mourned his death. Tears ran down the cheeks of many comrades, including some Australians, so great was our grief at the loss of our then beloved leader."[13]

The former American Communist and longtime foreign political editor of the New York *Daily Worker*, Joseph R. Starobin, has provided us with an eye-witness account of how Stalin's death was received in another corner of Asia—at the jungle headquarters of the Viet Minh, then battling the French for control of Vietnam. Starobin, who reached Vietnam by a long and circuitous journey via East Berlin, the Soviet Union, and China, met with Ho Chi Minh a few days before Stalin's death and again saw him just after that event. He writes:

I saw the President again several evenings later. He was in a preoccupied mood. The news of the death of Stalin had come to the jungles. It was Minh who had told us, saying simply: "Le camarade Staline n'est plus [Comrade Stalin is no more]." And that evening there was to be a funeral ceremony at which Ho would make the main address. . . . That evening, he spoke to a gathering of the ministers and cadres assembled in that part of the

[10] John Gates, *The Story of an American Communist*, New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1958, p. 152.

[11] Nikolai E. Khokhlov, *Recht auf Gewissen*, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1959, pp. 260-61. (Published in English as *In the Name of Conscience*, New York, McKay, 1960.)

[12] Pawel Monat with John Dille, *Spy in the U.S.*, New York, Harper & Row, 1961, p. 173.

[13] Keith McEwan, *Once a Jolly Comrade*, Brisbane, The Jacaranda Press, 1966, p. 36.

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forest. Everyone sat on rude benches illumined by candles set in a makeshift candelabra made out of bamboo; at the front of the large shed was a portrait of Stalin, wreathed in flowers. Two violins played softly. The President's speech was brief and devoted to a recollection of Stalin's leadership in helping to defeat the fascist Axis. Then he stood there in the half-light, and walked to the doorway, his frail figure etched against the black night.[14]

Some Observations

So much for some of the published recollections of persons who themselves experienced and observed the impact of Stalin's death within the sphere of world communism, though in widely varying situations. The different reactions to that event, ranging all the way from unbounded joy and prayers of thanks, through hope for improvement and change in the system, uncertainty, confusion, and shock, to deepest grief, show just how diverse were the inner feelings, opinions, and views of people behind the seemingly monolithic unity of world communism.

Of course, the single example studied here—the varying reactions to Stalin's death—does not of itself suffice to justify this conclusion. However, this example is nevertheless a typical one. Analysis of more than a hundred memoirs of former participants in the Communist world movement from twenty countries reveals that there were similarly diverse reactions to other important events, including for example Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the consequent reversal of the general line for all Communist parties, the dissolution of the Comintern in July 1943, the end of the war in 1945, the reestablishment of the Cominform in 1947, and Yugoslavia's break with Stalin's leadership in 1948.

Interestingly enough, this wealth of material bears witness to the fact that only in the rarest instances were the varying reactions related to the nationality of the person concerned. Rather they depended primarily on the function of the particular individual, his duties, his political career, his political philosophy, and the degree of loyalty he felt to the Communist ideology at the time of the event described. Time and again it was found that Communists in the same situation and phase of belief—even if they were of different nationalities and were in different parts of the world when a certain important event occurred—displayed astoundingly similar and sometimes even identical reactions to it. On the other hand, persons of the same nationality in the same country who learned of the same event at the same time often displayed completely different reactions if they were in different situations or functions, or in different circles of the party apparatus.

This is not to underestimate or deny the national element, which has undoubtedly played an important part in the process of differentiation evident in the Communist world since Stalin's death. But there does appear to be some danger in advancing this factor as the only or the predominant one. The differentiation, in this writer's view, is to be traced to trends, tendencies, differencies, and divergencies of opinion long active beneath the surface during the Stalin leadership —tendencies and divergencies which can by no means be ascribed solely to the factor of nationalism.

[14] Joseph R. Starobin, *Eyewitness in Indo-China*, New York, Cameron & Kahn, 1954, pp. 115-16.

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Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW. Washington, DC, 20547.*

Ferment in Czechoslovakia

To the Editors: Prof. Schwartz's examination of interest group theory in Czechoslovakia, as the first of the series "Politics in Flux" (Jan-Feb 1967), is an apt beginning. The last several years of Czechoslovak political development have witnessed an explosion of social and political criticism and proposals for reform unmatched in any other country which calls itself an ally of the Soviet Union. Michal Lakatos' article in *Pravny Obzor* of January 1965, which initiated the public discussion, remains the definitive theoretical critique of one-party misrule, and Mr. Schwartz is justified in treating him as a central figure in the debate. Dr. Lakatos' later articles and book, and the contributions of such CC functionaries as Pavel Auersperg and Zdenek Mlynar, are no more than commentaries or criticisms of this basic contribution.

It is unfortunate, however, that Mr. Schwartz deals neither with the evolution of institutions in Czechoslovakia nor with the forces which have stimulated this development. More than this: by examining the theory largely in isolation from the political reality, he fails to see that the theories of Lakatos and others are a prismatic reflection of that reality, not merely the musing of liberated intellectuals. Programs for political reform in contemporary Czechoslovakia have grown up, in part, as a rationalization of changes which have already taken place and, in part, as proposals for their institutionalization.

Mr. Schwartz correctly states that Czechoslovak reformers espouse concepts which would give institutional reality to conflicting interests because the suppression of conflict and the artificial harmonization of interests lead to the adoption of unrealistic and inefficient policies. But if only this were so, why should they win support, even in limited form, within the Central Committee? Constitutional reform has come to be debated in the CC and secretariat because the authority of the Czechoslovak CP has started to wane.

The classical tools of control through political directive and ideological education have been dulled from contact with competing vested interests. The worker feels threatened by the party campaign against "equal stomachs" and by the loss of job security. The party's economic advisors feel that reform is proceeding too slowly, that the party is bartering reform for working-class support. At the same time, while various economic interests have to be appeased, the political institutions are being scrutinized by political thinkers who see themselves as either selfless democrats or spokesmen for an as yet unsatisfied Slovak nationalism. . . .

As one example of a pressure group, the economic institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences—Ota Sik's domain—has an influence on policy far out of proportion with either its number or ostensible political positon. (Of its members, only Sik sits in the CC.) The State Planning Commission, another lobby group, competes with the institute, each struggling for the acceptance of its articulated economic policies. Both groups boast of partisans in the Presidium: Premier Josef Lenart for the economic institute and Oldrich Cernik for the SPC. Lenart and Cernik have publicly divided on the issues of consumption vs. investment, rapid growth vs. saving, and long-term vs. short-term foreign (Western) investment. The present economic policy, some aspects of which are yet to be decided, bears all the signs of compromise which the leadership has negotiated, not arbitrated.

The danger to the continuity of party policy which, in Communist societies, is always posed by intellectual dissidents is redoubled in the Czechoslovak environment because these artists, writers, and journalists enjoy the protection of their professional unions. The Union of Slovak Journalists, speaking with the voice of a revived Slovak national conscience, echoed the first criticism of former Premier Viliam Siroky in 1963. . . . Leading Communists within the professional artists' unions, who are responsible for the discipline of members, have recently been threatened with expulsion if they did not police their colleagues in the spirit of the party line. The party can no longer trust control of the unions to its leading workers because they cannot or will not act as executors of cultural policy. The editorial policies of such journals as *Literarny noviny and Kulturny zivot*, which are published under the imprimatur of writers' unions, are testimony to this defiance.

To take another example, the party no longer speaks even theoretically of the trade unions as transmission belts of policy to the working class. Nor, realistically speaking, can it any longer. In the face of factory closures and unemployment, created by economic reform, there has been hostile reaction from some trade union organizations. Some component units demanded retraining programs and unemployment insurance. (Such programs were eventually established.) "Work stoppages" have been reported, and some TU representatives have been dismissed for demanding higher wages. Like the intellectuals, but for different reasons, their allegiance to the party line is being tested by other loyalties. . . .

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From the above examples it is plain that competing interests emanate from within the party itself. . . . If, in view of this, it is an oversimplification to speak of a homogeneous party, it becomes all the more true when one examines the interrelationship between the Czech CP and the Slovak CP, for the question of national allegiance has become potentially the most far-reaching in its political implications. . . .

As early as June of 1963 Antonin Novotny condemned *Pravda*, the Slovak CC daily, for publishing on its pages "hysterical" attacks on party policy. In the course of the last four years, the Slovak CP has legitimized its own past, rediscovered the worth of Slovak national history and purged itself of its ultramontane personalities. Revived study of the distinctive features of Slovak development has the net result of legitimizing the national outlook which, in turn, gives substance to demands for an autonomous political existence.

From a dependency of the Czechoslovak CP, the Slovak party has been transformed into a source of countervailing political pressure. . . . On the pages of the Slovak party organs, articles have been published which state that the existing institutional structure does not serve the political or economic interests of Slovakia, and that a more acceptable alternative must be found.

Thus, Slovak Communists have made the liberalization of the CSSR their own cause because emancipation from Prague is the precondition for the solution of the Slovak question. As the Slovak party discovered in 1963, destalinization permitted the Slovak revival, and democratization continues to be the *sine qua non* for the achievement of nationalist objectives.

Amidst these forces, which threaten the continuity of policy, the content of party activity has started to change. The reconciliation of competing interests has been included in the party platform, and the CPCS has visibly modified its decisions in order to accomodate lobbying groups.

Yet, the party, of course, is loath to relinquish its traditional powers. The February 1967 meeting of the Central Committee was devoted exclusively to a discussion of the question of political and ideological unity—in other words, what should be the party's response to interest group pressures. On this point the Presidium divided.

Secretary Jiri Hendrych, who delivered the main report, stated that essentially the party's leading role cannot be altered, that discipline was the first requirement of party activity. Secretary Drahomir Kolder insisted that, in realizing the party line, "maximum use (be made) of independent organizations, institutions, and forces working outside the party."

Kolder's emphasis on the need for a flexible approach represents an admission that the rigidity of direct intervention and control serves only to amplify the disruptive force of group pressures. But this is no more than a recognition of the changes which have been taking place over the past several years. For those like Hendrych who would return to the classical Stalinist model there is little hope because, far from stabilizing the situation, the economic reforms will undoubtedly create more instability.

The leadership is faced with a dilemma. It cannot turn the clock back because much of the party would not tolerate a non-dogmatic line. But neither can it appeal to revisionist opinion because the most influential members of the leadership are too deeply associated with the past to survive a liberal transformation. Therefore, the leadership must use its admittedly considerable political skills to maneuver among competing forces, but in doing so government replaces control.

Stanley Riveles
Radio Free Europe
Munich, Germany

Scholarship or Propaganda?

To the Editors: David Caute's perceptive review of the Drachkovitch volume, *Marxist Ideology in the Contemporary World* (May-June, 1967), faithfully captures the prevalent "diabolical cancer" theme of anti-communism which permeates this collection of essays. Many of us who attended the conference on international communism sponsored by the Hoover Institution in 1965, from which the essays of the Drachkovitch volume were taken, felt at the time that this was less a genuine scholarly convocation than a propaganda display.

The selection of speakers (with a few notable exceptions) was obviously designed not to stimulate academic controversy, but rather to present a "united front" of anti-communism. The fault for this lies not so much with the individual participants, most of whom are (deservedly) well-respected scholars despite their marked tendency, aptly noted by Mr. Caute, to apply a double standard of critical evaluation to communism and capitalism, as it does with the Hoover Institution itself for failing to seek a more balanced presentation of views.

With all due respect to such distinguished scholars as Sir Isaiah Berlin and Professor Daniel Bell, who were perhaps unaware of the intentions of the sponsoring institution, one can only hope that such blatantly unbalanced "scholarly conferences" can be avoided in the future; or, if not avoided, then at least labeled for what they are.

Richard D. Baum
University of California
Berkeley, Calif.

Comment from India

To the Editors: I am one of the people who regularly receive your scholarly magazine, and I really enjoy and appreciate it. Of course the number of articles dealing with India in particular is very limited.

But recently you have given sufficient read-worthy material about India, such as "Peking and the Indian Communist Party," by Hemen Ray (November-December 1966) and "Soviet Theory and Indian Reality," by Stephen Clarkson (January-February 1967).

In fact I wish that every issue should contain at least one article about India.

I wish to draw your particular attention to this: In the article by Mr. Clarkson, all the references are unfortunately given only in Russian. He might have given them only in English—or at least might have provided English translations. . . .

I personally request you to bear this in mind and see that for each and every article the references are given in English also, as many of the readers happen to know only the English language.

K. Taranadh
Gndivada, India

From the Editors: Mr. Taranadh's request for translated references is most reasonable and will be honored whenever space permits.

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